January 22, 1999
DAR OPINION NO. 03-99
MEMORANDUM
FOR : CONRADO S. NAVARRO
Undersecretary
Field Operations and Support Services Office
SUBJECT : Request for a Legal Opinion (Saulog Estate, Rizal, Mindoro Occidental)
As culled from your Memorandum dated 11 January 1999 together with the documents later appended thereto, the property subject of the controversy has an aggregate area of 97.8906 hectares, more or less, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-160 and T-879, respectively, registered in the name of Nieves Vda. de Saulog and situated at Adela, Rizal, Occidental Mindoro; that on 29 November 1984, an "Agreement to Sell" was entered into by and between the plaintiff and the defendants as an alternative direct payment option in the implementation of P.D. No. 27; that in said agreement, plaintiff retains ownership and will not pass to the defendants until full payment of the purchase price and other obligations; that upon full payment of the balance, the plaintiff will execute a "Deed of Transfer" or "Direct Sale" in favor of the farmers pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27; that it was stipulated therein that a party who is in default shall be guilty of breach of contract; that since 1984 defendants continuously failed to pay their obligations to the plaintiff prompting her to institute on 11 August 1986 a complaint for the rescission of contracts with damages before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; that on 14 July 1988, Judge Restituto L. Aguilar of RTC San Jose, Occidental Mindoro rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff; that defendants thereafter appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review; and that after reviewing all the records transmitted to it from the RTC, said appellate court (15th division) rendered a decision on 8 June 1990 arming the decision of the RTC which became final and executory on 17 September 1990.
It is a time-honored rule in our jurisprudence that every litigation must come to an end at some other future time after the issues raised therein have been thoroughly resolved. Judgment is the final consideration and determination by the court of the rights of the parties as those rights presently exists, upon matters submitted to it in action and proceedings. It is the law's word on a judicial controversy. Corollarily, where a final judgment of an executory character had been rendered in a suit, the mission of the court is limited to the execution and enforcement of the said final judgment in all of its part and in accordance with its express orders.
Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the rights of the plaintiff renders the matter finally closed after the aggrieved parties have failed to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court on time for proper review. While the State is mandated to be extra-solicitous of the welfare of the poor, social justice or any justice for that matter is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law (Gelos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86186, May 8, 1992).
From the foregoing, we regret to inform you that in view of the finality of the subject Court of Appeals decision on 17 September 1990 and the considerable period of time that had already transpired from said date, the DAR has to abide by the aforesaid decision in recognition of the court's authority. In the judicial and quasi-judicial hierarchy of authority, administrative agencies like the DAR are subordinate to the Court of Appeals of which the former are bound by the dispositions or decisions of the latter.
However, the decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the judgment for the rescission of contract with damages rendered by the Regional Trial Court does not ipso facto spare the subject property from CARP coverage. Otherwise stated, the property of Nieves Vda. de Saulog is not necessarily exempt from CARP coverage by reason of such decision. Thus, the same can still be placed under CARP coverage subject to the retention right of the landowner and award to her children or heirs, if qualified, pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657.
Please be guided accordingly.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) DANILO T. LARA
Undersecretary for Legal Affairs, and Policy and Planning
Copy furnished:
The Regional Director
DAR, Region IV
Capitol Compound
Pasig City
The PARO
DAR, Region IV
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro
The MARO
DAR, Region IV
Rizal, Occidental Mindoro