TENTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. SP No. 41800. January 7, 1997.]
SENTRO PARA SA TUNAY NA REPORMANG AGRARYO (SENTRA) FOUNDATION, NATIONWIDE COALITION OF FISHERFOLKS FOR AQUATIC REFORMS (NACFAR), PAMBANSANG LAKAS NG MAMAMALAKAYA NG PILIPINAS (PAMALAKAYA), NATIONAL NETWORK OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADVOCATES (NNARA), SAMAHAN NG MALAYANG MANGINGISDA — ANIBAN NG MANGAGAWANG AGRIKULTURA (SAMAMAAMA), UGNAYAN NG MGA MANGINGISDA SA BALAGTAS, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), HON, FLORENCIO ABAD JR., HON. GREGORIO ANDOLANA, HON, MIKE DEFENSOR, HON, MILAGROS LAUREL-TRINIDAD, HON. OSCAR RODRIDGUEZ and HON. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, petitioners, vs. HON. SECRETARY OF REFORM, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
MABUTAS, JR., J p:
Before Us is a petition (certiorari and prohibition) assailing the constitutionality of Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 7881, which amended Republic Act No. 6657 (the law which instituted the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program), and DAR Administrative Order No. 03, Series of 1995, which was issued by the respondent on May 16, 1995.
Tracking down the antecedent facts of the case, We discerned the following substantial developments:
On June 7, 1988, Congress passed the consolidated versions of House Bill No. 400 and Senate Bill No. 249, which legislation later became Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
Said law was subsequently amended by Republic Act No. 7881 which took effect on March 12, 1995.
The assailed Section 1 of said law (Republic Act No. 7881) amended Section 3, Paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 6657 and was worded as follows:
"SEC. 3. Definitions. — For the purpose of this Act, unless the context indicates otherwise:
"(b) Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity means the cultivation of the soil, planting of cross, growing of fruits trees, including the harvesting of such farm products and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural of juridical." page 2689, No. 18, Vol. 91 of the Official Gazette).
On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7881 amended Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657 which reads as follows:
"(c) SEC. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. —
"(a) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish santuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.
"(b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act: Provided, That said prawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
"In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have been subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, by voluntary offer to sell, or commercial farms deferment or notices of compulsory acquisition, a simple and absolute majority of the actual regular workers or tenants must consent to the exemption within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act. When the workers or tenants do not agree to this exemption, the fishponds or prawn farms shall be distributed colletively to the worker-beneficiaries or tenants who shall form a cooperative or association to manage the same.
"In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have not been subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the consent of the farm workers shall no longer be necessary, however, the provision of Section 32-A hereof on incentives shall apply."
"(c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public of private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production center, church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and guarantine centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed, shall be exempt from the coverage of the Act." (pages 2689-2690, id.).
While Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7881 amended Section 11, Paragraph 1 of Republic Act No. 6657 and is worded as follows:
'SEC. 11. Commercial Farming. — Commercial farms, which are private agricultural lands devoted to saltbeds, fruit farms, orchards, vegetable and cut-flower farms, and cacao, coffee and rubber plantations, shall be subject to immediate compulsory acquisition and distribution after ten (10) years from the effectivity of this Act. In the case of new farms, the ten-year period shall begin from the first year of commercial production and operation, as determined by the DAR. During the ten-year period, the Government shall initiate steps necessary to acquire these lands, upon payment of just compensation for the land and the improvements thereon, preferably in favor of organized cooperatives or associations, which shall thereafter manage the said lands for the workers-beneficiaries," (page 2690, id.).
On May 16, 1995, the respondent promulgated Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1995, entitled "Rules and Regulations Governing the Exemption/Exclusion of Fishponds and Prawn Farms from the Coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) . . .," pursuant to Rep. Act No. 6657, as amended by R.A. No. 7881, which order took effect on May 27, 1995.
The foregoing development spurred the petitioners to file a petition (G.R. No. 122170) with the Supreme Court (page 3-43 of the Rollo) alleging that Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 7881 are "violative of the Constitution." They averred:
". . . By exempting fishponds and prawn farms, Congress has transcended the constitutional mandate which calls for the coverage of ALL agricultural lands, including fishponds and prawn farms under agrarian reform . . . .
"The passing into law of this Amendatory Act constitutes grave abuse of power and discretion by Congress amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which must be corrected by this Honorable Court in the exercise of its judicial power . . . ." (page 4, Petition).
The petitioners also contended that the respondent "acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in enforcing Republic Act No. 7881 and inpromulgating Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1995" (page 14, Petition).
Branding their petition as an original action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court." the petitioners interposed the following grounds therefor:
"A. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7881 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THE CONSTITUTION MANDATES THE JUST DISTRIBUTION OF ALL AGRICULTURAL LANDS, INCLUSIVE OF FISHPONDS AND PRAWNFARMS, UNDER THE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM.
"B. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7881 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THE EXEMPTION OF FISHPONDS AND PRAWN FARMS FROM THE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION INASMUCH AS FARMERS AND FISHERFOLKS STAND ON THE SAME FOOTING.
"C. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7881 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THE EXEMPTION OF FISHPONDS AND PRAWNFARMS RUNS CONTRARY TO THE REDISTRIBUTIVE SPIRIT OF THE SOCIAL JUSTICE PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION." (pages 14-15, the Petition).
On November 13, 1995, the Supreme Court issued a resolution, part of which reads as follows:
"Considering the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or issuance of a temporary restraining order, the Court, with out giving due course to the petition, Resolved to: (1) require the respondent to COMMENT thereon, (not to file a motion to dismis), within ten (10) days from notice; and (2) ISSUE the TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER prayed for effective as of this date and to continue to be so effective during the entire period that the case is pending or until further orders. . . ." (page 82, Rollo).
On December 21, 1995, an interested party (Tomas C. Llamas) filed a "Motion For Leave Of Court To File Comment By Way Of Intervention" (page 101, id.), which comment he filed on January 19, 1996 (pp. 119-141.id.).
On April 22, 1996, other individuals (the Chamber of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of the Philippines, Inc., Edgardo G. Sarrosa, Arnolo I. Goco, and Alonso L. Tan) filed an urgent motion for leave to intervene (pages 182-184, id.), attaching thereto their answer in intervention (pages 185-221, id.).
On July 31, 1996, the Supreme Court handed down a resolution referring the case to this Court "for proper determination and disposition" (page 224, id.).
The petition is devoid of merit.
After a fine filtration of the petition — taking note also of the "Answer in Intervention" filed by intervenors Chamber of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of the Philippines, Inc. et al. (pages 185-223, Rollo) and the Comment filed by interested party Tomas C. Llamas (pages 119-140, id.) — this Court, taking note of the Supreme Court's ruling in Mariano, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections (242 SCRA 211) feels that it cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 7881 and DAR Administrative Order No. 3 Series of 1995 which implemented the same. As stated in said case, the requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well-delineated, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself (Dumlao vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392).
Relative to the first requirement (it has been opined that an actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights — an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial adjudication. Said case must not be moot, academic, or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.
On the other hand, the term "controversy" was classified thus: It must be one that is appropriated for judicial determination. A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character or from one that is academic or moot. The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. (Aetna Life Ins. Co. vs. Haworth. 300 U.S. 227).
In the case at bench, such requirement is wanting. As aptly observed by the intervenors (Chamber of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of the Philippines, Inc. et al.), such need standards for the exercise of judicial review of a law on the ground of unconstitutionality are "totality wanting" (pages 12-22, Answer In Intervention). The petition does not show/mention any actual case or controversy arising from the disputed law (Republic Act No. 7881), the decision of which (the constitutionality of the law) is necessary for the determination of said case/controversy. There is no showing that the petitioners ever questioned the constitutionality of RA 7881 before the respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Also, they never assailed the respondent's guidelines to enforce the law (Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1995) before any forum before filing the instant petition with the Supreme Court. Much less did they call his (respondent's) attention to any injury or threatened personal injury arising from the enforcement of the aforemention administrative order. Further, they did not file any case with the lower courts asking that they be relived from obeying the questioned law on constitutional grounds.
With respect to the second requirement, We are reminded of Justice Jose P. Laurel's posture that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must hve a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement" (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). A proper party then is one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of (Ex Parte Levitt, 303 U.S. 633). Thus, until and unless such actual or potential injury is established, the complainant cannot have the legal personality to raise the constitutional question.
In the case at bench, the petitioners merely aver that their members are "directly and adversely affected by the challenged provisions of the law," but such averment was not conceptualized (how, when or where) thereby portraying merely contingencies which may or may not happen. In short, a hypothetical issue is being foisted as they may not even be the part(ies) to be adversely affected by the enforcement of the law they are now challenging. As aptly observed by the intervenors, the petitioners "have no locus standi or standing, because they have no interest personal and substantial to raise constitutional questions" — "they have not shown any direct, personal, immediate and substantial injury arising from operation of the statute, as well as no burdens or penalties by reason of said statute." (page 15-16, Answer In Intervention). Indeed, petitioners' averments appeared to be anchored on speculations, there being no clear showing as to how they are, or will be, adversely affected by the questioned legislation. As has been ruled, a controversy must be one that is appropriate or "ripe" for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory (Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, 204 SCRA 516).
Aside from the foregoing, this Court failed to see any grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent in enforcing Republic Act No. 7881 since he was duty-bound to do so. At this juncture, We wish to state anew that the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction (which the respondent unquestionably had) and not errors of judgment (Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo, 28 SCRA 890: Bimeda vs. Perez, et al., 93 Phil. 636; Fernando vs. Vasquez, 31 SCRA 288; Butuan Bay Wood Export Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 97 SCRA 297; Ramnani vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 582). It will not even issue for simole abuse of discretion (University of the Philippines vs. Civil Service Commission, 228 SCRA 207). When the issue of question involved effects the wisdom or soundness of a decision, not jurisdiction to render said decision or its validity, the same is beyond the province of the special civil action of certiorari (Philippine Surety and Insurance Co. vs. Jacala, et al., 108 Phil. 177; Makabingkil vs. People Homesite And Housing Corp., 72 SCRA 326: Ilacao vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 78 SCRA 301).
As could be gleaned from the records, the respondent was just acting in accord with the law (RA 7881). Thus, if in so acting he committed any error, he was not deprived of his jurisdiction or power to hand down, the assailed administrative order (No. 3, Series of 1995). Also, jurisprudence dictates that in the exercise of discretionary functions, good faith is always presumed (Llanto vs. Dimaporo, et al., 16 SCRA 599) — and on the party alleging bad faith lies the burden of proof. On this score, the petitioner failed (Mama, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 498). Thus, unless there is grave abuse of discretion, the courts may not review the discretionary act of a public officer (insular Motors, Inc. vs. City of Manila, et al., 67 Phil. 201). It is the policy of the courts not to interfere with the actions of the executive branch unless there is a clear showing of capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (Pajo, etc., et National Construction Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 217 SCRA 455), which fact does not exist in the case at bench, further, subject to well-settled exceptions not present here, certiorari does not lie against the legislative and executive branches or the members thereof acting in the exercise of their official functions, basically in consideration of the respect due from the judiciary to said departments of co-equal and coordinate ranks under the principle of separation of powers. Resultantly, the instant petition has to be junked.
Similarly, it has been ruled that a petition for prohibition must be based on jurisdictional grounds (Vda. de Suan vs. Unson, 185 SCRA 437). It is designed to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner (Planas vs. Gil. 67 Phil. 62; Lopez vs. City Judge, 18 SCRA 616). And to justify its issuance, there are certain requisites which must be complies with (Guingona, Jr. vs. City Fiscal of Manila, 137 SCRA 597). Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to comply with such requisites.
With the foregoing, petitioners' prayer for an injunctive relief finds no anchorage, for entitlement thereof necessitates a clear showing of a right — and others — claimed by them, as ruled in a long line of cases decided by the Supreme Court (Active Wood Products, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 183 SCRA 671; Viray vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 308; S & A Gaisano Incorporated vs. Hidalgo, 192 SCRA 224; Dionisio vs. Ortiz, 204 SCRA 746; Searth Commodities Corporation vs. Court of appeals, 207 SCRA 622; Syndicated Media Access Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 794; Carino vs. Capulong, 222 SCRA 593; Philip Morris, Inc vs. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 576; knecht vs. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 1), which requisites were not esctablished in the case at bench. This Court can not compel an agency to do a particular act or enjoin such act which is within its prerogative, except when in the exercise of its authority it gravely abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction (Provident Tree Farms, Inc. vs. Batario, Jr., 231 SCRA 463), which act was not established.
As We come to the finis, this Court wishes to quote the following pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Garcia vs. Secretary. (supra):
". . . Th policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE — and the same DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED
Gonzaga-Reyes and Aliño-Hormachuelos, JJ., concur.