FORMER EIGHTH DIVISION

[CA-G.R. No. SP-05989.  February 24, 1977.]

JUANITO VIERNES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. RODRIGO REYES, defendant-appellee.

D E C I S I O N

BUSRAN, J p:

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Fourth Regional District, Branch III at San Jose City in CAR Case No. 1526 for fixing of leasehold rental with damages.   HAaDTI

In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he has been an agricultural lessee of a riceland owned and/or legally possessed by the defendant with an area of three (3) hectares, more or less, located in San Roque, Lupao, Nueva Ecija; that his gross harvests from the land for the years 1967 up to 1970 are 108 cavans, 96 cavans and 100 cavans, respectively; and that the locality where the land is situated has been proclaimed a land reform area, but the defendant has refused to agree to the leasehold rental provided by law; and prayed for judgment fixing the legal rental for the land and ordering the defendant to pay him actual damages (Original Record, pp. 1-2).

In his answer, the defendant denied the material allegations of the complaint and averred that the plaintiff was only his hired farm laborer; that he (defendant) is the one actually in possession and cultivation of the land; that the court has no jurisdiction over the case; that the alleged gross harvests from the land are not true; and that the action is baseless and was filed to harass him, as a consequence of which he suffered damages; and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, damages and attorney's fees (Original Records, pp. 9-11).   ACETIa

On July 16, 1974, upon the plaintiff's motion, the court issued an order restraining the defendant from working the land until further orders, and allowing the plaintiff to transplant his seedlings (Original Record, p. 30). The defendant then filed a motion to reconsider the said order (Ibid., pp. 34-35). After an ocular inspection of the land conducted on August 29, 1974, the court set aside its order of July 16, 1974, allowed the defendant to continue cultivating the land and directed the plaintiff not to molest and/or disturb the defendant's peaceful possession and cultivation of the land until further orders (Ibid., pp. 56-60). On September 24, 1974, the case was heard on pre-trial, and the parties stipulated as follows:

"xxx                      xxx                      xxx

"The parties admitted the following facts, to wit:

"1.     That the plaintiff was the former overseer of the defendant over his farmland who acquired the subject landholding from one Elias Valerosa consisting of an area of 100 hectares, more or less;

"2.     That plaintiff admitted that he is an owner of a certain riceland situated along a road at San Roque, Lupao, Nueva Ecija, but the landholding in question is far from the said road;

"3.     That the plaintiff admitted that he sometimes engaged in buying and selling of large cattle which he sells at times in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.

"The foregoing stipulation of facts is hereby considered the pre-trial order of this Court. All other matters alleged in the respective pleadings of the parties are converted.

"xxx                      xxx                      xxx

(Ibid., p. 68).

Thereafter, the case was tried and, on September 8, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the complaint filed by the plaintiff for lack of jurisdiction, there being no tenancy relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.

"No pronouncement as to costs." (Original Record, pp. 185-186).

from which the plaintiff appealed (Original Record, p. 189).   DEacIT

The facts show that in 1951, the defendant bought a big parcel of land with an area of 95 hectares, more or less, located in San Roque, Lupao, Nueva Ecija. He took possession of the land, cleared the same, bulldozed it, built an irrigation system thereon and thereafter converted 40 hectares of the land into ricefields and the remaining 55-hectare portion was used as grazing lands for his cattle. He then hired workers to cultivate the riceland portion and paid them weekly for their services. After acquiring the land, the defendant employed the plaintiff as his encargado, whose duties were to look for laborers to cultivate the riceland portion, and to hire them, watch them and pay them their weekly wages with money given to him by the defendant. As such encargado, the plaintiff also attended to the threshing of the palay, made records thereof and submitted his reports thereof to the defendant who paid him for his services after each threshing. The plaintiff was the defendant's encargado of the land until 1972, when the defendant removed him for loss of confidence because of his shortages in his reports on the threshed palay. In his stead, his nephew Eliseo Tactay was placed as encargado of the land by the defendant.

Two years after his removal as such encargado, or in January 1974, the plaintiff commenced this action. During the ocular inspection of the land on August 29, 1974, when asked by the court if the plaintiff was a tenant of the defendant, the persons then present and working on the land, numbering about 23, unanimously answered no. It appears, too, that the plaintiff is the owner of three (3) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 3 hectares, more or less, which he himself cultivates, besides being engaged in the business of buying and selling cattle.

The real issue to be resolved in this litigation is whether the plaintiff was a tenant of the defendant on the land in question. Upon the record of this case, the appeal cannot be sustained.

The law defines agricultural tenancy as "the physical possession of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both." (Sec. 3, Rep. Act No. 1199, as amended). And, a tenant is one "who himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both." (Sec. 5(a), Rep. Act No. 1199, as amended). The Supreme Court has ruled that a person who does not work or till the land is not a tenant (Rural Progress Adm. v. Dimson, L-6068, Apr. 26, 1995).   aSITDC

In the case at bar, the preponderant evidence shows that the plaintiff was only the encargado, or overseer of the defendant since the latter acquired the big parcel of land with an area of 95 hectares, more or less, up to 1972 when the defendant removed him as such encargado, and put in his stead the plaintiff's nephew Eliseo Tactay. During said period, the plaintiff's duties were to look for laborers to cultivate the 40-hectare riceland portion of the land, hire them, watch them and pay them their weekly wages, and to attend to the threshing of the palay, record the same and submit his reports thereon to the defendant. For his services as such encargado, the plaintiff was paid by the defendant 5% of the gross palay harvest after each threshing. During the same period, the plaintiff never cultivated any portion of the defendant's land nor shared any produce thereof with the latter. The record discloses, too, that to satisfy itself and erase any doubts as what the real relation was between the plaintiff and the defendant, the court conducted an ocular inspection of the land. And during said ocular inspection, as aptly noted in the appealed judgment, in answer to the court's question, the persons then present and actually working on the land stated categorically and unanimously that the plaintiff was not a tenant on the defendant's land. Be it noted that no less than the plaintiff's own brother Alberto Viernes, who has been working as a laborer on the defendant's land since its acquisition in 1951 up to the present, and his nephew Eliseo Tactay who used to be one of the defendant's laborers on the land before being appointed as the encargado thereof in 1972, positively testified that the plaintiff was not a tenant of the defendant but only his overseer of the land.

Upon these established facts, it is clear that there was no tenancy relation between the plaintiff and the defendant in this case. Accordingly, the agrarian court was correct in dismissing this case for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 154, Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended; Sec. 154, Rep. Act No. 6389; Dumlao v. De Guzman, 1 SCRA 144; Matillano v. De Leon, 22 SCRA 1086).

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision, being in accordance with law and the evidence, is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.   HDIaET

SO ORDERED.

Gancayco and Reyes, JJ ., concur.