[DARCO ORDER NO. MS/MR-1101-012. January 25, 2011.]
A-9999-03-M-364-00
IN RE: ALLOCATION OF FARMHOLDING SITUATED AT STA. MARIA, UMINGAN, PANGASINAN
AMPARO DE LA CRUZ, complainant, vs. SPOUSES JUANITO and MIERCOLES DE LA CRUZ, respondents-movants.
ORDER
For resolution is the 'Motion for Reconsideration And/Or Reopening Or New Trial Based On Newly Discovered Evidence' dated 10 May 1997 1 filed by respondents-movants Spouses Juanito and Miercoles de la Cruz, 2 seeking reconsideration of this Office's Resolution dated 16 April 1997, 3 the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, Order is hereby issued AFFIRMING the Order dated April 12, 1988 of the Regional Director thus, DISMISSING the instant appeal for lack of merit. The peaceful possession and cultivation of the said landholding by appellee Amparo de la Cruz must be maintained.
SO ORDERED."
Respondents-movants seek the reconsideration of the aforecited Resolution and the conduct of a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence consisting of a deed of sale, Original Certificate of Title 4 No. 53490 registered in the name of Honorio Acosta, and Transfer Certificate of Title 5 No. T-39180 covering an area of 19,235 square meters which was issued on 09 May 1991 in the names of respondents-movants. They claim that these newly-discovered pieces of evidence, which were in existent and unavailable during the investigations conducted from 1987 to 1988, would support their allegation that they are the true owners and actual tillers of the land subject of the case.
Respondents-movants further aver that the award of the property to Amparo de la Cruz is without legal basis because they were not represented by counsel. They pray that a new trial be conducted.
Hence, the issues to be resolved are, as follows:
1. Whether or not there is sufficient basis to grant a new trial based on the alleged newly-discovered evidence; and
2. Whether or not the appellants were denied due process of law.
A careful perusal of the records shows that respondents-movants failed to submit the annexes supposedly attached to their Motion. In a letter dated 28 August 2001, then Assistant Secretary Roel Eric C. Garcia 6 of the Policy, Planning; and Legal Affairs Office requested respondents-movants to submit certified true copies of the said annexes, namely: (a) Annex "A" — Deed of Sale between the respondents-movants and one Mr. Feliciano Isit, (b) Annex "B" — OCT No. 53490, and (c) Annex "C" — TCT No. T-39180. In his letter, ASec. Garcia warned the respondents-movants that the failure to submit said documents within fifteen (15) days from their receipt of the letter would lead to the resolution of the case "based solely on the documents available on record".
Respondents-movants having failed to submit the alleged newly-discovered evidence despite the lapse of more than nine (9) years from the date of the aforesaid letter-request, and there being no indication during that period of any attempt on their part to or otherwise follow-up or inquire on the status of their motion, this Office is constrained to now resolve the case based on the available records to avoid any further delay.
This Office finds that there is no cogent reason to disturb the assailed Resolution. The instant motion must fail.
While captioned (partially) as a 'Motion for Reconsideration', it is actually a motion for new trial under Rule 37, Section 1 of the Rules of Court as it seeks a new trial of the case on the basis of newly-discovered evidence. Thus, the jurisprudence governing motions for new trial applies in the resolution thereof.
The requisites for newly-discovered evidence as a ground for a new trial are: (i) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (ii) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (iii) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment. 7 Furthermore, newly-discovered evidence as a basis of a motion for new trial should be supported by affidavits of the witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be given, or by duly authenticated documents which are proposed to be introduced in evidence. 8 Accordingly, where the evidence was known to the movant and was obtainable at the trial, or if not known, it is not satisfactorily shown why it was not available at the trial, or that due diligence was not employed in securing it, the motion for new trial should be denied. So, also, where the evidence consists merely in improbable or unreasonable testimonies of witnesses, or is merely cumulative or corroborative, and will not thus alter the results, the motion will be denied. 9 Forgotten evidence, not presented during the trial nor formally offered, is not newly found evidence that merits a new trial. 10
In this case, the supposedly newly-discovered evidence consisting of, among others, the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 53490 in the name of Honorio Acosta and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-39180, do not have any material bearing to the resolution of this case. It must be stressed that the only issue in this case is whether or not Amparo de la Cruz is entitled to be maintained in the possession and cultivation of the property as she was allegedly an actual cultivator thereof. Ultimately, the issue involves a question of possession and not of ownership. To resolve a question of possession merely on the basis of ownership is improper. While it is true that the right of ownership includes the right of possession, it is non-sequitur to conclude that the mere ownership of a person over a thing necessarily means that another person unlawfully possesses the same. The law is replete with examples in which a thing is in the lawful possession of one who is not the legal owner thereof, viz: when there is a contract of lease or usufruct between the parties, when the object is under custodia legis of a court of competent jurisdiction pending litigation, etc.
In a Resolution dated January 18, 1988 which resulted from a reinvestigation conducted by an Ad Hoc Committee composed of Messrs. Franklin E. Cocoy, Ernesto Pamoceno, and Wenceslao Saguidec, it was found that Amparo dela Cruz was the lawful tiller and possessor of the subject landholding. Considering such finding, it is clear that the mere ownership in favor of respondents-movants (even if true) does not have the effect of proving that they are entitled to the lawful possession thereof This is because of the finding that, as early as 1988, it was the complainant who was the lawful possessor of the landholding. Thus, the application of Article 529 of the Civil Code is proper, which provides:
Art. 529. It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was acquired, until the contrary is proved.
Considering that the records of the case show that possession appears to have been lawfully acquired, the question of ownership becomes irrelevant, and the purported owner has the burden of proving why a peaceful possessor should be disturbed in such possession and that the thing in question should be delivered to the former. Respondents-movants failed to accomplish this; as such, their claim must necessarily fail.
Moreover, the fact remains that the supposed "newly discovered evidence" being pressed by the respondents-movants were not even attached to their 'Motion for Reconsideration'. From the time they filed their motion on May 13, 1997 up to this date, respondents-movants did not even attempt to offer or submit such their "newly discovered evidence" for consideration by this Office. The rule is that whatever newly-discovered evidence a movant wishes to offer to justify the grant of a new trial must be attached to the motion for new trial; failure to do so merits the outright dismissal thereof.
Indeed, in the case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 11 PLDT prayed for a new trial on the basis of 'Affidavits of Witnesses' and 'Receipts, Releases, and Quitclaims' that, if purportedly admitted, would change the result of the trial. The Supreme Court upheld the denial of PLDT's motion for new trial by the Court of Tax Appeals, as it was shown that not only were the 'Receipts, Releases, and Quitclaims' unauthenticated, the copies of 'Affidavits of Witnesses' were not even attached to the motion for new trial.
In this case, the supposed "newly discovered evidence" were similarly not attached to the motion for new trial. This omission undoubtedly constitutes inexcusable negligence. In the case of Dela Cruz v. Quiazon, 12 where a party blamed the death of her counsel as the reason for the lapse of the reglementary period to file an appeal and invoked said death as a ground for their petition for relief from judgment, the Supreme Court rejected this argument, claiming it was tantamount to inexcusable negligence, as follows:
Had respondent bothered to check the status of the case, she would have discovered her counsel's demise. Parties are not expected to simply sit back and await the outcome of their case. They should be assiduous in keeping track of the status of any litigation to which they are a party. By allowing almost five years to lapse without monitoring the status of her appeal, respondent exhibited a total lack of vigilance tantamount to inexcusable negligence.
Hence, the inexcusable negligence committed by respondent-movants merits the outright dismissal of their Motion for Reconsideration. The dictum of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. A. Soriano Corporation 13 is but proper:
To accept the contrary view of the petitioner would give rise to a dangerous precedent in that there would be no end to a hearing before respondent court because, every time a party is aggrieved by its decision, he can have it set aside by asking to be allowed to present additional evidence without having to comply with the requirements of a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Rule 13, Section 5 of the Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals should not be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation of issued and their resolution. To do so would affect, to a considerable extent, the stability of judicial decisions.
We are left with no recourse but to conclude that this is a simple case of negligence on the part of the petitioner. For this act of negligence, the petitioner cannot be allowed to seek refuge in a liberal application of the Rules. For it should not be forgotten that the first fundamental concern of the rules of procedure is to secure a just determination of every action. In the case at bench, a liberal application of the rules of procedure to suit the petitioner's purpose would clearly pave the way for injustice as it would be rewarding an act of negligence with underserved tolerance.
In addition, respondents-movants' allegation that they were denied due process because they were not represented by counsel does not hold water. Due process does not always require the assistance of a counsel. Thus, in the case of Montemayor vs. Bundalian, 14 the Supreme Court held that:
The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one's side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. 15
In this case, the parties were given the opportunity to be heard in the investigations and proceedings conducted. In fact, they were even the ones who voluntarily sought the interference of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Team of Umingan, Pangasinan to hear their conflicting claims over the subject land. Thus, the claim that due process was not given is patently incorrect.
WHEREFORE, Order is hereby issued DENYING respondents-appellants Juanito and Miercoles de la Cruz 'Motion for Reconsideration And/Or Reopening Or New Trial Based on Newly Discovered Evidence' dated 10 May 1997 for utter lack of merit. The Resolution dated 16 April 1997 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Diliman, Quezon City, January 25, 2011.
(SGD.) VIRGILIO R. DE LOS REYES
Secretary
Footnotes
1. Hereafter, the "Motion."
2. Hereafter, the "Respondents-Movants."
3. Hereafter, the "Assailed Order."
4. Hereafter, "OCT."
5. Hereafter, "TCT."
6. Hereafter, "ASec. Garcia."
7. Amper v. Sandiganbayan, 279 SCRA 434, 441-442 (1997).
8. Philippine Long Distance Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 157264, January 31, 2008 citing RULES OF COURT, Rule 37, §1.
9. People v. Evaristo, 212 Phil. 186 (1965).
10. Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 159490, February 18, 2008.
11. G.R. No. 157264, January 31, 2008.
12. G.R. No. 171961, November 28, 2008, 572 SCRA 681.
13. G.R. No. 113703, January 31, 1997, 267 SCRA 313.
14. 405 SCRA 264 (2003).
15. Id., at 269.