TENTH DIVISION

[CA-G.R. SP No. 56036.  August 30, 2000.]

CONRADO W. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. HON. PETRITA BRAGA DIME, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 14, Malolos, Bulacan, and SIMEON ESPINOLA, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CRUZ, J p:

Subject of an unlawful detainer suit instituted by Simeon Espinola (or "private respondent") against Conrado W. Cruz (or "petitioner") in the Municipal Trial Court ("MTC") of Paombong, Bulacan is the 241 square-meter portion (or "premises in question") of a lot with an area of 21,858 square meters, situated at San Vicente, Paombong, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-076 in the name of the former. The lot was purchased by private respondent from Socorro C. Balisario (or "Balisario"), who acquired the same thru Emancipation Patent No. 496359.

The action is predicated on the averments that petitioner occupied the premises in question thru tolerance of Balisario and that despite private respondent's demands as new owner of the lot, which embraces said premises, petitioner refused to vacate the same.

In his defense, petitioner averred that the instant case involves an agrarian dispute; that the premises in question forms part of the tillage of one Bernabe Atienza (or "Atienza"); and that petitioner had been in possession of said premises as owner thereof since 1994, while private respondent has never occupied the same.

On September 8, 1998, the MTC rendered a decision, the decretal portion of which reads:

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the Plaintiff to be entitled to physical possession of Lot No. 1 more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-076 (Exhibit A) and situated at San Vicente, Paombang, Bulacan and this Court orders:

1.      The Defendant, his heirs, assigns or any other persons claiming any right or interest over the subject premises under or in his name to vacate the same and surrender peaceful possession thereof in favor of the Plaintiff;

2.      The Defendant to pay the plaintiff damages limited to the fair rental value for the use and occupation of the premises in the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) a month from the date of last demand (May 27, 1997) until he finally vacates and restores full possession thereof to the Plaintiff; and

3.      The award of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) in favor of the Plaintiff as and by way of Attorney's fees and costs.

SO ORDERED."

Petitioner appealed the MTC decision to the Regional Trial Court (or "RTC") of Bulacan (Branch 14) which, on March 10, 1999, rendered a decision affirming the same. His motion for reconsideration having been denied per order dated November 10, 1999, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, ascribing gave abuse of discretion to the RTC and MTC in assuming jurisdiction over the action.

Petitioner asserts that it is the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board — not the ordinary courts — which has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action for the reasons (i) that the premises in question was acquired by private respondent thru an emancipation patent, while petitioner bought the same from Atienza, a beneficiary of another emancipation patent; and (ii) that the dispute involves sale and possession of a tenanted agricultural land.

The instant petition is without merit.

Sec. 1, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "a party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals".

The assailed decision was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the case being an appeal from the decision of the MTC. Seeking relief from the RTC decision, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 42, however, petitioner should have filed a petition for review, instead of certiorari.

It is well-settled that certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of when (i) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, and (ii) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding (Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760). The existence and availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari (Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442).

But even if treated as a petition for review, the action is nevertheless devoid of merit. Sec. 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 prescribes the jurisdiction of inferior courts in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, as follows:

"SEC. 33.     Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

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(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession."

It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential precept that the "jurisdiction of a court over a specific case, as well as the nature of the action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and is not made to depend upon the allegations in the answer or in a motion to dismiss" (Dio vs. Concepcion, 296 SCRA 579).

The complaint in this case categorically avers that the lot, of which the premises in question forms part, was acquired by private respondent from Balisario; that petitioner occupied said premises thru tolerance of Balisario; and that despite demands, petitioner refused to vacate said premises. These averments make out a case of unlawful detainer which falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC.

On the other hand, the complaint contains no allegation of an agrarian dispute nor sale and possession of a tenanted agricultural land. And even if petitioner's answer contains such averment, the MTC was not divested of jurisdiction over the case (Onquit vs. Binamira-Parcia, 297 SCRA 354).

Petitioner contends that the case at bench involves an agrarian dispute. However, he is not occupying the premises in question in the concept of a "tenant". In Carreon vs. Court of Appeals (291 SCRA 78), the Supreme Court characterized the term "tenant" as referring to "the rightful occupant of the land and its structures, but does not include those whose presence on the land is merely tolerated and without the benefit of contract, those who enter the land by force and deceit or those whose possession is under litigation". Since petitioner's occupation was merely an act of tolerance, it carries with it an implied promise that he would vacate the premises in question upon demand.

On the other hand, the assertion that the premises in question is a portion of the tillage of Atienza is belied by these undisputed findings of the MTC, as affirmed by the RTC, to wit:

"That the subject premises is a portion of the tillage of one Bernabe Atienza is belied by the fact that said person has another emancipation patent in his name involving another lot (lot no. 6) which is technically different from the lot in question. On the allegation that the area stated in Exhibit A is erroneous as it included a portion which the Plaintiff does not till, this Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the same is properly within the ambit an administrative case for correction or cancellation of an emancipation patent and, hence, the title cannot be colleraterally assailed herein. Unless and until Exhibit A is corrected or cancelled before the proper forum, it enjoys the presumption of having been regularly issued."

Finally, with respect to the contention that petitioner has a better right to the premises in question because he has been occupying the same since 1994, it is a well-established rule that mere possession cannot defeat the title of the holder of a Torrens title to real property. The Torrens title issued to private respondent has become indefeasible. As such, he has acquired a better right to the premises in question. And even supposing that petitioner bought the premises in question from Atienza, the remedy is not to collaterally attack private respondent's title but to institute an action to annul or impugn it (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 199).

Consequently, the MTC and, on appeal, the RTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer suit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, while the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan (Branch 14) is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Barcelona and Buzon, JJ., concur.