FIRST DIVISION

[CA-G.R. SP No. 48761.  September 14, 1999.]

EMERSON BENDANILLO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. MRS. FELIGINA MAESTRADO, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

COSICO, J p:

            Assailed in this Petition for Review is the Decision, dated July 6, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, in Civil Case No. 98-20-258. The said decision in turn affirmed, with modification, the judgment dated March 17, 1998, of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, in Civil Case No. 571.

            The dispositive portion of the MTC's judgment reads:

"WHEREFORE, finding that the plaintiff has been in the possession of the property in question for many years and that she was deprived of such possession through intimidation, force and stealth by the defendants in July 1996, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff FELIGINA MAESTRADO and against the defendants EMERSON BENDANILLO and EDERLITO PERONG ordering the defendants to perform and pay the following:

1.      Jointly and severally pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 for damages;

2.      Jointly and severally pay plaintiff by way of reimbursement of contingent attorney's fee of P10,000.00.

3.      Immediately turn over the parcel of land or the premises thereof to the plaintiff.

SO ORDERED."

            Affirming with slight modification the said judgment, the RTC, in the assailed decision ruled:

"WHEREFORE, except for the reduction of the amount of damages to only P500.00 and the elimination of the award for attorney's fees, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."

            This case originated from a complaint for forcible entry with damages filed by herein respondent Feligina Maestrado, as plaintiff, against herein petitioners Emerson Bendanillo and Edilberto Perang, whose correct name is Edilberto Perong, as defendants, in the MTC of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur docketed as Civil Case No. 571.

            In her complaint, respondent averred, among other things, that she, together with her husband, Jose Maestrado, was in possession of a parcel of land as a tenant-lessee since 1949; that the land which is approximately 1.25 ha. was a portion of the vast Silvino Maestrado Estate and located at Culo, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur; that said land was surveyed for the purpose of granting title to tenant beneficiaries under the operation land transfer by the Department of Agrarian Reform; that the land was denominated as Lot No. 103, Psd-09-000092 and Certificate of Title No. E-12 was issued by virtue of Emancipation Patent No. 135096 under the name of her late husband; that as understood by the respondent and her husband, an allowance of 25 meters down to the river bank of Salug Diut River was excluded in the survey in accordance with riparian ownership of agricultural lands, and that what was included as covered by TCT No. E-12 was only 9,916 square meters and was planted with vegetables and other seasonable crops; that in July, 1996, petitioners by means of force, strategy and stealth entered the aforesaid adjoining strip of land and destroyed all the vegetables growing thereon; that petitioners are still in possession of the aforesaid land; that respondent filed an action with the Lupon Tagapayagpa of Culo, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur and because no amicable settlement was arrived at, a certification to file action was issued by the Lupon Secretary.

            Petitioners filed their answer when their Motion to Dismiss was denied by the MTC.

            Denying the complaint, petitioners alleged that they took possession of the lot in question as attorney-in-fact of the beneficiaries of the late Silvino Maestrado; that they did not commit forcible entry because what they occupied was Lot No. 104 and not Lot No. 103; that the adjoining land which is designated as Lot No. 104 is covered by TCT No. T-27,749 in the names of Lourdes M. La Vina and Carmen M. Velez, the daughters of Silvino Maestrado; that respondent does not have any cause of action against them and she did not comply with the mandatory provisions requiring conciliation in the barangay level; that petitioners went to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of Culo, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur to stop respondent from grabbing Lot 104 and the BARC Chairman endorsed the complaint to the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officers; and that respondent was summoned but the latter refused to appear despite due notice.

            After summary proceedings, the MTC rendered its judgment on March 17, 1998 against the petitioners ordering the latter to turn over the parcel of land to the respondent and to pay damages.

            Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners appealed to the RTC.

            On July 6, 1998, the RTC issued the assailed decision affirming, with modification, the judgment of the MTC.

            Hence, the instant petition for review alleging that the RTC erred in not dismissing the case.

            Petitioners' contention that respondent has no cause of action to institute the suit, for failure to comply with P.D. 1508 lacks factual and legal bases. In the case at bar, the Barangay certificate was issued on July 31, 1996 by the Lupon/Pangkat Secretary and attested by the Lupon/Pangkat Chairman of Barangay Culo, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur. Under the facts obtaining here, there was sufficient compliance with the legal requirement. While referral of a case to the Lupon Tagapayapa is a condition precedent for filing a complaint in court, however the conciliation process under P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement so that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant (Blardony vs. Coscolluela, Jr., 182 SCRA 825 [1990]).

            We disagree with the petitioners' contention that respondent has no cause of action to institute the forcible entry suit, she not being the real owner of the disputed property. In an action for forcible entry, the only issue involved is mere physical possession (possession de facto) and not juridical possession (possession de jure) or ownership. The judgment rendered in forcible entry is effective only with respect to possession and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land (Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 220 [1996]). Respondent in her complaint, claims prior physical possession of the contested property and questions the unlawful withholding of the said property by the petitioners. Clearly, respondent has cause of action to file a forcible entry suit against herein petitioners. It is a well-settled rule that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint (Peltan Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 82 [1997]).

            Even granting that the petitioners are of the belief that the issue involves a question of ownership, it bears stress that the complaint never touched on the issue of ownership. The complaint merely deals with the unlawful possession of the subject land by the petitioners and this falls squarely within the ambit of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court. Every lawful possessor has a right to be respected in his possession (Art. 429, Civil Code). Whether he has a title or not, he cannot be deprived of such without being given his day in court in a proper proceeding.

            Moreover, petitioners seasonably raised that jurisdiction over the instant forcible entry suit lies with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Adjudication Board. While the jurisdiction of DAR is confined to the cases which involve the determination of and adjudication of all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, etc. (Sec. 50 of RA 6657), the power to determine who has the actual, physical possession or occupation or the better right of possession over public lands remains with the courts (Solis vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 198 SCRA 267 [1991]). It has been a recognized principle of law in our jurisdiction that the courts have jurisdiction to determine who has prior possession of public land and entitled to be protected in such possession (Espejo vs. Malate, 120 SCRA 269 [1983]). The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint (Lavibo vs. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 143 [1997]), and not by the matters raised in the answer by the petitioners. A complaint for forcible entry is sufficient if it contains the allegation that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. The ultimate power to resolve conflicts of possession is recognized to be within the legal competence of the civil courts and its purpose is to extend protection to the actual possessors and occupants with a view to quell social unrest. Consequently, the lower court correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case of forcible entry.

            In forcible entry, the main issue is possession de facto, independently of any claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party may set forth in his pleadings. Anyone of them who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself. This rule holds true regardless of the character of a party's possession, provided that he has in his favor priority of time which entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right either by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria (De Luna vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 276 [1992]). Respondent's prior possession over the property, however, is not synonymous with her right of ownership over the same. As earlier stated, resolution of the issue of possession is far from the resolution of the issue of ownership. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and the actual title to an estate is not finally decided therein. Although admittedly petitioners may validly claim ownership based on the title of the plan presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable, quiet, possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of her prior possession, if she has in her favor priority in time, she has the security that entitles her to remain in the property until she is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right. In the present case, and assuming the factual milieu posited by petitioners, they should file a separate action wherein their alleged rights as owners of the land can be properly ventilated. Thus, the respondent who is in actual possession of the subject property is entitled to stay therein until she is lawfully ejected therefrom by a person having a better right irrespective of whether the possession was precarious or unrighteous.

            WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

            SO ORDERED.

            Elbinias and Vidallon-Magtolis, JJ., concur.