SIXTH DIVISION

[CA-G.R. S.P. No. 52468.  July 26, 1999.]

HEIRS OF TEODULO TOLEDO, Represented by PARTRICK T. VILLACORTE, petitioner-plaintiff, vs. BERNABE S. TOLEDO and THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATORY BOARD HEAD OFFICE and of MALOLOS, respondents-defendants.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J p:

            This is a "Petition for Certiorari", under the Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, for the nullification of the Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB) in "Heirs of Teodulo Toledo, et al. versus Bernabe Toledo, DARAB Case No. 5333, Annex "B" of the Petition", the quashal of the "Writ of Execution" issued by the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD), dated August 27, 1998, (Annex "E" of the Petition) and of the latter's "Order", dated February 23, 1999 (Annex "H" of the Petition) denying Petitioner's "Motion to Quash Alias Writ of Execution". We opted not to issue any temporary restraining order prayed for by the Petitioners but required the Private Respondent to file his Comment on the Petition. Within the period prayed for by him, the Private Respondent did file his Comment on the Petition, with a plea for the denial and dismissal of the Petition.    DacASC

            The factual backdrop in the present recourse is as follows — the Heirs of Teodulo Toledo, the Petitioners in the present recourse, filed a complaint, through their counsel, Atty. Ronolfo S. Pasamba, against Bernabe Toledo, the Private Respondent in the present recourse, entitled and docketed "Heirs of Teodulo Toledo, et al., versus Bernabe Toledo", DARAB Case No. 910-B-95, with the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Adjudicatory Board, for "Recovery of Possession" over a portion, with an area of 1.5 hectares covering three (3) parcels of land described in Certificate of Land Transfer Nos. 383, 384 and 385, issued on October 15, 1973 with a total area of 3.7200 hectares located in Pinambaran, San Miguel, Bulacan. After due proceedings, Respondent Provincial Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz promulgated a Decision, dated February 23, 1996, in favor of the Petitioners and against the Private Respondent ordering the latter to vacate the subject landholding (Annex "A", Petition). The Private Respondent appealed the Decision to the DARAB entitled and docketed as "Heirs of Teodulo Toledo versus Bernabe Toledo", DARAB Case No. 5333.

            In the meantime, Regional Director Dominador Andres of Region III of the Department of Agrarian Reform in Malolos, Bulacan, issued an "Order", dated June 13, 1997, granting the Petition of the Petitioners in the present recourse for the issuance of an "Emancipation Patent" over a portion of the said landholding, more particularly, Lot Nos. 21 and 22, with an area of .1927 and .0841 hectare, respectively, per approved Survey Plan No. Psd No. 03-0198722, not subject of the litigation in DARAB Case No. 910-B-95. The Private Respondent appealed the Order to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board.    TaEIcS

            Shortly thereafter, the DARAB promulgated "Decision" in DARAB Case No. 5333, reversing the Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the decision of the Board a quo and ordering:

1.      The Defendant-Appellant to be maintained in peaceful possession of the subject landholding;

2.      The Plaintiffs-Appellant to surrender the two (2) hectare portion to of subject landholding the Defendant-Appellant which was taken by them in 1986 and 1987;

3.      The cancellation of the Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) issued to the late Teodulo Toledo and a new one be granted to Defendant-Appellant." (Annex "B", Petition, at page 7)

            The Petitioners, through counsel, Atty. Ronolfo Pasamba, received a copy of said "Decision", on August 6, 1997. On August 18, 1997, the Petitioners, through said counsel, filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" of the Decision with the DARAB (Annex "C", Petition). On April 1, 1998, the DARAB came out with a Resolution denying the aforesaid motion of the Petitioners (Annex "D", Petition). The Petitioners, through Atty. Ronolfo Pasamba, was served with a copy of said Resolution (at page 44, Rollo).

            Earlier, the DARAB came out with an "Order" setting aside the Order of the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform ordering the issuance of an "Emancipation Patent" in favor of the Petitioners and ordered that the said Patent be issued, instead, to the Private Respondent. On April 14, 1998, the Petitioners, through Atty. Phio Viovicente filed, with the DARAB, a "Motion for Reconsideration" of the said Order of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 5333, dated April 1, 1998 (Annex "E", Comment). The aforesaid motion has not as yet been resolved by the DARAB (Annex "C", Comment).

            On June 29, 1998, the DARAB issued an "Entry of Judgment" in DARAB Case No. 5333 (Annex "G", Comment). On the same date, the records were remanded to the PARAD for the execution of the Decision of the DARAB (Annex "H", Petition). On August 27, 1998, the PARAD issued a "Writ of Execution" (Annex "E", Petition). The Petitioners, through Atty. Ronolfo Pasamba, was served with a copy of the Writ. On September 4, 1998, the Petitioners, through Atty. Phio Viovicente, filed with the PARAD a "Motion to Quash Writ of Execution" contending that, as counsel of the Petitioners, he was not furnished with a copy of the Resolution of DARAB Case No. 5333, dated April 1, 1998, denying Petitioner's "Motion for Reconsideration" and, hence, the Decision of the DARAB, in said case, had not yet become final and executory, and, hence, the "Writ of Execution" issued by the PARAD was null and void (Annex "F", Petition).    TDcAIH

            The Private Respondent opposed Petitioners' motion alleging that Petitioners' counsel of record, Atty. Ronolfo Pasamba, had not filed any withdrawal of appearance with the DARAB and PARAD and, hence, he, alone, was entitled to a copy of the Resolution of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 5333, dated April 1, 1998 (at pages 64-69, Rollo). On December 3, 1998, the PARAD issued an Order denying Petitioners' "Motion to Quash, etc." (Annex "G", Petition). The Petitioners, through Atty. Phio Viovicente, received a copy of said Order on December 15, 1998 (at page 130, Rollo). On January 20, 1999, the Private Respondent filed, with the PARAD an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Alias Writ of Execution", serving a copy thereof on the Petitioners, through Atty. Phio Viovicente. The Petitioners did not file any "Opposition" to said motion. On February 23, 1999, the PARAD issued an Order granting the said motion, serving a copy thereof on the Petitioners, through Atty. Phio Viovicente (at page 56, Rollo).

            On April 28, 1999, the Petitioners filed with this Court their "Petition for Certiorari" under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, against the Private Respondent, the DARAB and the PARAD. On April 22, 1999, the Sheriff served with a copy of the "Alias Writ of Execution" issued by the PARAD to the caretaker of the Petitioners.

            We are tasked to resolve, in the present recourse, the following focal and decisive issues, namely: (a) whether or not the Decision of the Respondent DARAB, (Annex "B", of the Petition) is already final and executory; (b) whether or not the Petition at bench is appropriate and timely, if so; (c) whether or not the Petition was filed within sixty (60) day-period provided for in Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

            Anent the first issue, the Petitioners resolutely aver that their counsel, Atty. Phio Viovicente, was not served with a copy of the Resolution of the DARAB, dated April 1, 1998, denying their "Motion for Reconsideration" and until then, the Decision of the DARAB never became final and executory, and, hence, the Order of the PARAD denying Petitioners' "Motion to Quash Writ of Execution" was null and void. The Private Respondent, on the other hand, averred that the counsel of record of the Petitioners, in the Respondent PARAD and as the DARAB, and until now, was Atty. Ronolfo Pasamba, who had not withdrawn his appearance as counsel of the Petitioners (at page 69, Rollo) and, hence, he, alone, as counsel of the Petitioners, was entitled to a copy of the Resolution of the DARAB denying Petitioners' "Motion for Reconsideration".

            We agree with the Private Respondent. Undeniably, the complaint of the Petitioner with the PARAD was filed by them, through their counsel, Atty. Ronolfo Pasamba. He was served with a copy of the Decision of the DARAB. The counsel of the Petitioners with the DARAB was Atty. Ronolfo Pasamba. In point of fact, said counsel filed the "Motion for Reconsideration" of the Petitioners with the DARAB. Atty. Ronolfo Pasamba had not withdrawn his appearance either in the PARAD as in the DARAB, as such counsel of the Petitioners. Unless and until Atty. Ronolfo Pasamba filed a formal withdrawal of his appearance, with the consent of the Petitioners, duly approved by the DARAB and/or PARAD, he remained the counsel of record of the Petitioners in said quasi-judicial bodies:

". . . [T]he lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the court. Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his client as well as by the court to do what the interests of his client require." (Angelito Orcino versus Atty. Josue Gaspar, 279 SCRA 379, at page 387)    IEAacS

            While it may be true that Atty. Phio Viovicente had filed, with the DARAB, a "Memorandum" for the Petitioners in support or in amplification of their "Motion for Reconsideration" filed, for them, by Atty. Ronolfo Pasamba, however, the filing of said "Memorandum" even with the consent of the Petitioners, did not have the effect of a valid substitution, by Atty. Phio Viovicente, of Atty. Ronolfo Pasamba, as counsel of the Petitioners. For such substitution to be efficacious, there must be a compliance of the procedural requirements. As our Supreme Court declared:

"As regards the first issue, we hold that there was no valid substitution of counsel in accordance with the Rules. For a valid substitution of counsel the following elements must concur: (a) there must be a written request for substitution; (b) it must be filed with the written consent of the client; (c) it must be with the written consent of the attorney to be substituted; and, (d) in case the consent of the attorney to be substituted cannot be obtained, there must be at least a proof of notice that the motion for substitution was served on him in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court.

In the instant case, the process of substitution of counsel was not yet complete when Atty. Ferraren filed the first petition in view of the absence of the third and fourth elements. If at all, it became complete and effective only after Atty. Ferraren received the letter from petitioners formally terminating his service as counsel. For, it was only then could he be considered to have been notified of the substitution. In the absence of clear and convincing proof, the allegation of petitioners that there was prior verbal notice is insufficient and cannot even be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements.

Thus when Atty. Ferraren filed his petition on 17 December 1993 he continued to enjoy the presumption of authority granted to him by petitioners because as of that date he was still their counsel of record. Petitioners cannot now be allowed to disown the negligence and mistake of their counsel which resulted in the dismissal of their petition as they are bound by them no matter how prejudicial they may be to their cause.

It must be stressed that while petitioners have the right to terminate their relations with their counsel and make substitution or change at any stage of the proceedings, the exercise of such right is subject to compliance with the prescribed requirements. Otherwise, no substitution can be effective and the counsel who last appeared in the case before the substitution became effective shall still be responsible for the conduct of the conduct of the case. The rule is intended to ensure the orderly disposition of the cases. Without it there will be confusion in the service of processes, pleadings and other papers." (Dante Nacuray, et al. versus NLRC, et al., 270 SCRA 9, at pages 15-16 supra)    THEDcS

            Petitioners' claim, in their "Motion to Quash Writ of Execution", (Annex "F", of the Petition), that their counsel, Atty. Ronolfo Pasamba, had already withdrawn his appearance is a falsity, belied, in point of fact, by the "Certification" of the PARAD, anchored on the records of DARAB Case No. 5333; remanded to him, as follows:

"CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that as per records of DARAB Case No. 5333 entitled "Heirs of Teodulo Toledo represented by Patrick T. Villacorte vs. Bernabe S. Toledo", no notice of withdrawal of appearance was filed by Atty. Ronolfo Pasamba. Records further show that there was no Notice of Appearance filed by Atty. Phio L. Viovicente as counsel for the plaintiffs-appellees." (at page 69, Rollo)

            We do not agree with Petitioners' pose that only Attys. Domingo Co and Primo Lara were served with copies of the Resolution of the DARAB (Annex "C", Petition), Page 3 of the Resolution of the DARAB, dated April 1, 1998, shows that the Petitioners and their counsel, Atty. Ronolfo Pasamba, were served with copies of said Resolutions, by registered mail, while Atty. Domingo Co and Primo Lara were served by personal delivery. The Petitioners themselves, in their "Motion to Quash Writ of Execution", (Annex "F" of the Petition), admitted that Atty. Ronolfo Pasamba was served with a copy of said Resolution:

"3.01.            Unfortunately, a copy of said resolution was not furnished/sent to the undersigned, but instead to plaintiffs-appellant's (sic) former counsel (who already withdrew his appearance) and their representative in the person of Capt. Patrick Villacorte." (at page 49, Rollo, emphasis supplied)

            The Petitioners should have, within the period therefor, filed their "Petition for Review" with this Court, from the Decision of the DARAB and its Resolution denying Petitioners' "Motion for Reconsideration". The Petitioners did not. As it was, the Decision of the DARAB became final and executory, resulting in the accomplishment of the requisite "Entry of Judgment" by the DARAB.    EICSTa

            The Decision of the DARAB having become final and executory, the same can no longer be modified, much less reversed, either by the DARAB or by this Court, on appeal, conformably with the doctrine of immutability of judgments:

"We thus reiterate our settled rule that, except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which causes no prejudice to any party or where the judgment is void, after the judgment has become final and executory, the same can neither be amended nor altered even if the purpose is to correct a perceived conclusion of fact or of law. This is true regardless of whether the modification is to be made by the magistrate that rendered the judgment, or by the appellate magistrate that reviewed the same. Indeed, all litigation must come to an end however unjust the result of error may appear. Otherwise, litigation would even be more intolerable than the wrong or injustice it is designed to correct." (Aboitiz Shipping Employees Association versus Undersecretary of Labor, etc., 278 SCRA 387, at pages 391-392)

            In a patent move to resurrect their lost recourse of appeal via a "Petition for Review", the Petitioners sought redress via a "Petition for Certiorari" under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in the guise of assailing the Order of the PARAD, dated December 3, 1998, denying Petitioners' "Motion to Quash Writ of Execution", and the "Alias Writ of Execution" issued by the PARAD, on March 23, 1999, (Annex "K", Comment). But then Petitioners' recourse is patently inappropriate and worse, time-barred because: (a) Certiorari to this Court under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was not the proper remedy from the Orders of the PARAD and the "Writ of Execution" and "Alias Writ of Execution" issued by him; (b) even if it was, the Petitioners lost, by their negligence, their right of appeal and certiorari should not be used as a substitute for lost appeal (Florencio Bernardo versus Court of Appeals, et al., 275 SCRA 413); (c) the Petition, even if appropriate, was time-barred, the same having been filed only on April 28, 1999 more than sixty (60) days from receipt, by the Petitioners, on December 15, 1998, of the Order of the PARAD, dated December 3, 1998 as provided for under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; (d) in denying Petitioners' "Motion to Quash Writ of Execution" and issuing the "Writ of Execution" and "Alias Writ of Execution", the PARAD acted in accord with the Rules and regulations of the DARAB and case law.

            We need not dwell anymore on the other issues posed by the Petitioners in the light of our foregoing disquisitions.    EAcIST

            IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED due course and is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the Petitioners.

            SO ORDERED.

            Abad Santos, Jr. and Umali, JJ., concur.