NINTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. SP No. 62136. April 10, 2001.]
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. HONESTO A. VILLAMOR, As Judge presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, JOSE MARIE RUFINO, ET AL., as represented by Eugenio Mateo, Jr., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
LABITORIA, J p:
Complaint for determination of just compensation was filed by Plaintiffs Jose Marie Rufino et al. represented by Eugenio Mateo, Jr. against Ernesto Garilao in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). 1
The Plaintiffs are the absolute and registered co-owners of a parcel of agricultural land covered by TCT No. T-22934 located at Barangay San Beron, Irosin, Sorsogon, with an area of 139.3456 hectares subject for immediate acquisition by the government. Sometime in February 6, 1989 in recognition of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the government, Plaintiffs voluntarily offered to sell to the Republic of the Philippines the said land pursuant to E.O. No. 229 in the sum of one hundred twenty thousand pesos (P120,000.00) per hectare. Acting on the offer, the DAR sent Plaintiffs a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition whereby the area of 139.3456 hectares was made subject to immediate acquisition and distribution with a valuation pegged at Eight Million Seven Hundred Thirty Six Thousand Two Hundred Seventy Pesos (P8,736,270.00). Finding the valuation unrealistic and shocking the matter was then referred to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). The DARAB in its decision adopted the earlier valuation of P8,736,270.40, hence, the filing of the Complaint for determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-6438. The RTC rendered its decision on July 4, 2000 and disposed:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered to wit:
a) Fixing the Just Compensation of the entire 138.4018 hectares for acquisition covered by TCT No. T-22934 in the total amount of THIRTY SEVEN MILLION NINE HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX THOUSAND (Php37,926,000.00) Pesos, Philippine currency less the amount previously deposited in trust with the Land Bank which was already received by the plaintiffs
b) The Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ordered to pay the landowners plaintiffs the afore-cited amount less the amount previously paid to them in the manner provided by law.
c) Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED." 2
Unsatisfied with the decision, a copy of which they received on July 13, 2000, Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on July 17, 2000. 3 Plaintiffs, however, subsequently withdrew their Notice of Appeal. 4 The withdrawal was granted by the trial court in its order dated July 28, 2000. 5
Landbank received a copy of the trial court's decision on July 14, 2000. Notice of Appeal was filed by the DAR while a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Land Bank on July 19, 2000. In its Order dated August 21, 2000, the trial court held:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION by the LANDBANK is hereby DENIED for being bereft of merit.
The Notice of Appeal interposed by the Department of Agrarian Reform having been filed within the reglementary period as fixed by the rules, the same is given due course.
The Clerk of court of this branch is directed to transmit the records of this case to the Court of Appeals within the period as provided for by the rules.
SO ORDERED." 6
Landbank received a copy of the denial of its motion for reconsideration on August 25, 2000.
Thereafter, Landbank filed a Notice of Appeal on August 29, 2000 which was given due course in the trial court's order dated September 5, 2000. 7
Subsequently, on September 5, 2000, Plaintiffs again filed a Manifestation and Motion to reinstate their Notice of Appeal. 8
The motion was again given due course by the trial court in its order dated September 13, 2000. 9
On September 15, 2000, 10 Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal which was granted in the order of the trial court dated October 18, 2000. The trial court held: 11
"Upon consideration of the motion and the arguments made by both parties, the Court finds that all the requisites necessary for this Court to exercise its discretion to validly order execution pending appeal are all present.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs are given ten (10) days from receipt of this Special Order within which to post a bond in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00) Philippine Currency to answer for the actual and compensatory damages if the decision is reversed on appeal, including the litigation expenses and costs.
Let a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal issue, for service and execution by the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of this Court to enforce the judgment.
SO ORDERED." 12
Landbank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order granting execution pending appeal which the trial court denied in its Order dated November 17, 2000. 13
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari.
The issues submitted to this Court for Resolution are:
"I. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR HAD ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THE QUESTIONED ORDERS DATED OCTOBER 18, 2000 AND NOVEMBER 17, 2000 AND WRIT OF EXECUTION DATED OCTOBER 26, 2000;
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPEAL OF PETITIONER IS MERITORIOUS. 14
Petitioner Landbank argues that Plaintiffs (now Private Respondents) received the decision of the RTC on July 13, 2000 and the motion for execution pending appeal was filed only on September 14, 2000 or sixty three (63) days thereafter which is contrary to settled jurisprudence that a motion for execution pending appeal should be filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision by the movant.
Petitioner also submits that a party appealing a case such as Private respondents cannot ask for execution pending appeal pending the resolution of his own appeal.
In a Resolution dated December 14, 2000, this Court temporarily restrained the respondents for sixty (60) days from enforcing/executing the Orders dated October 18, 2000, October 26, 2000 and November 17, 2000. 15
The petition is meritorious.
Rule 41 Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended provides:
"SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof . — A party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
A party's appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with section 2 of Rule 39 and allow withdrawal of the appeal."
Rule 39 Section 2(a) of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"SEC. 2. Discretionary execution. —
(a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal. — On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing."
Under the present rule, a party's appeal by notice of appeal as in the case at bar, is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time and the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
Indeed, it is only after all the parties' respective periods to appeal have lapsed that the court loses jurisdiction over the case.
Applying Rule 41 Section 9 in relation to Rule 39 Section 2, if the motion for execution pending appeal is filed with the trial court, the same must be filed while the trial court still has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal. Hence, even if the trial court is still in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal as the case maybe, if it no longer has jurisdiction over the case because the period to appeal by all the parties have already expired, the motion for execution pending appeal is no longer allowed. Thus: 16
"The additional residual authority granted the trial court after "perfection of the appeal" to order execution pending appeal, is limited by the phrase "in accordance with Rule 39, Section 2" which provides that "the writ may issue only while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion."
This means that discretionary execution may issue in cases where appeal is taken, where the motion for execution was filed before the perfection of the appeal, which shall be upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party, and may be acted upon by the court even after the period to appeal had already expired, (Universal Far East Corp. vs. CA, 131 SCRA 642) but not when the motion is filed after the court has lost jurisdiction by the "perfection of the appeal" meaning that the period to appeal by all the parties have already expired, because the court may do so only while it has jurisdiction over the case (Sec. 2 Rule 39)."
As earlier narrated, Plaintiffs (now Private respondent) received a copy of the decision on July 13, 2000 and filed their Notice of Appeal on July 17, 2000. This was later withdrawn by Plaintiffs and withdrawal was granted on July 28, 2000. Having again changed their minds, Plaintiffs moved to reinstate their Notice of Appeal on September 5, 2000 which was allowed by the trial court on September 13, 2000.
On the other hand, Petitioner Landbank received a copy of the decision on July 14, 2000. It had fifteen days to appeal the decision. On July 19, 2000 Landbank filed a Motion for Reconsideration. This was denied on August 21, 2000 and the order was received on August 25, 2000 by Landbank. Landbank had until September 4 to file its Notice of Appeal. Considering the above and applying Rule 41 Section 9, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case by September 5, 2000 because the latter period is the period of time when the right of all the parties to appeal have already expired. In short, when plaintiffs filed their motion for execution pending appeal on September 14, 2000, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed orders of the trial court dated October 18, 2000, October 26, 2000 and November 17, 2000 are declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Bello, Jr. and Tria Tirona, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Annex "D", p. 24, Rollo.
2. pp.43-44, Rollo.
3. Annex "I", p. 49, Rollo.
4. Annex "J", p. 50, Rollo.
5. Annex "H", p. 51, Rollo.
6. pp. 46-47, Rollo.
7. Annex "H", p. 48, Rollo.
8. pp. 52-53, Rollo.
9. p. 54, Rollo.
10. Annex "A", p. 18, Order dated October 18, 2000.
11. pp. 19-20, Rollo.
12. pp. 19-20, Rollo.
13. Annex "C", pp. 22-23, Rollo.
14. p. 8, Petition.
15. p. 57, Rollo.
16. Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. III, 1997, p. 472.