SEVENTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. SP No. 40438. June 10, 1997.]
EUSEBIO T. TAGARO, JR., VIRGINIA TAGARO AZARCON and PAULITA TAGARO BARRIOS, represented by DR. REMEDIOS TAGARO TAMARRA, Administrator, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD DILIMAN, QUEZON CITY, TEODORO LAGARE , SR. and NARCISO LAGARE., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
IBAY-SOMERA, C., J p:
This Court is called upon to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board rendered on February 13, 1996 in DARAB Case No. 0441 entitled "Eusebio T. Tagaro, Jr., Virginia Tagaro Azarcon and Paulita Tagaro Barrios represented by Dr. Remedios Tagaro Tamarra, Administrator, Complainants-Appellees, vs. Teodoro Lagare, Sr., respondent-appellant". the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered the decision of the Board a quo, dated July 25, 1991, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Complainant-Appellees are directed to maintain the tenants in the peaceful cultivation and possession of the landholding in dispute under the leasehold system.
SO ORDERED."
(p. 33, Rollo)
The factual findings of the public respondent as contained in the assailed decision are hereby adopted following the well-settled rule that "findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies which have acquired properties because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality and are binding upon the court (Maya Farms Employees organization vs. NLRC, 239, SCRA 508; Papandayan vs. COMELEC, 230 SCRA 4691; Dasa Filipina Realty Corp. vs. Office of the President, 241 SCRA 165; Castillo vs. CA, 205 SCRA 529). Hence, the same is reproduced hereunder;
"Complaints-Appellees, heirs of the late Eusebio Tagaro, Sr., are co-owners of the following parcels of land all located at Dalapang, Ozamis City particularly described as follows:
a. Lot No. 2352-C-6 which has an area of thirty seven thousand seven hundred sixty nine (37,769) square meters, more or less;
b. Lot No. 2365-C-6 with an area of thirty seven thousand one hundred eighty three (37,183) square meters, more or less;
c. Lot No. 2832 with an area of six thousand three hundred thirty four (6,334) square meters.
Respondent-Appellant Teodoro Lagare, Sr., is the agricultural lessee of one point eight (1.8) hectares, more or less, while Respondent Narciso Lagare is the tenant of two point eight (2.8) hectares, more or less, of the aforesaid land.
The parties had a sharing arrangement of one-third/two-third (1/3-2/3) of the proceeds of coconuts in favor of the landowners. With respect to corn, cassava, ubi produce, etc., proceeds thereof inure to the benefit of the Respondent-Appellant.
In a complaint, dated November 18, 1990, Complainants-Appellees alleged that the sale of the copra on July 30, 1990 by herein Respondent-Appellant with intent to gain and defraud Complainants-Appellees amounting to about one hundred fifty (150) pieces of coconuts gathered from the subject landholding was discovered by Remedios T. Tamarra, the administratrix.
In view of the aforesaid alleged unlawful acts of Respondents-Appellant, Complainants-Appellees lodged a complaint before the office of the Barangay Captain of Dapalang, Ozamis City and to the Lupon but no settlement had been reached, Complainants-Appellees justified that the complaint was not filed before the Barangay Agrarian reform Committee (BARC) as there was no existing BARC in their place at that time.
Complainants-Appellees further averred that the administratrix had also discovered that Respondent-Appellant are making some coconut trees into tuba without the consent of Complainants-Appellees. This act is, therefore, inimical and prejudicial to Complainants-Appellees as it reduced the productivity of the said coconuts and the proceeds thereof simply inured to the benefit of Respondent-Appellant.
Moreover, Complainants-Appellees contended that Respondent-Appellant Teodoro Lagare, Sr., is not actually attending his duties as tenant since most of the time he is in the city driving tricycle. This makes him, therefore, incapable of performing his duties as tenant because the law mandates actual cultivations of the landholding.
On December 3, 1999, Respondent-Appellant were summoned and required to file their answer. Hence, on December 20, 1990, Respondent-Appellant filed an answer denying as Fraudulent the allegation of Complainants-Appellees since the one hundred fifty (150) pieces of coconuts found therein were actually set aside by Respondent-Appellant Teodoro Lagare, Sr., to be planted on his tenanted area. Respondent Narciso Lagare denied the participation in the acts of Respondent-Appellant Teodoro for reasons that they have separate and distinct area of cultivation. He admitted, however, that he is making tuba out of three (3) coconut trees through acquiescence, such fact having existed for a long period of time without any objection from Complainants-Appellees.
Respondent-Appellant Teodoro, on the other hand, clarified that he only drives the tricycle during off-season when there are no more work to be done in the landholding. Besides, he claimed that his child and wife have been assisting him in cultivating and harvesting the said cocoland.
By way of affirmative defense, Respondent-Appellant averred that the forum of this case should be with the BARC of Dapalang whose Chairman is Ireneo Rodriguez and not with the Barangay Captain nor the Lupon.
On February 7, 1991, an urgent motion for issuance of restraining order as filed by Complainants-Appellees to enjoin respondents from harvesting in the cocoland.
On February 8, 1991, the respondents vehemently opposed the motion for issuance of restraining order. They claimed that their tenure shall continue until the court states otherwise.
On February 11, 1991, the Honorable Board a quo denied the motion in accordance with Section 2, Rule X of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure which provides that the Board or any Adjudicator shall not issue any order restraining the actual tiller from cultivating the land or preventing or impounding the harvest.
On March 22, 1991, Respondent-Appellant Teodoro Lagare, Sr., reiterated his earlier statement that the cultivation is made by him personally together with his grown up child and wife. He, however, admitted that he drives the tricycle in the city only during off season and when no other work are to be done on the farm.
In a position paper, dated April 10, 1991, Complainants-Appellees reiterated their earlier disclosure that Respondent-Appellant Teodoro has already been driving tricycle for three (3) years and would only go to the landholding during harvest time. They again averred that Respondent-Appellant Narciso used to leave several sacks of copra in order to be sold and proceeds thereof are arrogated to himself, such acts of which want only violated the trust and confidence they reposed upon him as a tenant."
(pp. 26-27, Rollo)
The Board Adjudicator for the City of Ozamis Region X rendered a decision on July 25, 1991 on the complaint filed by petitioner's against private respondents for "ejectment due to estafa tantamounting to violation of tenancy, acts inimical to the landowners and incapacity to perform duties as tenants with prayer for preliminary injunction and restraining order", the dispositive portion of which is hereunder reproduced as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby issued ordering:
1. The tenancy relationship between the complainants and Teodoro Tagare, Sr., terminated and he should vacate, the premises of his tenanted landholding;
2. Respondent Narciso Lagare should upon receipt of this decision stopped his tuba tapping with a warning that he should inform the administratrix or her (Illegible Portion) should he desire to introduce replanting of the coconut trees or reserve nuts for seedling purposes, clean the landholding and not to make "prenda" or mortgage of his tenancy rights.
3. The complainants and respondent Narciso Lagare should observe that leasehold system pursuant to Section 12 of R.A. 657 the sharing system is considered contrary to law and public policy that leasehold relationship should be observed by the parties. The MARO for Ozamis City is directed to facilitate the execution of the leasehold contract with a fix rental agreed by the complainants and respondent Narciso Lagare.
SO ORDERED."
(p. 22, Rollo)
The above quoted decision was appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform adjudication Board, Quezon City, by appellant Teodoro Lagare, Sr., now private respondent in the instant petition while petitioner appealed the portion of said decision which was favorable to Narciso Lagare, which office rendered the decision sought to be reversed.
The petition raised the following grounds, to wit:
"I
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTS COMMITTED BY TEODORO LAGARE, SR., IN HIDING 150 PIECES OF COCONUTS CONSTITUTE DISHONESTY AND THEREFORE A GROUND FOR HIS EJECTMENT;
II
WHETHER OR NOT THIS ACT OF TEODORO LAGARE, SR., IN DRIVING TRICYCLE AT OZAMIS CITY DAILY FROM 5:00 IN THE MORNING TO 9:00 O'CLOCK IN THE EVENING CONSTITUTE WANTON FAILURE TO COMPLY HIS DUTIES AS A TENANT AND THEREFORE A GROUND FOR HIS EJECTMENT.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTS OF TAPPING SIX (6) COCONUT TREES FOR TUBA PRODUCTION COMMITTED BY NARCISO LAGARE AND SELLING COPRA FOR HIS OWN PERSONAL BENEFIT AN ACT OF DISHONESTY AND THEREFORE A GROUND FOR HIS EJECTMENT."
(p. 7, Rollo)
The issues raised by the petitioners to support their action to eject the tenants are not one of those provided under the law, Republic Act No. 3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code), specifically Sec. 8, provides that agricultural leasehold relation established under this Code shall be extinguished by:
1. Abandonment of the landholding without knowledge of the agricultural lessor;
2. Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall serve three months in advance; or
3. Absence of the persons under Sec. 9 to succeed to the lessee, in the event of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee. (Talavera vs. Laxamana, G.R. No. 77830, February 27, 1990).
And Sec. 50 of Republic Act 1199 (Agricultural Tenancy Act) enumerated the causes for the dispossession of tenant of his landholdings, to wit:
"Sec. 50. Causes for the dispossession of a tenant — Any of the following shall be a sufficient cause for the dispossession of a tenant from his holdings:
a) The bona fide intention of the landholder to cultivate the land himself personally or through the employment of a farm machinery and implements: Provided, however, that should the landholder not cultivate the land himself or should fail to employ mechanical farm implements for a period of one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the land and damages for any loss incurred by him because of said possession: Provided, further that the landholder shall at least one year but not more than two years prior to the date of his petition to dispossess the tenant under this sub-section, file notice with the court and shall inform the tenant in writing in a language or dialect known to the latter of his intention to cultivate the land himself, either personally or through the employment of mechanical implements together with a certification of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources that the land is suited for mechanization: Provided, further, that the dispossessed tenant and the members of his immediate household shall be preferred in the employment of necessary laborer's under the new set up.
b) When the tenant violates or fails to comply with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Act; Provided, however, that this subsection shall not apply when the tenant has substantially complied with the contract or with the provisions of this Act.
c) The tenant's failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the land-holder's share: Provided, however, that this shall not apply when the tenant's failure is caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure.
d) When the tenant uses the land for a purpose other than specified by agreement of the parties.
e) When a share tenant fails to follow those proven farm practices which will contribute towards the proper care of the land and increased agricultural production.
f) When the tenant through negligence permits serious injury to the land which will impair its productive capacity.
g) Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any member of his immediate family or farm household of a crime against the landholder or a member of his immediate family."
(pp. 71-72, Rollo)
Records do not show that the private respondent committed any of the acts above cited. While the private respondents were accused or committing acts inimical to petitioners, however, no evidence was presented to support the charges as correctly found out by the public respondent. Settled is the rule that he who alleges must prove the same. In this, petitioners utterly failed.
We subscribe to the conclusion of the public respondent when it said:
"It is worth stressing at the outset that the purpose of the law in limiting the grounds for a tenant's dispossession is to give him security of tenure to prevent abuse in the dismissal of tenants, and to lead into its provisions grounds for ejectment not therein specified would not only defeat the purpose of the law but violate the policy it has declared that in interpreting it, the courts on this Board "shall resolve grave doubts in favor of the tenants" (Lao Oh Kim vs. Reyes, L-11391, May 14, 1958)."
(pp. 30-31, Rollo)
The Agricultural Tenancy Act or Republic Act 1199, specifically Sec. 51 explicitly states that:
"Sec. 51. Burden of Proof . — The burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of a tenant shall rest upon the landowner.
while Republic Act No. 3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code) likewise said:
"Sec. 37. Burden of Proof . — The burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful case for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee shall rest upon the agricultural lessor.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered affirming in toto the questioned Decision, February 13, 1996.
Cost against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Cui and Valdes, JJ., concur.