SPECIAL FIFTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. No. SP-06452-R. June 30, 1977.]
ALFREDO SAMSON, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAYMUNDA VDA. DE ALFONSO, et al., defendants-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
GUTIERREZ, H. E., J p:
In the Complaint filed on June 24, 1974, Alfredo Samson alleged that he is the successor tenant-farmer of the land owned by the defendants-appellants. He claimed that in spite of his being tenant-farmer, he has been deprived of his rights over the land, prohibited from entering the premises, and prevented from cultivating and performing other acts of a tenant-farmer. He asked the Court below to restrain the defendants from disturbing and molesting his possession of the premises and prohibiting his entry into the land.
Because of these allegations, this Court was initially confronted by the issue of whether or not Sections 2 and 3 of PD No. 1038 dated October 21, 1976 should apply. Sections 2 and 3 read: ASTcaE
"SEC. 2. No judge of the courts of agrarian relations, courts of first instance, city or municipal courts, or any other tribunal or fiscal shall take cognizance of any ejectment case or any other case designed to harass or remove a tenant of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and/or corn, unless certified by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform as a proper case for trial or hearing by a court or judge or other officer of competent jurisdiction and, if any such case is filed, the case shall first be referred to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative in the locality for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties. If the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative in the locality finds that the case is a proper case for the court or judge or other hearing officer to hear, he shall so certify and such court, judge or other hearing officer may assume jurisdiction over the dispute or controversy.
The preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, is not binding upon the court, judge or hearing officer to whom the case is certified as a proper case for trial. Said court, judge or hearing officer may, after due hearing, confirm, reverse or modify said preliminary determination as the evidence and substantial merits of the case may warrant.
SEC. 3. All cases still pending before any court, fiscal or other investigating body which are not yet submitted for decision or resolution shall likewise be referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform for certification as provided in the preceding section."
After deliberation on this preliminary issue, the Special Fifth Division found it necessary to have a special division of five constituted to rule on the matter. The special division of five decided that referral to the Department of Agrarian Reform pursuant to the provisions of PD 1038 is not warranted. In line with the stand of this Court in CA-G.R. No. SP-02667-R, Corcolon vs. Bautista, reiterated on several occasions, the required referral applies to the trial courts, fiscals and other investigating bodies, but not to the appellate courts and more specifically the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the decree refers to ejectment proceedings filed by the landowners designed to harass or remove a tenant of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn. While Section 1 of PD 1038 secures the tenants or tenants-tillers in private agricultural lands devoted to crops other than rice or corn, such as, abaca, banana, coconut, mangoes, durian and other permanent trees, it is significant that the referral under Section 2 specifies agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn only. The term "any court" in Section 3, PD 1038 is, therefore, construed in relation to and limited by the other more specific provisions of the decree, and we find that it is not applicable to the facts of the case. This Court, therefore, decided to rule on the appeal.
The parcel of land which is the subject of this action for injunction and redemption is located at Lumbac, Pulilan, Bulacan and is described as follows:
"1. The landholding in question is rectangular in shape, having an area of six thousand eight hundred ninety three (6,893) sq. meters, more or less, bounded on the North, by the landholding formerly owned by Victor Barcelona; on the South, by the landholding owned by Mr. Graciano Parale and Clemente Torres; on the West, by the landholding owned by defendant Virgilio Dionisio and on the East, by Calderon Street.
2. On its Northern, Southern and Eastern boundaries, the landholding in question is entirely fenced in by adobe stones .61 m. (2 ft.) in height, with hog wires at a height of .91 m. (3 ft.) placed above the adobe stones and supported by concrete posts at a distance of every four (4) meters. No fence of any kind separates the Western boundary of the landholding in question which incidentally, adjoins the landholding also owned by defendant Virgilio Dionisio.
3. No permanent improvements, such as houses, huts or shelters are erected inside the landholding in question. The landholding, in general, is devoted to bamboos which practically cover the landholding in question, except on its northern portion where four (4) rows of banana plants numbering fifty three (53) in all are seen growing. There are seventy (70) bamboo grove found in the landholding and each grove has, in the average, ten to fifteen bamboo plants.
4. Aside from the bamboos and banana plants found inside the landholding in question, the following were also observed to be present inside the landholding, namely, ten (10) santol trees, six (6) mango trees, two (2) Antipolo trees, and one (1) caimito tree, one (1) tamarind tree, one (1) guava tree, one (1) pomelo tree, one (1) papaya plant and one (1) palmera plant.
5. The house of the plaintiff is around fifty (50) meters away from the nearest portion (North-West corner) of the landholding in question and is erected on the lot owned by the plaintiff himself with an area of around one thousand (1,000) sq. meters, more or less.
Another house observed during the ocular inspection erected near the landholding in question is the house of Mr. Jose Cajingal, caretaker, of defendant Virgilio Dionisio. This house of Mr. Cajingal is twenty (20) meters away from the nearest portion of the landholding in question and it is erected on the lot owned by defendant Virgilio Dionisio. (Report of Ocular Inspection, dated January 31, 1975, submitted by the Deputy Clerk of Court)." (pp. 15-16, CAR Decision dated January 6, 1977)
The above parcel of land was originally owned by Emiliano Alfonso and Irene Calderon, now deceased; who were succeeded by their son Aniceto Alfonso, also deceased and who, in turn, was succeeded by his widow, defendant Raymunda Aguirre Vda de Alfonso. Sometime in February 1974, defendant Raymunda Aguirre Vda. de Alfonso sold the above parcel of land to defendant Virgilio V. Dionisio for the amount of P20,000.00.
In his Complaint dated June 24, 1974 and amended on July 18, 1974, Alfredo Samson alleged that his father, the late Balbino Samson, was the tenant-farmer of Aniceto Alfonso over the parcel of land; that on May 28, 1964, the Court of Agrarian Relations in the case of Balbino Samson versus Aniceto Alfonso declared that Balbino Samson was dispossessed without lawful cause and prior authority of the Court of Agrarian Relations for which he should be reinstated and paid damages; that Balbino Samson was succeeded as tenant-farmer by his only son, plaintiff Alfredo Samson; and that the plaintiff, while in actual and physical possession of the property in question was prohibited from entering the premises by the defendants who put up a fence and deprived the plaintiff of his right to the land. The plaintiff, therefore, sought an order from the Court to restrain the defendants from disturbing or molesting him in his possession, from prohibiting him to enter the premises and from changing or destroying the improvements he has put up in the property in litigation. He also asked that he be respected in his possession as tenant-farmer, that the transfer of the property to defendant Virgilio V. Dionisio be annulled and that he be given actual and moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees.
The defense of the spouses Virgilio Dionisio and Aurora M. Dionisio is centered around the following arguments which they summarized in their memorandum:
"1. That plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendants;
2. That the judgment in CAR No. 677-Bul. '72 (this should be CAR No. 677-Bul. '62) upon which plaintiff premised his cause of action had already prescribed;
3. That plaintiff's predecessor had waived the benefits and legal effects of the judgment in CAR Case No. 677-Bul. '72 (sic) through abandonment and/or continued neglect to enforce the decision until his death;
4. That the alleged tenant relationship between Aniceto Alfonso and the predecessor of plaintiff was extinguished upon the latter's death and, when said predecessor of the plaintiff, due to sickness and old age, abandoned his right as tenant for the long period of ten years since the promulgation of the decision in CAR Case No. 677-Bul. '72 (sic);
5. That this Honorable Court had no jurisdiction over the complaint as the subject matter is not agricultural land and that the same is not tenanted by the plaintiff;
6. That there exist no agrarian relationship between the parties and, for that reason, this Honorable Court had no jurisdiction over the case;
7. That plaintiff is not a farmer by occupation and, therefore, cannot invoke the benefits enjoyed by tenants under existing agrarian laws;
8. That plaintiff himself is a landholder and, consequently, cannot invoke Presidential Decree No. 27 in his favor; ASTcaE
9. That insofar as herein answering defendant is concerned, he is a purchaser for value and in good faith without knowledge of any existing agreement between plaintiff or his predecessor on the one hand and defendant Raymunda Aguirre Alfonso or her husband Aniceto Alfonso on the other hand;
10. That plaintiff who is neither a share tenant nor an agricultural lessee could not validly exercise the right or redemption under Section 12 of Republic Act 3844."
On January 6, 1977, the lower Court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"1. Declaring the plaintiff to be the share-tenant of defendants Virgilio V. Dionisio and Aurora M. Dionisio on the landholding in question located at Bo. Lumbac, Pulilan, Bulacan;
2. Ordering the defendants Virgilio V. Dionisio and Aurora M. Dionisio to reinstate the plaintiff on the landholding in question as share-tenant thereon with all the rights accorded and obligations imposed by law;
3. Declaring the plaintiff to have validly exercised the right of redemption of the landholding in question with all the improvements existing thereon from defendant Virgilio V. Dionisio and Aurora M. Dionisio at its fair and reasonable value of P15,824.50;
4. Ordering defendants Virgilio V. Dionisio and Aurora M. Dionisio to execute the corresponding Deed of Conveyance of the landholding in question and the improvements thereon in favor of the plaintiff within a period of 30 days from the date of payment by the plaintiff of the redemption price in the total amount of P15,824.50;
5. Considering the amount of P5,000.00 consigned by the plaintiff with this Court now deposited in the office of the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan under Official Receipt 7496246 S dated April 29, 1975 as partial payment of the said redemption price and granting the plaintiff a period of 90 days from finality of this decision within which to pay defendants Virgilio V. Dionisio and Aurora M. Dionisio the remaining balance of the redemption price in the amount of P10,824.50;
6. In the event the plaintiff shall fail to pay the full redemption price of the landholding in question within the period herein-above granted to him, he shall be deemed to have forfeited his right of redemption, but shall continue as agricultural share tenant of defendants Virgilio V. Dionisio and Aurora M. Dionisio on the said landholding;
7. Dismissing the complaint as against defendant Raymunda A. Vda. de Alfonso; and
8. Dismissing the other claims of the plaintiff and counterclaims of the defendants.
No pronouncement as to costs." (pp. 548-549, Decision of the lower court dated Jan. 6, 1977).
The issues resolved by the lower Court in its decision were:
"1. Whether or not the plaintiff is the agricultural tenant on the landholding in question;
2. Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to reinstatement to said landholding and recover damages from the defendants; and
3. Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to exercise the right of redemption over the said landholding under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 3844."
These issues are basically the same ones which are now before us on appeal.
There is also a motion for immediate execution filed by the counsel for the plaintiffs and granted by the lower court on January 31, 1977. The memorandum of the plaintiff-appellee asserts that in this appeal from a decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, the only issue is whether or not the finding of fact in said decision are supported by substantial evidence as basis thereof, and the conclusions stated therein are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence. In consonance with this proposition, we have examined the first and principal finding of fact — whether or not the plaintiff is the agricultural tenant on the landholding in question. We find that this finding is not supported by substantial evidence and that the lower Court erred in its basic premises which colored its entire findings on the first issue.
The lower Court accepted as an undisputed fact that Balbino Samson, father of the plaintiff, was, during his lifetime, the share tenant on the landholding in question. This was among the principal facts which were disputed in the court below and which continues to be disputed on appeal. There is no question that up to the rendition of judgment in CAR Case No. 677-Bulacan '62 on May 28, 1964, Balbino Samson was the legitimate share tenant on the land of Alfonso Aniceto. However, the evidence shows that as of 1964 and in fact as early as 1962, and in spite of his being the legitimate share tenant, Balbino Samson was not on the land itself. The judgment of the Court dated May 28, 1964 is evidence that Balbino Samson still had to be reinstated to the land. There is no satisfactory evidence to show that he was indeed reinstated or that he took positive steps to have the judgment actually implemented. On the contrary, the evidence is clear that several months before his death, he was no longer in Pulilan but was in Manila because of his illness. The lower Court erred in thinking that because its own records indicate a judgment declaring Balbino Samson as share tenant, he worked as a share tenant from the time of the judgment in 1964 up to the time of his death in 1972 and, therefore, that his son was also such a tenant. As regards this factual issue, the evidence of the plaintiffs and that of the defendants are not only directly antagonistic to one another but cannot be used as the bases of a categorical statement that "it is undisputed that the late Balbino Samson, father of the plaintiff herein, who died on December 18, 1972 was during his lifetime, the share tenant on the landholding in question." At any rate, this error of the lower Court is significant not because a contrary finding would necessarily result in a reversal of the judgment but because this finding or premise of the Court led it to disregard the evidence on the real and material issue being litigated — namely the status of the plaintiff insofar as the disputed landholding is concerned.
The central question upon which the resolution of all the issues raised on appeal depends is whether or not plaintiff Alfredo Samson is the tenant-farmer on the disputed property. The plaintiff-appellee relies on Section 9, Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, which reads:
"SEC. 9. Severance of Relations. — The tenancy relationship is extinguished by the voluntary surrender of abandonment of the land by, or the death or incapacity of the tenant; Provided, That in case of the Tenant's death or incapacity, the tenancy relationship shall continue between the landholder and one member of the tenant's immediate farm household who is related to the tenant within the second degree by consanguinity and who shall cultivate the land himself personally unless the landholder shall cultivate the land himself personally through the employment of mechanical farm implements, in accordance with section fifty hereof. Should the deceased or incapacitated tenant have two or more members of his immediate farm household qualified to succeed him, the landholder shall have the right to choose from among them who should succeed. The expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by the parties, or the sale, alienation or transfer of legal possession of the land does not of itself extinguish the relationship. In the latter case, purchaser or transferee shall assume the rights and obligations of the former landholder in relation to the tenant. In case of death of the landholder, his heir or heirs shall likewise assume his rights and obligations. (R.A. No. 2263).
On the basis of the provision on "Severance of Relations", it is apparent that Alfredo Samson could not continue whatever tenancy relationship existed between his late father and the landholder. "Immediate farm household", according to Republic Act No. 1199, includes ". . . the members of the family of the tenant, and such other person or persons whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him operate the farm enterprise," and this description includes the son-in-law and grandsons of the tenant. It is true that the law does not require that these members of the tenant's family be dependent on him for support, such qualification being applicable only to "such other person or persons, whether related to the tenant or not." (Pangilinan et al. vs. Alvendia, 101 Phil. 794) Nonetheless, even a liberal interpretation of the law cannot include as a member of an "immediate farm household" one who does not even live in the municipality or province but in Manila, an adult son with his own family and working in the government as a junior executive and career government official or even a retiree.
The plaintiff-appellee also cites Section 9 of Republic Act No. 3844, which reads:
"SEC. 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relations Not Extinguished by death or Incapacity of the Parties. — In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the leasehold shall continue between the agricultural lessor and the person who can cultivate the landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor within one month from such death or permanent incapacity, from among the following: (a) the surviving spouse; (b) the eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; or (c) the next eldest descendant or descendants in the order of their ages; Provided, That in case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee occurs during the agricultural year, such choice shall be exercised at the end of that agricultural year; Provided, further, That in the event the agricultural lessor provided, the priority shall be in accordance with the order herein established. (R.A. No. 3844)."
It appears from the foregoing provision that the tenant who succeeds to the leasehold relationship of the deceased must be a person who can cultivate the landholding personally. In other words, the successor must be a bonafide farmer at the time he succeeds to the relationship.
The Code of Agrarian Reforms, the Presidential Decree mandating the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and the many other pieces of vital legislation aimed at correcting the centuries-old inequities of the Philippine Land tenure system all refer to and are intended for bona-fide tenant-farmers. It is a fundamental requisite that the beneficiary who invokes these laws against the landowner must first be a genuine tenant and farmer. A person who is not himself a farmer but who is a professional, a civil service career worker, a businessman, a landed gentleman, or one who earns a living at an occupation or calling other than that of farmer cannot chameleon-like convert himself in an instant, upon the death of the original tenant, into a farmer and claim the benefits of the law against the legitimate landholder or against another tenant, assuming there is another tenant involved. The Code of Agrarian Reforms was motivated by the noblest of purposes. It cannot and should not be used as a tool of opportunism by anyone who sees a possibility to buy land at very low prices really intended lay the law for poor and oppressed bona-fide tenants nor as an instrument of oppression and discrimination against property owners who refuse to bow down to demands or strained interpretations not contemplated by the law. ASTcaE
Under Republic Act 1199, a tenancy relationship is the juridical tie between a landlord and a tenant who agree to undertake jointly the cultivation of land belonging to the former. It is implicit in the law that the tenant cultivates the land personally. Furthermore, he must do all the work necessary in accordance with proven farming practices. The Code of Agrarian Relations is similarly unequivocal. It refers to those who live and work on the land as tillers. Its beneficiaries are the bona-fide tenants who have carried on their shoulders for such a long time the burdens of a feudalistic and archaic landlord-tenant system. For them it aims to achieve a dignified existence by converting them into small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices, independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, sources of genuine strength in a truly democratic society.
The error of the lower Court lies in assuming that the son of a farmer is also a farmer and that the son of a tenant is necessarily also a tenant. Status has to be proved especially where it is disputed. The various agrarian reform laws and decrees envision the eventual transformation of the average Filipino farmer from a tenant into an independent small farmer. However, land reform is not the only way whereby tenants may be emancipated from the bondage of the soil. Through education, industry, perseverance, and enterprise many tenants and children of tenants have become professionals, public officers, labor leaders, military officers, industrialists, entrepreneurs, merchants, and independent farmers, among many other means of earning a livelihood.
The evidence indicates that the plaintiff was such a praiseworthy individual. Long before the beginnings of this case were stirred into life, plaintiff Alfredo Samson had ceased to belong to the class of tenant-farmers. He is an LL.B. degree holder and was the assistant librarian of the Senate in the defunct Congress of the Philippines. Far from being the tenant-farmer for whom agrarian reform laws were intended, the plaintiff was, therefore, a white-collar worker, a civil servant occupying a responsible position in the Senate of the Philippines, and one, who if he only persevered in the bar examinations, would now be a lawyer. Other evidences in the record negate his entitlement to the benefits of Section 9, Republic Act No. 3844. A tenant-farmer must not only be a bona-fide farmer but should actually live on the land or so near the land as to be able to personally cultivate and take care of the farm, report or take action against trespassers, take care of farm animals and implements, and otherwise avoid any signs of abandonment or neglect of the farm he is working on. (Section 26, Rep, Act Tao. 3844)
The evidence indicates that Alfredo Samson resides, not in Pulilan, Bulacan but in Sampaloc, Manila. His family is in Manila. He lived in Manila during his years as a public servant and the evidence indicates he still lives there despite his allegations of having returned to and now living in Pulilan, Bulacan. He has not registered with the barangay of Lumbac, Pulilan. The Sheriff of the Agrarian Court could not serve processes upon him at Lumbac because the barrio people informed him that the plaintiff lived in Manila. The defendant's witnesses positively alleged that they never saw him cultivate the property. The plaintiff himself admitted that he was not a farmer until 1972 when his father died. His own testimony indicates he is more of a gardener than a farmer. He has no work animals and none of the usual farm implements identified with farmers. He states that he used a hoe on the disputed land and planted pechay. The plaintiff's allegations on his having planted corn are doubtful for, as pointed out by the defendant, the corn allegedly planned by the plaintiff after Christmas of 1972, grew and matured in only two months time and was harvested February, 1973.
The plaintiff is himself a landowner. He owns a 1,000 square meter piece of land adjacent to the disputed lot according to his own "undisputed facts" in his memorandum. There is evidence that he tried to sell this adjacent lot to defendant Virgilio Dionisio. The description of the disputed lot is also material in determining the issues in controversy. The Commissioner's report shows that the lot is completely fenced with adobe stones and hog wire up to a height of about five feet. There is no house, hut, or shelter on the lot. The lot has bamboo groves, 53 banana plants, 10 santol trees, six mango trees, two Antipolo trees, one caimito tree, one tamarind tree, one pomelo tree, one guava tree, one papaya tree, and one palmera plant. Considering all the evidence on the record, we are convinced that the plaintiff is litigating to acquire the disputed lot adjacent to his own lot, not for the reasons behind the enactment of the Agricultural Land Reform Code and not for the preservation of his rights as a bonafide tenant farmer but because he sees the lot as a good purchase.
Inasmuch as the evidence shows that plaintiff Alfredo Samson is not a bonafide farmer, tenants or agricultural lessee, he cannot have any rights to exercise under Republic Act 3844.
On the basis of this finding, we find it unnecessary to rule on the other issues raised in this appeal.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. If Paragraph 4 of the dispositive portion of the Decision, referring to a Deed of Conveyance, appealed from has been executed, the plaintiff-appellee is directed to reconvey the property to the defendants-appellants. The complaint is dismissed with costs against the plaintiff-appellee.
SO ORDERED.
Serrano and Agcaoili, JJ ., concur.