SIXTEENTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. CV No. 39202. November 18, 1996.]
HEIRS OF AURELIA PABLO PALAEZ represented by AMOS PALAEZ, RICARDO PALAEZ, RODOLFO PALAEZ, LINDA MACALALAG, METZI P. LEE, FELIX PALAEZ, CONRAD PALAEZ & SUSAN CARLING, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. BLAS WALLAC AND MARCELINO PES-OYEN, defendants-appellees.
D E C I S I O N
VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS, J p:
This case has its antecedents in the Regional Trial Court (Branch 9) of La Trinidad, Benguet, where a complaint for Ownership and Recovery of Possession with Damages was filed on December 12, 1990 by the plaintiffs (herein appellants, heirs of Aurelia Pablo Palaez) over the northern portion of a 19,500 square meter land situated at Agagat, Kapangan, Benguet, which was declared by Marcelino Pes-Oyen (herein defendant-appellee) as part of his property.
The plaintiffs in their Complaint alleged that they are the true and lawful co-owners of a parcel of land by virtue of their Tax Declaration No. 5281 and 6886 since the year 1949, having inherited the same by operation of law from the late Aurelia Palaez, the wife of plaintiff, Amos Palaez and the mother of all the other plaintiffs. Said property is particularly described as follows:
"A parcel of land located at Agagat, Kapangan, Benguet; Bounded on the North by Creek and Bansan, on the East by Creek and P. Land, on the South by Creek and Bisaya and on the West by Path Ticul and Bansan; containing an area of NINETEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (19,500) SQUARE METERS, more or less." (per Tax Declaration No. 6886/5281)
The above-described property was acquired by the late Aurelia P. Palaez from her mother, the late Calixta Magsi Pablo, before the year 1949. Aurelia Palaez and her heirs have been in possession of the same in the concept of owners continuously for more than 30 years. Sometime in the year 1973, the late Aurelia P. Palaez discovered that the northern portion of her property was declared by defendant Marcelino Pes-Oyen as his own without her knowledge and consent. Thereafter, defendant Marcelino Pes-Oyen, through his representative, defendant Blas Wallac, forcibly entered the northern portion of plaintiff's property and made use of the same for pasturing their animals, thereby depriving Aurelia Palaez and her family of the use and fruits of the said portion of the land. Several protests and attempts to settle the matter amicably was initiated by the plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interests before the Barangay Officials in May 1990 and later with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor but to no avail because of the refusal of the defendants to appear despite receipt of a subpoena. Due to the adamant refusal of defendants to vacate and surrender the possession of the land in dispute, the plaintiffs are demanding that they pay rentals at P1,000.00 a year, commencing from 1973 up to the time they vacate the premises plus attorney's fees and other litigation expenses.
On January 25, 1991, the defendants filed their Answer with Counterclaim in which they denied the material allegations of the complaint, and set forth the following defenses: that Marcelino Pes-Oyen is the true and lawful owner of the properties since time immemorial, having inherited the same from his parents; that the properties he inherited are covered by Tax declaration nos. 5815 now 3375, 5827 now 3377, 3751 now 3371, and 5845 now 3362 all issued in his name for taxation purposes since 1948, except the land covered by tax declaration number 4986 which he purchased from Mr. Antonio Capulo in 1957 by virtue of a Deed of Transfer and was still declared in the name of Capulo in 1948 under Tax Declaration No. 5825; that he (Marcelino Pes-Oyen) has been in actual, continuous, open and notorious possession of the property since time immemorial and has introduced all existing improvements on the property; that he did not ignore the prosecutor's call to appear before him, the truth being that he was prevented by a series of calamities such as the earthquake that devastated the province of Benguet. And as counterclaim, he prays for the award of damages in the amount of P40,000.00.
The case was set for Pre-Trial conference on March 5, 1991 at which the parties stipulated only on one fact, i.e., that defendant Blas Wallac is a stranger to this case, being a mere representative of defendant Marcelino Pes-Oyen.
Trial on the merits then proceeded on the following issues:
1) Whether or not plaintiffs are the true and lawful owners of the property in litigation.
2) Whether or not laches or prescription has set in;
3) Who among the parties are entitled to damages. cdasia
Plaintiffs presented four (4) witnesses to bolster their claim namely: Henry Pablo, who is the brother of Aurelia Pablo Palaez; Amos Palaez, her husband; Rodolfo Palaez, one of the plaintiffs-son of Aurelia Palaez; and Amalia Campulat, their neighbor.
Henry Pablo testified that the subject land was owned by his mother Calixta Magsi who gave the same to Aurelia as her share of the estate. While both were alive, they planted camote on the land. And since he resided at Sagubo which is eight (8) kilometers away from the property, he introduced a ditch and also "baoc" or fences to determine the boundary on the west and south of the property. Likewise, he introduced three (3) rice fields, two on the north and one on the south. He knows the land in dispute but he cannot identify the tax declarations. (TSN, 3/6/91, pp. 2-8).
Plaintiff Amos Palaez, husband of the late Aurelia Pablo, testified that the 19,500-square meter land was owned by his wife who died in 1982 and who inherited the same from her mother, Calixta Magsi, who also died in the same year. He presented tax declarations as evidence of his wife's ownership over the land. Tax declaration no. 5821 issued in 1949 cancels tax declaration no. 214 which was previously issued in the name of Calixta. Subsequent tax declarations numbered 1160, 6886, 8317 and 11623 all covering the same area, are also in the name of Aurelia P. Palaez.
The witness (Amos Palaez) also brought to court a sketch he prepared to support the description of the portion covered by tax declaration no. 5821. He identified the disputed area as the northern part which he claims to be less than a hectare and is bounded on the west by a public trail. The land was utilized by the defendant for pasturing animals which was then tolerated until the year 1985 when they discovered that it was declared for taxation purposes by the defendant who was issued tax declaration number 10415 in 1958 with the following description: on the north bounded by a public trail, South — a creek, on the East — Waring Abellera and on the West — a public trail. This he claims to be the same property covered by the tax declaration number 5821. As early as 1980, he came to know of Blas Wallac's acts in intruding into the property even if he was advised by Calixta to refrain from using the land. Such land is also utilized for Kaingin purposes by a number of people who were listed and who pay for the use of the same. He further insisted on the presence of the ditch that covers the entire western portion and such ditch was constructed without any protest. However, during his cross-examination he did not dispute the fact that the property in litigation which was earlier identified as covered by tax declaration no. 10415 was registered in the name of Antonio Capulo in 1948 in the presence of Calixta who never made any action of protest (TSN, 4/7/91, pp. 3-20).
Rodolfo Palaez testified that he is one of the plaintiffs and the son of Amos Palaez. He claimed that he helped in making a boundary at the West portion together with Henry Pablo. He also introduced a ricefield. It was in 1973 that Aurelia discovered the usurpation of the northern portion by Marcelino Pes-Oyen but he made the protest only in 1990 because he was assigned to different provinces as a soldier. In 1985, he found out from the assessor's office that such portion of the property was declared by Capulo in his name, then later transferred the same to Marcelino Pes-Oyen.
Lastly, Amalia Campulat testified that she lives near the plaintiffs and his father has a property adjoining that of the plaintiffs which she managed. She claimed that Aurelia leased the subject property to Kaingeros and that she knows Capulo who came from Itogon as she is related to him. She further stated that Capulo has no property in Agagat; that the area in dispute is used only for pasturing and not planting camote; and that there are no rice paddies there because of lack of water (TSN, 6/4/91, pp. 4-12).
On the other hand, the defendant Marcelino Pes-Oyen testified on his behalf and in addition he presented two other witnesses who claimed to be present during the 1948 land assessment where Calixta Magsi was also present. Their testimonies may be summarized as follows:
1. Marcelino Pes-Oyen. — He owns several farm lands in Kapangan which are covered by tax declarations. Some were inherited from his parents while the land covered by tax declaration number 5815, now 10415, was purchased from Antonio Capulo on October 24, 1957. There were no other persons who possessed, planted and occupied the said parcel of land other than his parents, himself and now his brother-in-law, Blas Wallac. Even prior to 1948, he saw only Capulo and his wife cultivating the said land as it adjoins his property. It was only in 1990 that the family of Aurelia made a complaint.
2) Blas Wallac. — He cultivates Pes-Oyen's land aside from his own farm land. The property owned by Magsi is near the property of Capulo and such lands were separated by a creek. He personally saw Capulo fence his property which fence was maintained by Pes-Oyen who also planted vegetables on it. During the assessment in 1948, Calixta Magsi, who was then present, never protested when Capulo declared the property in his name.
3) Venancio Saro. — He was a municipal councilor of Kapangan from 1935 1949 and subsequently the Vice-Mayor from 1964 to 1966. In 1948, a tax revision was made and a survey was conducted as to the actual lot owners. The property of Capulo in Agagat, Kapangan is at the tip and is adjacent to his property. The other land owners nearby are Blas Wallac, Marcelino Pes-Oyen and Baliba. The property of Capulo was planted with camote, corn and ginger during the rainy season and there are no rice paddies. The property declared by Capulo for taxation purposes in 1948 is a public land, and during the 1948 assessment wherein Calixta Magsi Pablo was present, she did not protest against Capulo. That property was already transferred to Pes-Oyen. The plaintiffs have been living in the area but not in the portion of Capulo's property which is far.
4) Baliba Estud. — He has a property which he is tilling in Agagat and in Alado. Blas Wallac and Pes-Oyen also own a farm land in Agagat, and his land is bounded by that of Capulo. During the assessment he was present when Calixta, Capulo, Wallac, and Cariño partitioned their properties. His land is adjacent to that of Capulo who during his lifetime cultivated his land together with his wife. Calixta Magsi never cultivated the land owned by Capulo because the lot of Magsi is wide. The boundary of Capulo and Magsi's property is a creek, while his (witness's) property is adjacent to Magsi's property located less than a kilometer away.
After the parties had rested, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the defendants, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"The Court finds that the plaintiffs failed to prove their claim hence their case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment dismissing the case."
"Costs against the plaintiffs."
Not satisfied, the plaintiffs now come to Us on appeal, attributing the following errors to the court a quo:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT SUFFICIENTLY PROVED THEIR CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION.
II
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PLAINTIFFS' ACTION HAS PRESCRIBED.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
We shall discuss together the first two assignments of error, it appearing that the alleged misapprehension of facts in No. 2 relates also to the merits of the plaintiffs-appellants' claim over the subject property.
Such claim of possession over the subject property is anchored on their alleged continuous and uninterrupted possession for thirty (30) years, as shown by several tax declarations, initially in the name of Calixta Magsi for 1945 (Exhibit "D"), and from 1949 onwards in the name of Aurelia Pablo Palaez, wife of appellant Amos and mother of the rest of his co-appellants (Pls see Exhibits "A", "B", "E, "O", "P" and "Q"). They asseverate that because their tax declaration is much earlier than those of the appellee Marcelino Pes-Oyen, the "Two-Title" rule should be applied to their favor, i.e., where there are two titles issued to two (2) different persons over the same parcel of land, the earlier in date must prevail.
In the first place, the plaintiffs-appellants have not sufficiently proven that they have been in open, exclusive, continuous and undisputed possession of the land for the period prescribed by law. The evidence they presented are plagued with inconsistencies that erode their credibility. For instance, Henry Pablo, sister of the late Aurelia Pablo Palaez, testified that they introduced a "boac" or canal (later described as a ditch) to serve as boundary at the western and southern side of the property, and that there were three (3) ricefields on the land, two (2) on the north and a wider one on the south (p. 6, TSN. 5/6/91). According to the plaintiff-appellant Amos Palaez, the ditch covers the entire western portion. No mention was made of the southern side. When asked if there are still existing ricefields, he answered without certainty: "It should be." (p. 15, TSN, 5/7/91). When asked if he, being the husband of Aurelia Pablo, had any occasion to introduce improvements on the land in dispute, his answer was:
"We do. We try to pasture our animals there and ask somebody to make kaingins but we were not able to cultivate that throughout because the fence we did not maintain." (p. 16, Ibid.)
When it was the turn of plaintiff-appellant Rodolfo Palaez to testify, he likewise mentioned a ditch as part of the improvements on the land located at the western portion as well as ricefields, the location of which he did not specify.
These allegations, however, run counter to the description of their property as appearing on the tax declarations which indicate that the subject land is a "camote land" and/or pastureland (Exhibit "A", "B", "D", "O", and "Q"), or vegetable land (Exhibit "P").
What is more, even appellants' witness, Amalia Waring Campulat, contradicted the allegations of the plaintiffs-appellants themselves when she declared that the land in dispute is used only for pasturing and not for planting, as there is no water and therefore no rice paddies exist in the area (TSN, p. 12, 6/4/91). HTCIcE
Now, the plaintiffs-appellants claim that their tax declarations beginning with the year 1945 are consistent in their entries, unlike those of the defendants-appellees which obviously refer to different kinds of land.
Tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership and right of possession over a piece of land (San Miguel vs. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 722; Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 195 SCRA 38).
Even without the foregoing rule, however, We still cannot give much credence to the plaintiffs-appellants' tax declarations. The alleged consistency of said appellants' tax declarations appear to be true only from 1949 onwards, as shown by Exhibits "A", "B", "E", "O", "P" and "Q", which refer to a 1.950-hectare parcel of land (or 19,500 square meters) located at Bo. Agagat, Kapangan, Mountain Province. But Tax Declaration No. 214, supposedly for 1945 is something else. It covers four (4) different parcels of land located in Central Kapangan, consisting of 3 hectares, 1/4 hectare and 3 hectares for the first 3 parcels, or an aggregate of 8-1/4 hectares. The area of the fourth parcel is not given. According to witness Henry Pablo, the first parcel was assigned to Aurelia Pablo Palaez, the plaintiffs-appellants' predecessor-in-interest. However, neither its area (3 hectares) nor its known boundaries tally with those appearing on the other tax declarations of the plaintiffs-appellants, as shown by the following:
Boundaries Per T.D. 214 Per other T.D.'s
North Walac & Waring Creek & Bansen
East Abangle & Toles Creek & P. Land
South Galmesa & Palacsa Creek & Bisaya
West Magsilo P. Trail & Bansen
Moreover, the sketch prepared by Amos Palaez (Exhibit "N") does not coincide with the sketch supposedly prepared by the Provincial Assessor (Exhibit "W"). In Exhibit "N", the lot allegedly belonging to the plaintiffs-appellants is a contiguous mass separated only by a creek — if we are to include the controversial portion being claimed by the appellees. On the other hand, Exhibit "W" depicts the appellants' land as being divided into sections (Exhibits "W-1", "W-2" and "W-3"), with irregular boundaries not necessarily adjoining each other.
Furthermore, plaintiffs-appellants Amos and Rodolfo Palaez not only do not know the exact area of the land they are claiming (pp. 7 and 19, TSN, 5/7/91), they also failed to adduce sufficient evidence to identify clearly and distinctly the particular portion belonging to them which is allegedly being usurped by the defendants-appellees. They claim that the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 10415 in the name of appellee Marcelino Pes-Oyen (formerly declared in the name of Antonio Capulo) is part of the property of the late Aurelia Pablo Palaez (TSN, P. 20, 5/7/91). However, the boundaries of this piece of land is quite different, to wit: North — a public trial; South — a creek; East — Waring Abellera; and West, a public trial, which boundaries are a far cry from those of the appellants' property, as follows: North — a creek; South — Creek and Visaya; East — Creek; and West — Sagubo Trail, Waring. More importantly, the land covered by TD No. 10415 contains an area of 2.290 hectares (22,900 square meters). Since the appellants claim that only a portion of their property (of 1.950 hectares) is being usurped, they could not be referring to the appellees' aforementioned lot which is obviously bigger in area. There should have been a survey to determine once and for all the metes and bounds of the appellants' property.
In the case of Beo vs. Court of Appeals (200 SCRA 575), the Supreme Court held: "When the record does not show that the land subject matter of the action for recovery of possession has been exactly determined, such action cannot prosper."
In the light of the foregoing, We are constrained to reject the claims of the plaintiffs-appellants. The burden of proof on this question is upon the said appellants. He who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting evidence to obtain a favorable judgment. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 292; Transpacific Supplies, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 494). Hence, even if We concede that there might have been certain inconsistencies in the testimony of appellee Pes-Oyen as to his mode of acquisition of the property, whether by inheritance or by purchase, still the appellants cannot prevail, for they failed to prove their case with a preponderance of evidence. Anyway, the defendant-appellee has explained that the properties covered by Tax Declarations Nos. 5815 (later 3375), 5827 (later 3377) 3751 (later 3371) and 5845 (later 3362) are those he inherited from his mother, while those covered by Tax Declarations Nos. 5825 is the one he purchased from Antonio Capulo.
The trial court was therefore correct in its conclusion that the plaintiffs-appellants failed to sufficiently prove their claim of ownership, possession, and even the boundaries of the property they are claiming. As provided for in Article 434 of the Civil Code:
"In an action to recover, the property must be identified and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim."
Moreover, findings of facts of trial courts are accorded great weight and respect unless it can be demonstrated that they overlooked certain facts of substance or value which if considered will affect the outcome of the case (People vs. Coral, 230 SCRA 499). We find no cogent reason to disgress from this doctrine.
The issue of prescription is relegated to the background by the foregoing discussions. Be that as it may, We agree with the trial court that the plaintiffs-appellants' action has prescribed. The alleged usurpation alluded to is the act of the defendant-appellant in declaring the property in his name for taxation purposes. The tax declaration of the appellees' predecessor-in-interest is dated June 17, 1948 (Exhibit "7"). The matter of the alleged usurpation should have been threshed out as early as 1948 when the Provincial Assessor of Benguet made a tax-maping survey of the properties in the province. In fact, the appellees' witnesses claim that Calixta Magsi, the original owner of the appellants' property, was present when Capulo declared it in 1948, but she made no objection nor did anything to protect her interests, if at all. Thus, the plaintiffs-appellants cannot have any better right than Calixta Magsi, who preferred to keep silent rather than stand up for her rights. Being successors-in-interest of Calixta Magsi and Aurelia Pablo Palaez, they are like assignees who cannot acquire greater rights than those pertaining to the assignor (Koa vs. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 541). As the saying goes, the spring cannot rise higher than its source.
In any case, the appellants' cause of action accrued in 1948. Thus, even granting that the prescriptive period is thirty years pursuant to Article 1148 of the Civil Code, the same should be counted from 1948, when the first Tax Declaration was made in the name of the appellee's predecessor-in-interest, and not from 1973 — the time when Aurelia P. Palaez allegedly discovered the fraud attributed to the appellee. In such a case, since the accrual of the cause of action was before the effectivity of the New Civil Code, the applicable law is Section 40 of Act 190 otherwise known as the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides for a ten-year prescriptive period for actions to recover title to or possession of real property or any interest therein, counting from the date of accrual of the cause of action. (Quetulio vs. de la Cuesta, 22 SCRA 420). Thus, the appellants' cause of action has definitely prescribed.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the findings and conclusions of the court a quo, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Abad Santos, Jr. and Amin *, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
* Acting Third Member.