TWELFTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. CV No. 51347. September 2, 1997.]
SALVADOR RILI-MARIANO and LEONARDO C. MARIANO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. GLICERIO R. BRIOSO, substituted by FELICIDAD Z. BRIOSO BENER Z. BRIOSO, JULITO Z. BRIOSO, GLICERIO Z. BRIOSO, JR., and ERNESTO BRIOSO, CONCEPCION BRIOSO-NOLASCO, MARCOS NOLASCO and SALVADOR BRIOSO, defendants-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
MONTOYA, J p:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Libmanan Camarines Sur (Branch 29) dated July 14, 1995 in Civil Case No. L-006 (214), the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, after proper evaluation of the evidence presented by both parties, this court finds and holds that the preponderance of evidence is in favor of the plaintiffs. Hence, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Concepcion Brioso-Nolasco and her husband, Salvador Brioso and the substitute defendants for deceased defendant Glicerio Brioso who are ordered to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, in the proportion stated earlier:
a) (Illegible Portion)
b) P147,000.00 for transportation, hotel and representation expenses;
c) P95,000.00, for income loss from employment and business activities;
d) P20,000.00 for attorney's fees;
e) P150,000.00 for moral damages;
f) P50,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
g) To pay the costs.
All these amounts shall earn interest at (Illegible Portion) fully paid by the defendants.
The defendants are (Illegible Portion) directed to immediately turn-over the physical and material possession of Lots (Illegible Portion) 725 to the plaintiffs as reflected in Exh. D.
SO ORDERED.
On May 27, 1977, Salvador Rili-Mariano and Leonardo C. Mariano filed a complaint for recovery of real property against Glicerio R. Brioso, Ernesto E. Brioso, Concepcion Z. Brioso-Nolasco, Eusebio Nocedal and Salvador Brioso in the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. On February 26, 1980, an amended complaint was filed in (Illegible Portion) to include as additional defendants Marcos Nolasco the husband of Concepcion and the Land Bank of the Philippines.
In their complaint plaintiffs alleged that they are the legitimate and lawful owners of a parcel of land (Plan Psu-168948) with an area of 19.5229 hectares located at (Illegible Portion) Libmanan, Camarines Sur. According to the plaintiffs they sold the subject land to the defendant Glicerio Brioso on August 22, 1970 under a sale with right to repurchase within a period of five (5) years; that they were able to make the repurchase through the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in refused to (Illegible Portion) 718, 722 (Illegible Portion) rights thereto; that they then brought the matter to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and after all the procedures and investigations the DAR of July 14, 1975 found the (Illegible Portion) the defendants absolutely without merit and ordered the defendants to vacate and surrender the possession of the lots to plaintiffs; that the defendants appealed the case to the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture which sustained the findings of the DAR; and that the defendants still refuse to turn over the physical and material possession of the subject lots, so that the plaintiffs were constrained to file the present action after having suffered damages.
On June 11, 1977, defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that there is another pending action between the same parties before the Court of Agrarian Relations (Branch 1 Naga City). The plaintiffs submitted an opposition to the motion to dismiss.
On June 16, 1977, the court issued an order dismissing the complaint, but on plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, the case was ordered reinstated on February 14, 1979.
On February 27, 1979, the defendants filed their answer. They denied some material allegations in the complaint and as affirmative and special defenses, alleged that the complaint states no cause of action against defendant Glicerio Brioso because the latter had surrendered all his interest over the subject property upon repurchase by the plaintiffs; and that the other defendants were installed as tenants by Glicerio while he was still the vendee-a-retro. They also claim that the court has not jurisdiction over the complaint because there was no certification from the Department of Agrarian Reform that the case is proper for trial.
On February 22, 1980, defendants amended their answer. They alleged therein that defendants Ernesto Brioso. Concepcion Nolasco and Eusebio Nocedal have remained in possession of their respective landholdings being bona-fide tenants and had been religiously complying with their obligation as tenants-tillers. They claim that the findings of the Department of Agrarian Reform regarding the tenancy status are not binding upon the court and are therefore irrelevants and immaterial.
By way of counterclaim, defendants alleged that the payment of P57,000.00 in 25-year LBP bonds was accepted only because of the agreement between the plaintiffs and defendant Glicerio Brioso that the former would replace or convert into cash the said bonds as soon as they shall have been paid for the other properties they had sold to the Department of Agrarian Reform; and that plaintiffs had refused to abide by their agreement to the damage and prejudice of the defendants.
On August 30, 1987, defendant Glicerio Brioso died. Defendants' counsel accordingly filed a notice of death on September 18, 1987, stating therein the names and addresses of the heirs of Glicerio Brioso. On September 26, 1987, counsel for the plaintiffs filed a motion for the substitution of the deceased defendant Glicerio Brioso by his legal heirs. On October 8, 1987, the Regional Trial Court granted said motion.
The evidence presented by the parties at the hearing showed that on February 1, 1975, the plaintiffs had repurchased the subject property through the Land Bank of the Philippines who paid defendant Glicerio Brioso P13,000.00 in cash and P57,000.00 in LBP 25-year bonds. (Exh. N-1). It appears that on the same day, plaintiffs sent a letter to the defendants requesting the turn-over of all the documents, promissory notes and other papers pertinent to the pacto-de-retro sale as well as the physical possession of the subject property. In a letter dated March 11, 1974, the plaintiffs advised defendants to turn over the remaining 7.21 hectares of land to the Office of the Agrarian Reform Team and to desist from any plan of cultivating the area to avoid incurring unnecessary expenses. (Exh. A-3). Another letter was sent to the defendants informing them that the plaintiffs already applied for retention rights over lots 715, 716, 718, 722, 724, 725 with the Department of Agrarian Reform, (Exh. A-4).
Evidence was submitted showing that defendant Glicerio Brioso initially applied under the Operation Land Transfer for the subject property claiming that he is a qualified tenant-beneficiary. However, the Land Reform Team found that Glicerio was disqualified as a tenant of the subject property. The latter then listed his children, herein defendants Ernesto Brioso, and Concepcion Brioso-Nolasco and his mechanic Eusebio Nocedal as tenants of the subject property. When the plaintiffs demanded the return of the subject property, these defendants refused to turn over their possession thereof claiming to be legitimate tenants, hence, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant Glicerio Brioso with the District Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform in Naga City on June 5, 1974 to assail the status and qualifications of Ernesto Brioso, Concepcion Brioso-Nolasco and Eusebio Nocedal as beneficiaries of the Operation Land Transfer program.
On December 26, 1974, District Office No. 10 of the Department of Agrarian Reform in Naga City rendered a decision (Exh. 1), the dispositive portion of which provides:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) Declaring Ernesto Briones as the only tenant de jure of the landholding in question, more particularly Lot Nos. 715 and 718;
(2) Declaring that the portion being claimed by Concepcion B. Nolasco and Eusebio Nocedal be returned to the herein complainants pursuant to the legal documents executed by the defendant and his wife in consideration of the settlement of the complainants outstanding obligation as vendee-a-retro."
An appeal was filed with the Acting Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform in Legaspi City which case was eventually referred to the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform in Diliman, Quezon City, which rendered a decision on July 14, 1975 (Exh. Q), the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, Order is hereby issued:
1. Declaring the portion of Cad. Lot No. 5, PSU-97524, referred to as "pastro"; and situated in Tarum, Libmanan, Camarines Sur as not primarily devoted to rice and/or corn, and accordingly, dismissing for lack of merit the claims of Stephen Camaing, Priscilo Camaing, Horacio Erasmo, Lucio Ferrer, Jaime Pelagio, Delfin Candelaria, Jr., Salvador Ferrer, Panfilo Ferrer, David Presentacion, Jorge Mabuhay, Jaime Quinones, Fernando Sayno, Gabriel Alarma, Valentin Suniga, Felix Candelaria, Jovenal Ferrer and Victorio Molina to portions thereof; provided, however that such claimants as are actual residents/occupants of the "pastro" shall not be ejected therefor;
2. Denying, for lack of merit, the petition for revaluation of lands already transferred to tenants;
3. Declaring parcellary Lots 403 and 411, situated in Tampuhan, Libmanan, as primarily devoted to rice and corn, and, accordingly, affirming the certificates of land transfer issued to Geronimo Operio and Gaudencio Operio for the said lots;
4. Denying, for lack of merit, the petition to award parcellary Lot 401 (Tampuhan) in favor of one Maria Cordial, and accordingly, affirming the certificates of land transfer issued to Domingo Oxales for the said lot;
5. Declaring Ernesto Brioso not a tenant-tiller and recalling the certificates of transfer issued to him for Lots 715 and 718;
6. Directing petitioner to recognize Domingo Guerrero as tenant-tiller of Lot 724 and maintain him (Guerrero) as lessee thereof until said lot shall have been disposed of in the manner to be prescribed in the rules implementing Presidential Decree No. 27;
7. Requiring Domingo Guerrero to pay provisional rentals to the Land Bank of the Philippines with respect to Lot 718 and to the petitioner with respect to Lot 724, until the said lots shall have been disposed of to other qualified persons;
8. Requiring Eusebio Nocedal to cultivate Lot 715 and to pay provisional rental therefore to the Land Bank until said lot shall have been disposed of to other qualified persons;
9. Directing the Land Bank of the Philippines to hold in trust Lots 715 and 718 and to collect rentals therefrom;
10. Granting the petitioner such other remedies as may be legally permissible in the premises." (Emphasis supplied)
On April 11, 1977, defendant Ernesto Brioso filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, but the motion was dismissed for lack of merit on August 10, 1977. On appeal to the Office of the President, the Order dated July 14, 1974 of the Department of Agrarian Reform was sustained and the motion of the defendants was dismissed on January 2, 1979. (Exh. A-10).
On November 17, 1981, upon plaintiffs' motion, the lower court issued an order dismissing the case against the defendant Land Bank of the Philippines, Ernesto Brioso and Glicerio Brioso. Later, however, the order was amended changing the name of Glicerio Brioso to Eusebio Nocedal.
On July 14, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs. It held that:
"Incidentally, because the DAR found that the defendant Concepcion Brioso-Nolasco has never been a tenant-tiller as she was merely made to appear as tenant after her father defendant Glicerio Brioso was disqualified to become beneficiary under Operation Land Transfer, her continued possession and cultivation of the lots (Lot 716, 722 and 725) is illegal and any claim of title or right thereto is null and void.
Defendant Glicerio Brioso while actually did not possess or cultivate any portion of the land being claimed by the plaintiffs after he was found disqualified by the Agrarian Reform Team, nonetheless he was the root cause of all these troubles. He should have surrendered the land claimed by the plaintiffs. But, instead of doing so, he made it appear that certain parcels were cultivated by his children, defendants Ernesto and Concepcion, including his mechanic, defendant Nocedal, as tenants.
Likewise, defendant Atty. Salvador Brioso while actually did not possess any portion of the land claimed by the plaintiffs but, he was also responsible in giving wrong and illegal advises to his co-defendants to claim, possess and cultivate the land respectively claimed by them because they were allegedly entitled to.
The court believes that there can be no verbal agreement that plaintiffs will pay or redeem the Land Bank bonds of defendant Glicerio Brioso because the P57,000.00 Land Bank bonds includes not only the repurchase price but also the interest and other charges and the Land Bank bonds earns a 6% interest per annum. Aside from this, Glicerio Brioso who was a businessman cannot be prejudiced by accepting the Land Bank bonds for the bonds may be used as collateral for loans from government banking institutions. It may be used also in payment of taxes with the government.
The letter of defendant Glicerio R. Brioso to the plaintiffs dated January 27, 1975 (Exh. 1) has no probative value it being self-serving. Likewise, the letter of defendant Glicerio Brioso to His Excellency Ferdinand E. Marcos (Exh. 2), the unsigned telegram of defendant Glicerio R. Brioso to President Marcos dated January 10, 1977 (Exh. 3) and the letter of defendant Glicerio R. Brioso to Mr. Teodoro F. Valencia c/o Over a Cup of Coffee. "Bulletin Today, Manila" dated July 7, 1977 (Exh. 4) do not mean anything and proves nothing."
The defendants heirs of Glicerio Brioso, including Concepcion Brioso-Nolasco and Salvador Brioso filed this appeal contending that:
"I
The trial court erred in rendering a decision notwithstanding the fact that there has been no valid substitution of the deceased Glicerio Brioso. principal defendants in this case.
II
The trial court erred in concluding that defendant-appellant Atty. Salvador Brioso had allegedly "shown extreme bad faith and improper conduct being an officer of the court."
III
The trial erred in granting damages to plaintiffs-appellees.
IV
The trial court erred in holding that there was no valid agreement wherein plaintiffs-appellees would convert the P57,000.00 LBP bonds into cash.
V
The trial court erred in holding that Concepcion Brioso-Nolasco is not a tenant-tiller of the lots in question."
Defendants-appellants maintain that the decision of the trial court does not bind them since the court had not acquired jurisdiction over their persons for lack of notice to them of the substitution by the court. This contention has no merit.
Rules 3, Sec. 17 of the Rules of Court provides:
"Death of party. — After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs."
In this case, the records show that on September 23, 1987, Atty. Augusto Pardales, counsel for defendants, filed a notice of death informing the court that, defendant Glicerio R. Brioso died on August 30, 1987. (p. 316, Records) Counsel for the plaintiffs accordingly filed a Motion for Substitution of Deceased Defendant on October 5, 1987 (p. 318, Records) The trial court on October 8, 1987 issued an Order which reads:
"The motion of Atty. Gradeda to substitute the deceased defendant Glicerio Brioso is hereby admitted.
SO ORDERED."
Subsequently, the heirs of Glicerio Brioso, namely: Mrs. Felicidad Z. Brioso, Benet Z. Brioso, Julito Z. Brioso, Glicerio Z. Brioso, Jr., Ernesto Z Brioso, Concepcion Brioso-Nolasco, and Salvador Z. Brioso, were made substitute defendants in the case. Their counsels were definitely aware of such substitution. In fact, one of them, Atty. Salvador Z. Brioso, was one of the counsels for the defendants. It was the duty of said counsels to inform the heirs of the substitution after the court had issued the order granting the motion of the plaintiffs.
Moreover, Ernesto Brioso cannot deny the fact that he knew of the pendency of the action and the substitution of the heirs because he participated as a witness for the defendants even after the case against him was earlier dismissed. Undoubtedly, the court had acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the heirs and the judgment is thereby binding upon all of them.
Defendant-appellants claim that the trial court erred in holding that Atty. Salvador Brioso showed "extreme bad faith and improper conduct as an officer of the court" and thus held him jointly and severally liable, in his capacity as the lawyer of the defendants, to the plaintiffs for damages.
It appears that Salvador Brioso, as a lawyer, represented his siblings as their counsel in several cases filed in the Department of Agrarian Reform and in the trial court regarding the subject property under their claim of tenancy rights thereto. As such, the trial court held that Salvador Brioso should have advised his sister to surrender possession of the subject properties and should have desisted from filing other cases in the Department of Agrarian Reform concerning their claims to the subject lands. The trial court held that Salvador Brioso showed extreme bad faith and improper conduct as an officer of the court "by encouraging the defendant Concepcion Brioso-Nolasco to continue to illegally possess the land properly belonging to the plaintiffs." In other words, the trial court found Salvador Brioso liable for damages for having acted as lawyer of the defendants.
This court believes that if any action of Salvador Brioso, in representing his siblings as a lawyer and officer of the court, is actionable, he may, if at all, be liable only in a separate action either administrative or civil and not in the same case where he appears as counsel. (see De Borja vs. De Borja, 101 Phil. 916)
In this case, however, even if Salvador Brioso is absolved from being liable for damages to the plaintiffs-appellees in his capacity as lawyer and counsel of the other defendants, he remains liable for damages as one of the heirs of Glicerio Brioso.
Defendants-appellants also contend that the trial court erred in finding them liable for damages to the plaintiffs-appellees. They contend that the award of actual damages to the plaintiffs-appellees were based on evidence that were merely speculative, conjectural and hypothetical.
Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proved with reasonable degree of certainty, and courts, in making an award, must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne. (Del Mundo vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 348) The trial court in this case found that:
"The evidence presented by both parties show that plaintiffs were illegally and maliciously deprived of the possession and produce of Lots 716, 722 and 725 with an aggregate area of 3.56 hectares. This land being irrigated, would produce based on conservative estimate of about 66 cavans of palay per hectare, (Annex 1-a to Exh. C). The Court finds the assumption in the Computation of Income Loss Yield (Annex 1-A of Exh. C-1) as feasible and reasonable, if not a very conservative estimate. Consequently, the plaintiffs suffered and actual loss or damage in the amount of P303,972.45 from Lots 716, 722 and 725 for the period covering the years 1974 to 1985 in the total amount of P147,000.00 (Exh. C). This claim is also supported by Exhs. F, F-1 to F-75. The plaintiffs also suffered income loss from employment and business activities in the amount of P95,000.00 (paragraph C, Annexes 3 and 4 of Exh. C). They also suffered worries, pressures, and anxieties as testified to by plaintiff Salvadora Rili-Mariano (p. 22, tsn, Oct. 17, 1985) With this clear testimony of plaintiff Salvador Rili-Mariano that they suffered anguish, anxiety, etc. they are entitled to moral damages. . . In this case, plaintiffs were dispossessed unlawfully, maliciously and fraudulently by the defendants of their property and, therefore, they are entitled to a bigger amount for moral damages. However, the claim for opportunity loss in the amount of P389,357.96 (Exh. C-1) is not tenable, it being speculative, even if the plaintiffs would convert the lots into a seed farm and, therefore, it cannot be granted. For attorney's fees and other legal expenses, the plaintiffs paid the amount of P20,000.00."
It appears from the records that the plaintiffs-appellees had presented concrete evidence to prove the amount of actual damages that were incurred by them as a result of the refusal of the defendants-appellants to surrender to them the possession of the subject properties. It is also shown in the records that defendants-appellants failed to object to the evidence of the plaintiffs-appellees during trial. They even failed to submit a formal objection to all the documentary evidence of the plaintiffs-appellees, hence, they were admitted by the court for the purposes for which they were presented.
Defendants-appellants claim that the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs-appellees are not based on actual facts, but they do not have evidence to substantiate such claim. The evidence presented by defendant Nolasco showing the actual quantity of palay harvested in the two landholdings they were claiming (Exhs. 8, 8-A to 8-M, 9, 9-A to 9-E, 10, 10-A to 10-E) cannot be given probative value considering that their tenancy status had not been established and that they had been found to have held the landholdings in bad faith. This evidence was validly considered as self-serving.
On the other hand, the trial court ruled that the computation made by the plaintiffs with respect to the income and produce of the subject properties were conservative and reasonable, and the trial court had no reason to reject the said computation.
Defendants-appellants claim that the evidence of the plaintiffs-appellees particularly on transportation expenses show that most of the dates on the Philippine National Railways tickets of the plaintiffs-appellees from Libmanan/Naga City to Manila and back did not correspond to dates when hearings were actually conducted. Defendants-appellants obviously forgot that as a result of the pendency of a case in court, parties do not incur expenses on transportation only during hearings; they also incur travel expenses for reasons related to the case pending in court. There are times when meetings are set prior to hearing dates. There are also times when the case would require the parties to go to places to obtain documents or pertinent papers that are needed for the trial. All these travel expenses are legitimate expenses that can be considered in computing actual damages.
As regards the award of moral and exemplary damages, we agree with the trial court that as a result of the continuous refusal of the defendants to surrender the physical possession of the subject properties maliciously and in bad faith despite a final ruling in the Department of Agrarian Reform that they do not have the right to possess the subject lands because of the absence of tenancy relations between them and the plaintiffs-appellees, the latter are entitled to recover moral and exemplary damages from the defendants-appellants.
With respect to their counter-claim that plaintiffs-appellees had refused to convert to cash the LBP bonds that were paid to Glicerio Brioso under their verbal agreement, we agree with the trial court that there was no concrete evidence to prove that such verbal agreement was indeed made by and between the said parties, except the self-serving evidence and unsubstantiated claim of the defendants-appellants. The trial court had carefully studied the evidence on record, specifically: (a) the letter of the plaintiffs to the Land Bank of the Philippines with the conformity of the defendant Glicerio Brioso dated January 22, 1974 (Exh. R) regarding the redemption of the subject properties from the latter, which did not mention anything about converting the LBP bonds to cash; (b) the Assignment of Rights executed by plaintiffs again with the conformity of Glicerio Brioso (Exh. M) which did not indicate that the bonds shall be converted to cash on a later date; and (c) the Affidavit of Quitclaim executed by defendant Glicerio Brioso with the marital consent of his wife Felicidad Zaldua and witnessed by their son Salvador Brioso wherein he renounced whatever claim he had against the plaintiff and acknowledged receipt of the redemption price of P70,000.00 which again did not mention anything about the LBP bonds being converted to cash.
The letter written by Glicerio Brioso in 1976 (Exh. I); to the plaintiffs-appellees cannot be given much consideration since it is self-serving and they do not provide concrete information proving the existence of a verbal agreement to convert the LBP bonds into cash. Again, we adopt the findings of the trial court which held:
"The court believes that there can be verbal agreement that plaintiffs will pay or redeem the Land Bank bonds of defendant Glicerio Brioso because the P57,000.00 Land Bank bonds includes not only the repurchase price but also the interest and other charges and the Land Bank bonds earns a 6% interest per annum. Aside from this, Glicerio Brioso who was a businessman cannot be prejudiced by accepting the Land Bank bonds for the bonds may be used as collateral for loans from government banking institutions. It may be used also in payment of taxes with the government.
The letter of defendant Glicerio R. Brioso to the plaintiffs dated January 27, 1975 (Exh. 1) has no probative value it being self-serving. Likewise, the letter of defendant Glicerio Brioso to His Excellency Ferdinand E. Marcos (Exh. 2), the unsigned telegram of defendant Glicerio R. Brioso to President Marcos dated January 10, 1977 (Exh. 3) and the letter of defendant Glicerio R. Brioso to Mr. Teodoro F. Valencia c/o Over a Cup of Coffee, "Bulletin Today, Manila" dated July 7, 1977 (Exh. 4) do not mean anything and proves nothing."
Lastly, defendants-appellants claim that the trial court erred in holding that defendant-appellant Concepcion B. Nolasco is not a tenant-tiller of the subject lots.
This contention has no merit. The fact is clear that the issue of whether a tenancy relationship existed between plaintiffs-appellees and defendant-appellant Concepcion Nolasco had been resolved with finality at the Department of Agrarian Reform. The Department of Agrarian Reform had already made its own findings and had ruled that defendant Concepcion Nolasco is not a tenant of the subject lots. Defendants-appellants now claim that the trial court should not have relied on the findings of the Department of Agrarian Reform. This is unmeritorious.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. Later, the DARAB was created under Executive Order 129-A to assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. The term "agrarian dispute" under R.A. 6657 refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangement, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise.
Under RA 6657, the Regional Trial Courts are still designated as special agrarian courts with exclusive and original jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to land owners and the prosecution of criminal offenses under R.A. 6657. However, based on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it has been held that the trial court should not arrogate into itself the authority to resolved a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. In the case of Machete vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 176, the Supreme Court held that the resolution by the Department of Agrarian Reform of the agrarian dispute is to the best advantage of the parties since it is in a better position to resolve dispute, being the administrative agency presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter.
From the foregoing therefore, the trial court was justified in taking cognizance of the findings of the Department of Agrarian Reform regarding the non-existence of a tenancy relationship between plaintiffs-appellees and the defendant-appellant Concepcion Brioso-Nolasco.
All told, we find no reason not to sustain the findings and conclusion of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Labitoria and Aliño-Hormachuelos, JJ., concur.