SPECIAL FORMER SECOND DIVISION
[CA-G.R. SP No. 55146. June 13, 2000.]
GREGORIA SANTIAGO, FELICITAS SANTIAGO NICOLAS RUBEN SANTIAGO, REMEDIOS SANTIAGO, PRISCILLA SANTIAGO-CASTAÑEDA, LEGAL HEIRS OF THE LATE JOVITO SANTIAGO, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT PANFILO SANTIAGO; and PANFILO SANTIAGO, also ONE OF THE LEGAL HEIRS OF THE LATE JOVITO SANTIAGO and BENEDICTO ALQUIROZ, petitioners-appellants, vs. FLORDELIZA RIVERA, (Respondent-Appellee) and JUDGE WILFREDO T. NIEVES in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 84, Malolos, Bulacan, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
ABESAMIS, J p:
This is a Petition for Review abundante cautela filed under Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (with an alternative Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65) assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 84, Malolos, Bulacan, which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Bocaue, Bulacan, in Civil Case No. 95-2449 ordering herein petitioners to vacate and to surrender possession of the subject parcels of land to herein respondent.
The pertinent facts culled from the records are as follows:
The late Pacifico Santiago, father of Jovito Santiago and Raymundo Santiago, originally owned the five (5) parcels of land subject of the instant case. Raymundo Santiago, who later became the owner, mortgaged the subject lots with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), and for failure to pay his loans, the same were foreclosed.
Alejandrina Tuzon purchased the properties from DBP. After the purchase, Tuzon filed an action for injunction against the defendants (petitioners herein), to prevent them from tilling and working on the landholding. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 289-M-88 and assigned to Branch 7, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan. A writ of preliminary injunction was issued on May 28, 1990, and petitioners were forced to stop working on the land.
Later on, Tuzon sold the said parcels of land to Flordeliza Rivera, herein respondent.
On August 9, 1995, Flordeliza Rivera also filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bocaue, Bulacan, naming Jovito Santiago, Benedicto Alquiroz, Emilio Umali, Felix Santiago, Spouses Ariel and Lydia Listangco, Toto Nicolas, Jorge Albacino and Alberto Santiago as defendants. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-2449. 1 Respondent Rivera averred in her complaint that Jovito Santiago and Benedicto Alquiroz, together with their co-defendants, have, for the past seven (7) years, been in unlawful possession and occupation of the parcels of land subject matter of the case upon her (Rivera's) tolerance and refused to vacate the same despite repeated demands.
On August 31, 1995, the defendants filed their Answer with Counterclaim, alleging that they are the actual tillers/tenants of subject parcels of land and questioned the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court to hear and decide the case. 2
On May 7, 1996, the MTC rendered a decision in favor of herein plaintiff-respondent Rivera, ordering "defendants and all persons claiming rights or authority from it to vacate the property in question and immediately surrender possession of the same to plaintiff ." 3
Jovito Santiago and Benedicto Alquiroz appealed the decision of the MTC to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. The other defendants did not appeal.
On May 27, 1997, the RTC Branch 84, rendered a decision, affirming in toto the decision of the MTC. 4
A Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC decision was seasonably filed by Jovito Santiago and Benedicto Alquiroz. 5 Subsequent thereto, Santiago and Alquiroz filed a Motion to Dismiss reiterating the issue of jurisdiction earlier raised in the MTC. 6
Meanwhile, Jovito Santiago and Benedicto Alquiroz filed a case before the Department of Agrarian Relations Adjudication Board (DARAB), docketed as DARAB Case No. R-03-02-5145'97, against DBP, Alejandrina Tuzon, Flordeliza Rivera, former Deputy Register of Deeds Jose G. Flores of Meycauayan, Bulacan, and the then incumbent Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan. The said DARAB action sought to annul the Deed of Sale executed by and between Tuzon and Rivera covering the subject parcels of land.
On March 26, 1999, the DARAB dismissed the complaint filed by Jovito Santiago and Benedicto Alquiroz and ruled against the existence of any tenancy relationship. IaDSEA
On April 27, 1999, the court a quo (RTC) directed the parties to submit their respective comment on the status of the DARAB cases filed by Santiago and Alquiroz against Rivera, et. al., to which Order both parties complied.
Meantime, the ejectment case filed by Alejandrina Tuzon was dismissed on June 1, 1999. Thereupon, petitioners resumed working on the landholding as tenants with notices sent to respondent Rivera 7, the Barangay Agrarian Reform Chairman 8, and the Barangay Captain 9.
On September 7, 1999, the RTC issued an Order denying defendant's Motion for Reconsideration as well as their Motion to Dismiss. 10
Aggrieved by the RTC's Decision and Order, the petitioners now come to this Court on the issue of (1) whether or not tenancy relations existed as between the parties; and (2) whether or not the court a quo and the MTC acquired jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant case.
At the outset, it must be stated that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations and averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. 11 If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by a simple strategem. Hence, at the start of the proceedings, at least, the MTC had jurisdiction over the ejectment case, until and unless a hearing on the merits show otherwise.
This principle is clearly enunciated in Isidro vs. Court of Appeals, to wit:
"xxx xxx xxx
It is well settled jurisprudence that a court does not lose its jurisdiction over an unlawful detainer case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. The court continues to have the authority to hear the evidence for the purpose precisely of determining whether or not it has jurisdiction. And upon such hearing, if tenancy is shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. [citations omitted] . . .." 12
In Ignacio vs. CFI Bulacan, it was ruled that "while it is true that the jurisdiction of the court in a suit for ejectment or forcible entry is determined by the allegations in the complaint, yet where tenancy is averred as a defense and upon hearing, is shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction." 13
That being said, we are now called to rule upon the single crucial issue of the existence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the petitioners and the private respondent herein.
A tenancy relationship may validly be established even without a written agreement. 14 The characteristics of tenancy are:
1. The parties are a landholder either juridical or natural and is the owner, lessee or usufructuary and a tenant who himself and with the aid available from within his household cultivates the land subject matter of the tenancy;
2. The subject land is agricultural land;
3. The purpose of the contract is agricultural production;
4. The cause or consideration is that the landholder and the share tenant would divide the agricultural produce in proportion to their respective contributions. 15
5. In leasehold, the tenant or lessee gets the whole produce with the obligation to pay a fixed rental. 16
From the evidence adduced, Jovito Santiago and Benedicto Alquiroz were able to establish that:
1. They have been working as tenants at the time Pacifico Santiago and Raymundo Santiago, DBP and Alejandrina Tuzon were the owners. This is shown by their affidavit and the different certifications of the different Barangay Captains, the BARC Chairman and the MARO.
2. Subject lands are ricelands. This is shown by the tax declarations in the name of Raymundo Santiago, the handwriting on top of the conditional sale made by DBP in favor of Alejandrina Tuzon reading "FO (first option) Raymundo Santiago Agricultural." 17 Tax Declaration of Tuzon also described the land as "agricultural vacant." 18
3. The purpose of the contract is agricultural production. This is shown by the affidavits of Jovito Santiago and Benedicto Alquiroz, 19 Barangay Captain Raul Sanchez, 20 Barangay Captain Fortunato Roxas 21 and Fernando Mamuyac, 22 Certification of the BARC Chairman and MARO.
4. The letter of Atty. Paul Carreon to DBP way back in 1983 asking DBP as to where Jovito Santiago will deliver the rental to DBP, 23 shows that the contract is one of leasehold tenancy.
5. This is also shown without doubt by the Rural Bank of Bocaue Savings Account No. 01-000-636 under Passbook No. 040M in the account of Alejandrina Tuzon by Jovito Santiago with a deposit of P1,380.00 dated January 17, 1990 24, of which respondent Tuzon had been formally notified by the letter dated January 19, 1990, addressed to Alejandrina Tuzon and received by her through her driver informing her that the amount corresponds to the annual rental for the crop year 1989. 25
The following documentary evidence on record likewise indubitably show the real status of petitioners as lawful tenants-lessees on the land in dispute. These are: (1) Certification of the former Barangay Captain Fernando Mamuyac (now deceased) of Tambobong, Bocaue, Bulacan, attesting to the fact of tenancy; (2) Certification of the former Barangay Captain Fortunato Roxas, Sr. (now deceased) of Tambobong, Bocaue, Bulacan, dated June 18, 1988, also attesting to the fact of tenancy; (3) Certification of the former Barangay Captain Raul Sanchez of Tambobong, Bocaue, Bulacan, dated June 18, 1988, likewise supporting the defense of tenancy; (4) Certification for Jovito Santiago of BARC Chairman Lamberto Castillo 26 and Barangay Captain Raul Sanchez, dated March 25, 1998, 27 again attesting to the existence of tenancy relationship; (5) Certification for Benedicto Alquiroz of BARC Chairman Lamberto Castillo and Barangay Captain Raul Sanchez, dated March 25, 1998, also proving tenancy; (6) Certification of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, Fe L. Jacinto, dated March 26, 1998, for Jovito Santiago again attesting to the fact of tenancy; 28 (7) Certification from the Municipal Agriculture Officer, Ms. Aurea G. Escalante, dated November 27, 1997, showing that Jovito Santiago appears in their records as a farmer beneficiary. 29
It is not surprising for Alejandrina Tuzon to remain silent despite receipt of the letter dated January 19, 1990, supra, informing her about the deposit of money corresponding to the agricultural annual rental. But the fact that she did not contest or controvert the contents of the letter clearly shows that Tuzon was aware of a tenancy leasehold relationship of Jovito Santiago and Benedicto Alquiroz with the former owners, her predecessors-in-interest. As events would turn out, Alejandrina Tuzon instead of answering the letter of Jovito Santiago in relation to the deposit of money in the savings account in her name made by Jovito Santiago, filed a suit for preliminary injunction seeking to stop said Jovito Santiago and Benedicto Alquiroz from tilling and working on the landholding in question. aDCIHE
From the evidence adduced by the petitioners before the lower courts, there is prima facie showing or reasonable ground to believe that petitioners are bonafide tenants on the landholdings in dispute. Accordingly, the lower court was mandated to refer the case for ejectment to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, pursuant to P.D. 316, the law then in force, for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties. Section 2 of the said P.D. 316 specifically provides that unless certified by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform as a proper case for trial or hearing by a court or judge or other official of competent jurisdiction, no judge of the Court of Agrarian Reform, Court of First Instance, Municipal or City Court . . . shall take cognizance of any ejectment case or any other cases disguised to harass or remove a tenant of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn.
Parenthetically, during the hearing of the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, petitioners submitted and marked documentary evidence tending to prove the court's lack of jurisdiction over the case as they are tenants-lessees on the landholdings in dispute. However, the lower court (RTC) disregarded and refused admission of the said documents on the ground that presentation of evidence when the ejectment case is already on appeal with the RTC is not allowed under Section 18, par. 2, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that the appeal shall be decided only "on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin (MTC) and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the court."
We disagree.
The provision of Section 18, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should not be considered as limiting the power of the RTC as an appellate court from accepting affidavits or other evidences necessary or material if only to clarify certain issues, specifically the issue of jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction over the subject matter, basic and extremely important to a court, is questioned, and on the basis of the documents submitted, there is real doubt as to the jurisdiction of the court, the pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure 30 should not be made to defeat substantial justice. Furthermore, Sec. 18, Rule 70, does not prohibit the presentation of affidavits and evidences on the issue being raised.
As ruled by the Supreme Court: "The court is no longer allowed to hold hearings to receive testimonial evidence. Should the court find it necessary to clarify certain issues, it may require the parties instead to submit affidavits or other evidence (Section 10, Revised Rules of Summary Procedure)." 31
From the above ruling, it is clear that while under the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure, the court is no longer allowed to hold hearings to receive testimonial evidence, it is certainly not precluded from requiring the parties instead to submit affidavits or other evidence necessary to clarify certain issues. Indeed, in this particular case, it is the petitioners who initiated the move for the court to accept and consider affidavits and other evidences.
It is noteworthy that the issue of tenancy relations and the question of jurisdiction were invoked by herein petitioners from the very inception of the case at bench. They substantiated their claim in their answer as well as in their position paper as shown by the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Jovito Santiago and Benedicto Alquiroz. 32
In Carag vs. Court of Appeals, 33 the Supreme Court held: "to a genuine tenant, that would have been the first thing to come to mind. The fact that the respondent never raised the issue of tenancy when he filed the answer to the ejectment complaint is significant. He thought of raising the issue of tenancy only when the Decision was being executed and he countered with the complaint to annul the Municipal Court's Decision." Such is not the case with petitioners in the case at bench for at the earliest opportunity, they invoked and substantially supported the existence of tenancy relations. Indeed, in the 2nd paragraph of the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Jovito Santiago and Benedicto Alquiroz, 34 they asserted that they were the tenants even at the time the land was owned by their father Pacifico Santiago. Such is a clear strong evidence that the land is tenanted even when Tuzon bought it from the DBP. Under the security of tenure provision, the fact of tenancy is deemed to continue from Pacifico Santiago, to Raymundo Santiago, to DBP, then to Tuzon and now to Rivera.
The MTC, however, disregarded the substantial allegations of the answer and the meritorious defense of tenancy, as narrated in the position paper with the attached sworn statement invoking the question of the court's jurisdiction. On appeal, herein petitioners still raised the question of jurisdiction and offered to present evidence in support of the issue of jurisdiction.
To negate petitioners' claim of tenancy, private respondent posited in her Comment that the case for cancellation of deeds of sale of the land in question between Tuzon and DBP filed by herein petitioners before the DARAB was dismissed in the Order dated May 26, 1999. 35 While it is true that DARAB granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by DBP (not by Flordeliza Rivera) in DARAB Case No. R-03-02-5145'97, entitled Jovito Santiago, et. al. vs. DBP, et. al., private respondent failed to show that the dismissal of the case had already become final. Private respondent failed to dispute petitioners' claim that the said dismissal was still the subject of a motion for reconsideration. Besides, in dismissing petitioners' complaint before the DARAB, the said agency refused to entertain petitioners' contention that they are tenants since the MTC and the RTC had already passed upon such issue of tenancy and DARAB was prohibited to review, modify, reverse or interfere with the judgment, orders and other lawful process of another co-equal or coordinate agency.
The ratiocination of the DARAB on this issue holds no water considering that the decisions rendered by both the MTC and the RTC have not yet become final and executory as the said decisions are in fact the subject of this present petition for review and/or certiorari.
It must also be emphasized that the DARAB denied petitioners the opportunity to present evidence to substantiate their claim of tenancy when it immediately granted the DBP's Motion to Dismiss petitioners' complaint.
In consonance with the above-mentioned jurisprudence, it is clear that the Municipal Trial Court of Bocaue as well as the Regional Trial Court, Branch 84, Malolos, Bulacan, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to clear want of jurisdiction, in not finding that the instant case is one of tenancy dispute.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 84, Malolos, Bulacan dated May 27, 1997 affirming the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Bocaue, Bulacan dated May 7, 1996 is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered DISMISSING the case for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales and Cruz, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 111-114.
2. Rollo, pp. 115-122.
3. Rollo, pp. 135-143.
The dispositive portion of the assailed MTC Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter as follows:
1. Defendants and all persons claiming rights or authority from it to vacate the property in question and immediately surrender possession of the same to the plaintiff;
2. To pay the sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) as reasonable rental value of the premises occupied by each of the defendant from the time the complaint was filed until they vacated the subject premises;
3. Defendants to pay jointly and severally the sum of P35,000.00 by way of attorney's fees;
4. Defendant pay plaintiff the cost of the suit."
4. Rollo, pp. 54-57.
5. Rollo, pp. 58-66.
6. Rollo, pp. 67-103.
7. Rollo, p. 125.
8. Rollo, p. 126.
9. Rollo, p. 127.
10. Rollo, pp. 105-110.
11. Chico vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 33, 36 [1998]; Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 108; Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 162.
12. 228 SCRA 503, 509 [1993].
13. 41 SCRA 69.
14. Ponce vs. Guevarra, 10 SCRA 649.
15. De los Reyes vs. Espinelli, 30 SCRA 575.
16. People vs. Adillo, 68 SCRA 90-91.
17. Rollo, p. 191.
18. Rollo, p. 186.
19. Rollo, pp. 129-130.
20. Rollo, p. 133.
21. Rollo, p. 294.
22. Rollo, p. 293.
23. Rollo, p. 128.
24. Rollo, p. 131.
25. Rollo, p. 132.
26. Rollo, p. 296.
27. Rollo, p. 297.
28. Rollo, p. 298.
29. Rollo, p. 299.
30. now incorporated in the 2nd paragraph of Section 18, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
31. Placido Miranda vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 378.
32. supra, p. 129, Rollo.
33. 151 SCRA 45.
34. supra, Annex L, Petition, Rollo, pp. 129-130.
35. Rollo, pp. 224-232.