TWELFTH DIVISION

[CA-G.R. SP No. 45567.  April 24, 1998.]

FELICIANO AND IGNACIA GINGCO, petitioners, vs. HON. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD AND TEODORO CRUZ, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SALAS, B., J p:

This being a Petition for Review pursuant to Rule 43, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. We only have to find out if prima facie wise DARAB committed errors of law or fact that would justify a reversal of the June 30, 1997 contested Decision; otherwise Our only option is to deny herein petition due course and then a dismissal of the same. This is on the assumption that the findings of fact of DARAB should be accepted as binding, if supported by substantial evidence (Rule 43, Section 10).

Before the DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, San Fernando, Pampanga), the complainants/appellants said that they are the owners of a parcel of riceland situated at Matangtubig, Baliuag, Bulacan, subject of this case, measuring an area of 14.068 square meters, formerly owned by Efren Reyes.

The property used to be worked on by a certain Felipe Nuguid who had to sell his tenancy rights, in favor of herein respondent/appellee, supposedly because of financial difficulty. The sale of his tenancy rights was made without the knowledge and consent of the appellants and their predecessors-in-interest. "Worse", the appellee is not personally cultivating the property; on the contrary, he has a lucrative employment in Manila together with his wife. Moreover for the past two (2) agricultural years, the appellee failed to pay the rentals.

Precisely prayed was for a declaration that the appellee is not an agricultural leasehold tenant; and in the alternative a declaration that the appellee lost his right to be issued a Certificate of Land Transfer, supposedly in violation of PD 816.

On the other hand, the Answer of the appellee (Rollo, p. 73) states that the sale of the tenancy right was with the conformity of the owner. Efren Reyes; as a matter of fact, evidenced by a "Pagpapatunay" dated June 28, 1994, signed by him (appellee) and Efren Reyes. This is even "bolstered" with the execution of an Agricultural Leasehold Contract between him and the owner. He is actually and physically in possession of the property and is "personally working" on the land. The fact alone that he has to be going to Manila from time to time is of no consequence.

Even granting arguendo that the appellants eventually became the property owners, they were merely subrogated to the rights and obligations of the former owner. Absence of case of action, was raised as a Special and Affirmative Defense.

Aside from asking for a dismissal of the case, the appellee likewise demanded payment of damages.

To recall, the July 14, 1992 contested Decision of the Board a quo states (Rollo, p. 40):

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1.      Dismissing the instant complaint for lack of merit;

2.      Maintaining defendant, Teodoro Cruz in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject landholding;

3.      Granting defendant the right to redeem the subject landholding pursuant to (Section 12 of Rep. Act No. 6389);

4.      Ordering defendant to render to the plaintiffs the rightful and corresponding lease rentals thereof;

5.      Dismissing Motion for Intervention for lack of merit; and

6.      All other claims and counterclaims are hereby dismissed for lack of any legal basis.'"

After this was elevated to the DARAB, the latter on June 30, 1997, directed dismissal of the appeal, or the affirmation of the appealed decision.

Faulting the DARAB, the appellants raised the following issues (Ibid, p. 32):

"5.1   Whether or not Respondent-Appellee is a bona-fide tenant on the landholding.

5.2    Whether or not Respondent-Appellee is entitled to a right of redemption.

Also argued was that tenancy relationship, as ruled in the case of Carag vs. Court of Appeals (151 SCRA 421), then reiterated in Sintos vs. Court of Appeals (246 SCRA 223) would presuppose the following requisites: 1) the landowner and the tenant, as the parties; 2) of the land being agricultural; 3) consent between the parties; 4) agricultural production as the purpose; 5) personal cultivation (by the tenant); and 6) sharing of the harvests.

The appellants added that an "unbiased mind" would readily conclude that the appellee was never a tenant, for how can he, as a "top brass executive" of a Makati based corporation, undertake personal cultivation of the property as required by law, a point that DARAB "failed to appreciate". Aside from that, the respondent/appellee never gave them the rightful shares of the produce, a conduct that is contrary to a person who claims to be a tenant. Also, the element of sharing of the harvest is absent.

Furthermore, the right of redemption is available only to a bonafide tenant. In the case of the respondent, because he failed to qualify as a tenant, he necessarily cannot exercise the right of redemption.

Then the "Petitory". They said that this case is a classic example of a landless couple who has the desire to acquired a land; they acquired money from a loan shark, and then purchased the property, but unfortunately, they have not been able to enjoy the fruits of the land after a period of ten (10) years since their right to enjoy the same is stopped by a person who claims to be the tenant of the former owner. They cannot even afford to send their minor children to school. Moreover, they are living "miserably" in an old small house, under sub-standard conditions.

The respondent, on the other hand, lives with his family comfortably in Metro Manila with all his three (3) children studying in an exclusive private institution. Also, he and his wife are top-executive/stockholder and company treasurer, not to mention the many properties they have in the City of Manila and Cavite. They also own several motor vehicles, brand new cars and jeepney. This is a petition therefore that calls for the application of the principle of social justice. Between a poor landless peasant and a person who fictitiously claims to be a tenant, the law should have leaned more in favor of the petitioners whose dream of having a land that they can call their own, will naturally come true if their plea for social justice will be granted.

We disagree.

In affirming the appeal, DARAB said that Felipe Nuguid, the former tenant, voluntarily transferred his tenancy rights to the appellee in June, 1994, with the conformity of the land owner, Efren Reyes. They even executed an Agricultural Leasehold in June, 1994, then registered with the Municipal Treasurer of Baliuag, Bulacan. Lease rentals were similarly paid to Efren Reyes. The appellee is therefore a tenant-lessee.

The execution by Efren Reyes thereafter of the . . . Salaysay, denouncing the Leasehold Contract and not recognizing the appellee as the tenant/lessee, is of no moment. Being a lessee, the appellee should be entitled to security of tenure, therefore also entitled to the right of redemption, thus (Rollo, pp. 43-44):

"In resolving the first issue, the records show that due to old age, Felipe Nuguid, the former tenant on the landholding, voluntarily transferred the tenancy rights to Defendant-Appellee in June, 1984 as shown in the 'Sinumpaang Pahayag' (Exhibit '3', p. 25, Rollo). The transfer of tenancy was likewise confirmed by landowner. Efren Reyes, as evidenced by the 'Pagpapatunay' (Exhibit '2' p. 25, Rollo). An Agricultural Leasehold Contract (Exhibit '1' p. 30, Rollo) was entered into by and between Efren Reyes and Defendant-Appellee in June, 1984, duly notarized and registered with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Baliuag, Bulacan. After the institution of Defendant-Appellee as tenant on the landholding, the latter started cultivating the same and paid the corresponding lease rentals to Efren Reyes, as shown in the receipts (pp. 123, 124, 125, 126, Rollo).

Moreover, Complainants-Appellants admitted in their Motion for Release of Deposited Palay (pp. 149-150, Rollo) that lease rentals were deposited by Defendant-Appellee to the M. Eugenio Ricemill in favor of Efren Reyes.

Furthermore, in one occasion, Efren Reyes executed a sworn 'Sinumpaang Salaysay/Kahilingan' (Exhibit '8', p. 101, Rollo) praying for the release of the deposited palay in the name of Defendant-Appellee in favor of Efren Reyes as payment of lease rentals.

The foregoing affirm the claim of Defendant-Appellee as tenant-lessee on the landholding. The 'Sinumpaang Salaysay/Kahilingan' (Exhibit '8') were all sworn and/or notarized. These affidavits, being notarized are, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face (Realino vs. Villamor, 87 SCRA 318). As the function of a Notary Public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements (Cruz v. Villazor, 54 SCRA 31). Efren Reyes and Felipe Nuguid are bound by their voluntary admissions and declarations against their own interest appearing in the affidavits and/or contract. After executing the affidavit voluntarily wherein Reyes made admissions and declarations against his own interest under the solemnity of an oath, he cannot be allowed to spurn them and undo what he had done. He cannot, even 'with great repentance, retrieve the body he forsook and now wishes to live' (Dequito vs. Llamas, 66 SCRA 504).

Thus, when Efren Reyes executed a 'Sinumpaang Salaysay' (Annex 'D', p. 105, Rollo) denouncing the Agricultural Leasehold Contract and not recognizing Defendant-Appellee as tenant-lessee on the landholding is of no moment. Consequently, the contentions of Complainants-Appellants against Defendant-Appellee are untenable."

Naturally, once established, the agricultural lessee has the right to continue working on the land unless otherwise terminated in accordance with law.

Also, the appellee's right of redemption should be sustained. While it is true that a Deed of Sale was executed between Efren Reyes and the appellants on June 26, 1997, the document is not binding considering that it was executed without the knowledge and consent of the appellee, the latter a tenant. As a matter of fact, he continued paying the lease rentals in good faith to Efren Reyes and it was only during the pendency of the case before the Board a quo that the appellee learned of the supposed sale in favor of the appellant.

Under Sections 11 and 12, RA No. 3844, as amended by RA No. 6389, the right of the agricultural lessee to purchase the property, if sold to another party, is preferred, and the entire landholding is to be pre-empted by the land authority, thus (Rollo, p. 45):

"Sec. 11.       Lessee's Right of Pre-emption. — In case the agricultural lessor decides to sell the landholding, the agricultural lessee shall have the preferential right to buy the same under reasonable terms and conditions: Provide, That the entire landholding offered for sale must be pre-empted by the Land Authority if the landowner so desires, unless the majority of the lessees object to such acquisition: Provided, further, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said preferential right only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of pre-emption under this Section may be exercised within ninety days from notice in writing, which shall be served by the owner on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform."

The lessee has also the right to do redemption, supposedly to be exercised within a period of 180 days from notice in writing by the vendee, thus (Rollo, p. 46):

"Sec. 12.       Lessee's Right of Redemption. — In case the landholding is sold to third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section maybe exercised within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served by the vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption. The redemption price shall be the reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale.

'Upon the filing of the corresponding petition or request with the department or corresponding case in court by the agricultural lessee or lessees, the said period of one hundred eighty days shall cease to run.

'Any petition or request for redemption shall be resolved within sixty days from the filing thereof; otherwise, the said period shall start to run again.

'The Department of Agrarian Reform shall initiate, while the Land Bank shall finance, said redemption as in the case of preemption.'"

Pre-emption and redemption would necessarily implement the policy of the State to establish a system of ownership-cultivatorship, if not to uplift the dignity of a small farmer, the latter supposedly to be freed from pernicious institutional restraints and practices; the objective is to inculcate in every tenant-farmer an independent and self-reliant existence that would make him a strong and responsible citizen of society so that he can play a role in nation-building (Baltazar vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 619; Hidalgo vs. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 106).

There is certainly no valid pretension by the appellants that DARAB committed errors of fact or law that would justify a modification of the contested Decision. Necessarily, DARAB's findings of fact, should be accepted by Us as binding. As a matter of fact, appellants' limited argument was that, the appellee as a top-brass executive of a Makati corporation could not do cultivation of the contested property, a "point" that DARAB supposedly failed to appreciate.

Appellee also said (Rollo, pp. 84-85):

"Teodoro Cruz' employment as executive in Geotesting International cannot disqualify him from being a tenant of the subject landholding. Assuming for the sake of argument that he work for six days a week, it is important to note that he is entitled to a leave of absence. And in that particular time, he can personally perform all phases of agricultural labor on the subject landholding particularly on the planting season, harvesting and threshing. Further, it is important to note that Teodoro Cruz always goes home at Baliuag every weekends to personally attend to his farmlot. Thus, considering the above-mentioned, personal cultivation has been duly satisfied. Our Supreme Court in several cases ruled that only Policemen and other persons engaged in maintaining peace and order are disqualified from becoming a tenant because they are obliged to work 24 hours a day thus have no time to personally perform all phases of agricultural labor. Further, it is noteworthy to state that if ever herein respondent-appellee is living in a comfortable life, it should not be a factor to disqualify him as a tenant. His comfortable status in life is attributed to hardwork and patience. . . ."

There is logic in his argument.

We have no option but to direct dismissal of the petition.

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, herein Petition for Review is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED

Ynares-Santiago and Rivera, JJ ., concur.