[ADM. CASE NO. A-9999-05-EXE-101-08. June 8, 2011.]
IN RE: APPLICATION FOR LAND EXEMPTION WITH RETENTION OF CERTAIN PROPERTIES LOCATED IN CALPI, PILAR, SORSOGON AND CAGRARAY, BARACAY, ALBAY FROM THE COVERAGE OF RA 6657
HEIRS OF SOLEDAD FAJARDO VDA. DE SALAZAR, represented by the HEIRS OF JESUS F. SALAZAR, JR., AURORA S. BIESHUVEL, PEDRO F. SALAZAR, AND JOSE F. SALAZAR, appellants-movants.
ORDER
For resolution before this Office is a Partial Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated 28 July 2010 filed by the heirs of Soledad Fajardo Vda. de Salazar (hereafter "heirs of Soledad"), through their representative, Pedro Salazar, seeking partial reconsideration of the Order 2 dated 17 June 2010 issued by this Office, the dispositive portion of which is hereunder quoted, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is partially GRANTED. The Order dated 21 August 1995 denying the exemption/exclusion of the lands located in Calpi, Pilar, Sorsogon is AFFIRMED.
The Order dated 18 December 1998 denying the exemption/exclusion of the lands located in Cagraray, Bacacay, Albay is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and a new Order is issued DECLARING Lot Nos. 91, 94, 64, 121, 51, 127, 123, 125, 146, and 149 with an aggregate area of 16.8265 hectares land in Cagraray, Bacacay, Albay EXEMPTED/EXCLUDED from the coverage of CARP being mineralized lands. Lot No. 6105 covering an area of 4.3490 hectares is DECLARED part of the retention area of the petitioner-appellants.
The Order dated 25 July 2008 is SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
In the present motion, the heirs of Soledad are seeking the reconsideration of the denial of their application for exemption/exclusion of the land covered by TCT No. T-3991 located in Calpi, Pilar, Sorsogon, on the ground that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon had already exercised jurisdiction over the same property. To support such claim, the heirs of Soledad submitted the following documents: (1) certified photocopy of the Decision 3 dated 06 April 2001 of Branch 51, RTC of Sorsogon docketed as Civil Case No. 97-6333 for Injunction with Damages decided in favor of the heirs of Soledad against Maoy Ludovice, et al., (2) Certificate of Finality dated 25 June 2008; 4 (3) Writ of Execution 5 dated 03 July 2008; and (3) Delivery of Possession 6 dated 23 August 2010.
Essentially, the heirs of Soledad allege that the prior exercise of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject landholding has the effect of res judicata, thereby divesting this Office of its jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue regarding the coverage of the subject property under the CARP.
After a thorough evaluation and analysis of the issues and arguments raised, this Office finds the partial motion for reconsideration bereft of merit.
DAR has primary jurisdiction over
cases involving the implementation
of agrarian reform
It is well-settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. 7 Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 vests the DAR with primary jurisdiction on agrarian reform matters and clothes it with quasi-judicial powers as follows:
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case. . . . (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
This is reiterated in the recent case of Alingan Realty and Development Corporation vs. Office of the President, 8 where the Supreme Court ruled in this wise:
"The exclusive jurisdiction to classify and identify landholdings for coverage under the CARP is reposed in the DAR secretary. The matter of CARP coverage, like the instant case for application for exemption, is strictly part of the administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter well within the competence of the DAR Secretary. As we explained in Leonardo, et al. vs. Court of Appeals (Ninth Division), et al.: 9
The power to determine whether a property is subject to CARP coverage lies with the DAR Secretary pursuant to Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657. Verily, it is explicitly provided under Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB Revised Rules that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP and other agrarian laws and regulations, shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR." (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, it is this Office which has jurisdiction to determine whether or not a landholding should be covered or exempt from the coverage of CARP.
Res judicata does not bar the DAR to
exercise its jurisdiction over agrarian
reform matters
Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. 10 The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment, on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. 11
For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. 12
The principle of res judicata lays down two main rules, namely: (1) the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties and their privies and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two suits are the same. 13 The first general rule is referred to as "bar by former judgment," while the second general rule is known as "conclusiveness of judgment." 14
Based on the foregoing standards, this Office finds that the present case is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
It should be noted that while the decision rendered by the RTC in Civil Case No. 97-6333 for Injunction with Damages (enjoining the defendants therein from intruding and entering the property of the heirs of Soledad located in Calpi, Pilar, Sorsogon on the ground that such defendants are not tenants of the said property) has indeed become executory as evidenced by the Writ of Execution and Certificate of Finality, the finality thereof was only insofar as Civil Case No. 97-6333 was concerned. The RTC had no jurisdiction to decide on the propriety of CARP coverage or to entertain questions regarding the coverage of the subject property under agrarian reform laws, as the primary and exclusive jurisdiction over such cases is vested with the DAR. Clearly, bar by former judgment is inapplicable in the present case.
Conclusiveness of judgment is likewise not applicable in the present case. As held in the case of Spouses Antonio v. Sayman Vda. de Monje, 15 a previous judgment operates as a bar to a subsequent one when it had "touched on [a] matter already decided," or if the parties are in effect "litigating for the same thing." It must be emphasized that what was ruled upon by the RTC in Civil Case No. 97-6333 was the unlawful entry by certain persons into the property owned by the heirs of Soledad. This has absolutely no bearing on the issue of coverage of the same property under CARP. In addition, a reading of the said RTC decision would show that there were neither discussions nor disposition of the issues raised in the present case. Otherwise stated, the issue raised in the present case, i.e., whether or not the landholding is agricultural in nature and is not part of the landowner's retention area, has not been discussed nor passed upon by the RTC in resolving Civil Case No. 97-6333.
There being no concurrence of the elements of res judicata, it is clear that this Office is not divested of the jurisdiction to determine whether the subject landholdings should be covered or exempt from CARP coverage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Partial Motion for Reconsideration, relative to the affirmation of the denial of the exemption/exclusion of the lands located in Calpi, Pilar, Sorsogon is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Order dated 17 June 2010 issued by this Office is hereby MAINTAINED. The portion of said Order pertaining to the exemption/exclusion from CARP coverage of Lot Nos. 91, 94, 64, 121, 51, 127, 123, 125, 146, and 149, with an aggregate area of 16.8265 hectares, located in Cagraray, Bacacay, Albay, for being mineralized lands, as well as the declaration of Lot No. 6105 also situated in Cagraray, Bacacay, Albay, covering an area of 4.3490 hectares, as part of the retention area of the heirs of Soledad, not having been questioned in this motion, is hereby declared FINAL and considered CLOSED.
SO ORDERED.
Diliman, Quezon City, June 8, 2011.
(SGD.) VIRGILIO R. DE LOS REYES
Secretary
Footnotes
1. Rollo, p. 647.
2. Rollo, pp. 628-637.
3. Rollo, pp. 648-651.
4. Rollo, p. 652.
5. Rollo, p. 656.
6. Rollo, p. 655.
7. Dao-ayan v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, G.R. No. 172109, 29 August 2007, 531 SCRA 620.
8. G.R. No. 180471, 26 March 2010.
9. G.R. No. 170182, 18 June 2009.
10. Lanuza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131394, 28 March 2005 citing Manila Electric Company v. Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc., 425 Phil. 65, 78 (2002).
11. Id. citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 558, 564 (2000).
12. Spouses Tumbokon v. Legaspi, et al., G.R. No. 153736, 12 August 2010, citing Custodio v. Corrado, G.R. No. 146082, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 500; Suarez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83251, January 23, 1991; 193 SCRA 183; and Filipinas Investment and Finance Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66059-60, December 4, 1989 (July 30, 2004).
13. Spouses Noceda v. Arbizo-Directo, G.R. No. 178495, 26 July 2010.
14. Id., citing Alamayri v. Pabale, G.R. No. 151243, 30 April 2008, 553 SCRA 146.
15. G.R. No. 149624, 29 September 2010.