[ADM. CASE NO. A-0304-1222-97. May 18, 2011.]
IN RE: APPLICATION FOR RETENTION OVER A PARCEL OF LAND LOCATED IN STA. ANA, PAMPANGA
JUANITA S. YUMUL, petitioner-appellant.
ORDER
For resolution is a Motion for Reconsideration dated 18 May 2009 filed by petitioner-appellant, through counsel, assailing the Order dated 15 April 2009 issued by this Office, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed Order dated 20 May 1998, issued by the Regional Director of DAR Regional Office III is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED."
Movant reasserts her right of retention and seeks reconsideration on the following grounds, to wit:
1. She has twenty seven (27) hectares of land but three (3) hectares thereof are occupied, for free, by residents of the barangay;
2. Titles had been issued for the subject landholdings, and some farmer-beneficiaries (FBs) had already sold their land to third persons; and
3. She did not collect the amount offered by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) as payment for their lands that were transferred to the FBs.
This Office finds the instant motion bereft of merit.
With respect to the issue of the assailed constitutionality of Department Administrative Order No. 4, Series of 1991, for being seemingly broader than the rules provided for by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 insofar as retention rights are concerned, the Supreme Court has explained that:
It is a general rule that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment. Furthermore, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great weight and respect. 1
DAR A.O. No. 4, Series of 1991 merely supplies the details for the exercise of a landowner's retention rights, as provided by either P.D. No. 27 and/or R.A. No. 6657. More importantly, there is no Supreme Court ruling nor any new legislation that strikes down, supercedes, repeals, or in any way amends the Administrative Order (AO) in question. Therefore, until said AO is struck down or is superseded by a law that cannot be harmonized therewith, it remains to be fully in effect.
Secondly, the "new" claims by the movant-appellant (i.e., that the three (3) hectare portion is occupied for free by residents of the barangay, that she is not deriving income therefrom) are irrelevant to the issue of retention and may not be utilized to acquire a reversal of the Order in question. It is worthy to emphasize that the main criterion as provided in A.O. No. 4 is if the size of the subject landholding exceeds twenty four (24) hectares, and not whether said movant-appellant derives benefit from such, economic or otherwise. The fact that the latter is not deriving income from the three (3) hectare portion of the landholding currently being used as a residential area, and that the titles had already been issued to the FBs, are of no legal significance, and will, in no way, sway this Office in reversing the Order in question. That the movant-appellant owns twenty seven (27) hectares of land has been, in fact, affirmed and verified by the movant-appellant herself in her pleadings.
Moreover, the movant's argument that she did not collect the amount offered by LBP will not affect the validity of the previous Orders awarding the landholdings in question to the FBs. It is baffling why the movant-appellant continues to rely on the "Kasunduan" executed on 19 April 1996 with the FBs, where they agreed that in exchange for the free use of the land, they will not apply for ownership under the CARP. It must be noted, however, that this "Kasunduan" had been subsequently adjudged as contrary to law and as a blatant means resorted to by the movant to circumvent the intent of the law. We cannot, therefore, reverse a lawful Order to ease up the unintended consequence of movant's unlawful means. Had she followed what is mandated by law and accepted the offer of the Land Bank of the Philippines, and ceased in her reliance on the unlawful "Kasunduan", she would not be impoverished as she presently claims.
A thorough evaluation and scrutiny of the Motion for Reconsideration will readily show that the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof had been exhaustively discussed and considered by this Office in its questioned Order. Since no new matter or issue was raised other than those already passed upon and resolved in the Order sought to be reconsidered, no further disquisition would appear necessary. Petitioner — Appellant must be reminded that a Motion for Reconsideration, which does not make out a new matter sufficiently persuasive to induce modification of judgment, will be denied. 2
Accordingly, this Office stands by its factual findings and conclusions and finds no reason to disturb the same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. Thus, the assailed Order dated 15 April 2009 issued by this Office is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, insofar as this Office is concerned, this case is considered CLOSED.
SO ORDERED.
Diliman, Quezon City, May 18, 2011.
(SGD.) VIRGILIO R. DE LOS REYES
Secretary
Footnotes
1. The Heirs of Aurelio Reyes vs. The Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 605 SCRA 294 (2009).
2. See PCI Bank v. Escolin, 67 SCRA 202 (1975).