FOURTEENTH DIVISION

[CA-G.R. CV No. 44738.  January 8, 1999.]

SPOUSES JOSEPH AND CONCEPCION SAGUILOT, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. HEIRS OF ALBERTO BARUZO, REPRESENTED by AVELINO BARUZO, defendants appellees.

SPOUSES JOSEPH AND CONCEPCION SAGUILOT, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. JOSE C. LLAMES, Director IV, PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, defendants-appellee.

D E C I S I O N

AGCAOILI, J p:

            Before this court is an appeal from the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Kalinga-Apayao, in Civil Case Nos. 331 and 334.

            Civil Case No. 331 is a case for "quieting of title" filed by appellants, the spouses Joseph and Concepcion Saguilot, against appellees, the heirs of Alberto Baruzo, while Civil Case No. 334 is an action for "annulment with preliminary injunction and damages" filed by appellants against appellee, Director Jose Llames of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office, Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).

            The subject of the twin cases is a parcel of land, denominated as Lot No. 6006-E, PMS No. 009, containing an area of 2.9775 hectares, located at San Quintin, Rizal, Kalinga-Apayao. The property was awarded to Alberto Baruzo as a tenant-beneficiary under PD No. 27 1. Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 0168493 was issued to him.

            In 1977, Baruzo obtained a loan from the Land Bank of the Philippines using the said CLT as security. In the meantime, he agreed to allow the Saguilot spouses, appellants herein, to cultivate the land in exchange for the latter's payment of amortizations to the bank. Subsequently, Baruzo allegedly executed an affidavit of waiver voluntarily relinquishing all his rights and interest over the land to the said spouses, He died in 1987.

            Two years after Baruzo's death, a DAR investigation team recommended the cancellation of his CLT in favor of appellants on the ground that he had already waived his rights over the land in their favor and he had no heirs who could succeed him. In his order dated May 20, 1989, the Regional Director, DAR-Cordillera Administrative Region, upheld the recommendation and cancelled Baruzo's CLT. Joseph Saguilot paid the loan amortizations to the bank. In due time, an emancipation patent was issued in his name, later registered as TCT No. 761.

            The heirs of Baruzo filed a protest before the DAR, questioning the cancellation of their late father's CLT. They claimed that the Saguilot spouses inveigled their father into signing a blank piece of paper, not knowing that it contained a waiver of his rights over the property. After due investigation, the DAR team recommended the cancellation of the CLT issued to Joseph Saguilot on the ground that the same was fraudulently recorded.

            On December 17, 1992, the DAR, through Director Jose Llames, issued a resolution cancelling appellant's (Joseph Saguilot's) CLT thus:

            "WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby resolved that:

1.      The order dated May 20, 1990 declaring Joseph Saguilot as the new allocatee of lot No. 6006-E, PMS No. 009 and CLT No. 0168493 containing an area of 2.9775 hectares located at San Quintin, Rizal, Kalinga-Apayao, be revoked and held without any valid effect.

2.      That the re-allocation of the said landholding be now caused in favor of the surviving spouse and children of the deceased beneficiary Alberto Baruzo pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 27.

3.      That the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer II of Kalinga-Apayao is hereby instructed to cause the transfer of the landholding immediately tin favor of the Heirs of Alberto Baruzo." 2

            Appellants appealed the resolution to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. However, without awaiting the resolution of their appeal, appellants instituted this complaint for quieting of title against the heirs of Baruzo before the court a quo. The heirs of Baruzo filed their answer to the complaint.

            In the meantime, appellants filed with the same court a complaint against Director Jose Llames of the DAR, docketed as Civil Case No. 334, seeking the nullification of his order dated December 17, 1992.

            Director Llames filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 334, grounded on lack of cause of action for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, and for forum-shopping (another action involving the same cause was pending before the same court).

            On October 12, 1993, the court a quo issued its assailed order dismissing the complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 331 and 334 mainly in deference to the primary jurisdiction of the DAR in agrarian cases.

            Parenthetically, on March 29, 1994, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued an order dismissing appellants' appeal for lack of merit. However, appellees, the heirs of Alberto Baruzo, were ordered to reimburse the value of improvements introduced by appellants on the property.

            In this appeal, appellants impute error on the part of the court a quo under the following assignment of errors:

"ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

ERROR NO. 1

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING CIVIL CASES NOS. 331 AND 334.

ERROR NO. 2

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ASSERTING ITS JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE NO. 334 WHERE GROSS CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS WERE RAISED BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT REGARDING THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL DIRECTOR JOSE C. LLAMES DEPRIVING PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT OF THEIR RIGHT OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

ERROR NO. 3

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING CIVIL CASE NO. 331 IN THE ABSENCE OF A MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY DEPENDENT-APPELLANT (SIC) HEIRS OF ALBERTO BARUZO, AND ALSO THE FACT THAT A PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION WAS ORDERED." 3

            In this instance, appellants admit that they did not exhaust administrative remedies available to them. However, they claim that their case falls under the exception to the rule on the primacy of administrative jurisdiction since they were allegedly deprived of their property without due process of law. Appellants question the authority of the DAR regional director to cancel the award in their favor. They insist on the indefeasibility of TCT T-761 in their names. Finally, they contend that the heirs of Alberto Baruzo no longer have any legal claim with respect to the property since Alberto, the original beneficiary, had already waived his rights thereto and the government has already reallocated the property to appellants.

            The preliminary but decisive question posed by this appeal is whether or not the court a quo correctly declined to assume jurisdiction over the twin cases filed by appellants. We answer in the affirmative.

            Appellants essentially assert that it is the court a quo and not the DAR which had jurisdiction over their complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 331 and 334 because the issuance of an emancipation patent and its alleged registration as TCT No. 761 in appellants' names precluded the DAR from revoking the award in their favor. They claim that only the court may nullify their title to the property.

            It. is beyond dispute that the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine agrarian reform matters and has exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. 4 Its jurisdiction has been squarely laid down in the fairly recent case of Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals 5 to wit:

            "It must be stressed that under section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, it is the DAR which is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. Further exceptions to the DAR's exclusive original jurisdiction are provided for in sections 56 and 57 of the Act which vest in the trial courts (designated by the Supreme Court as Special Agrarian Courts) original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act."

            The issues raised herein, mainly the revocation of the award to appellants, is a matter endemic to the jurisdiction of the DAR as the government agency tasked with matters pertaining to agrarian reform. As pointed out by the court a quo, the herein controversy involves a "sequence of the implementation of the agrarian reform laws by officers of the Department of Agrarian Reform. " 6

            Accordingly, it is the DAR and not the regional trial court which has primary jurisdiction over this case. The jurisdiction of trial courts on agrarian matters has been delimited to petitions for the determination of just compensation and the prosecution of all criminal offenses arising from the law on agrarian reform. 7

            Contrary to appellants' asserevations, the issuance of an emancipation patent does not operate to exclude matters arising therefrom from the jurisdiction of the DAR. The Rules of Procedure of the DARAB in fact expressly include the issuance of emancipation patents within its jurisdiction, to wit:

            "SECTION 1.           Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction.—

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

            Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the following:

            f)       Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT), Certificate of Land Ownership (CLOA) and Emancipation Patent (EP) and the administrative correction thereof;" 8

            However, even if we assume ex gratia argumenti that it is the lower court which had jurisdiction over the complaints, appellants are estopped from interposing this as a defense. Appellants themselves recognized the jurisdiction of the DAR over the instant case when they appealed the revocation of the award to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.

            A party's active participation in the proceedings before a tribunal without jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such lack of it. Participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable and attacking it later for lack of jurisdiction if the decision is adverse, is an undesirable practice. 9 It should not be countenanced.

            Appellants, at the very least, are guilty of violating two sacrosanct principles in administrative cases — the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies and the prescription against forum-shopping.

            Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is fatal to a party's cause of action and a dismissal based on that ground is tantamount to a dismissal based on lack of cause of action. If a litigant goes to court without first pursuing his administrative remedies, his action is premature or he has no cause of action to ventilate in court. His case is not ripe for judicial determination. 10 Exhaustion of administrative remedies ensures an orderly procedure which favors a preliminary sifting process, particularly with respect to matters peculiarly within the competence of the acting agency by withholding judicial action until the administrative process had run its course, and prevention of attempts to swamp the courts by a resort to them in the first instance. 12

            Appellants are not unaware of the import of the basic principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Nonetheless, they insist that their case falls under the exceptions because they were allegedly "deprived of their property without due process."

            We are not impressed.

            It is true that the doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies finds exceptions under certain circumstances, one of them being deprivation of due process. However, the invocation of a catch-all argument, such as "lack of due process," without more, does not automatically operate to exclude the instant case from the rule. The fact that the regional director ruled on the propriety of the award to appellants, notwithstanding appellants' allegations that the claim was "without factual or legal basis", is not deprivation of due process. On the contrary, it constitutes the DAR's adjudication on the matter before it.

            The essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process. 13 The rule is that as long as the parties were given the opportunity to be heard before judgment was rendered, the demands of due process were sufficiently met. 14

            Having availed of the administrative remedy of an appeal to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, it is fairly evident that appellants had their day in court and they were not deprived of due process. 15 Their plea for exemption from the rule on exhaustion of remedies on the ground of deprivation of due process is but a lame excuse for a lost cause.

            Worse, the act of appellants in filing the instant action before the court a quo while they had a pending appeal before the Secretary of Agrarian Reform clearly constitutes forum-shopping.

            The issue posed before the lower court, that is, who had the better right over the property subject of litigation, is the same issue raised on appeal before the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. The reliefs sought in Civil Case Nos. 331 and 334, mainly, the declaration of nullity of the resolution issued by Director Llames of the DAR and the desistance from disturbing appellants in their possession of the property, are identical with, if not the necessary consequence of the nullification of the award of the lot to appellants.

            The dismissal of the complaint was a befitting consequence of its infirmities.

            WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellants.

            SO ORDERED.

            Ibay Somera and Umali, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

  1.       Entitled "Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to them to Ownership of the Land They Till and Providing for the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor".

  2.       Rollo, 41-42.

  3.       Rollo, 20-21.

  4.       R.A. 6657; Central Mindanao University v. Department of Agrarian Reform, 215 SCRA 86 (1992).

  5.       266 SCRA 404 (1997).

  6.       Rollo, 51.

  7.       Quismundo v. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 609 (1991).

  8.       Section 1, Rule II, DARAB Rules of Procedure.

  9.       Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, 279 SCRA 397 (1997).

10.       Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Mendoza, 2 SCRA 1064 (1961); Aboitiz and Co., Inc. v. Collector of Customs, 83 SCRA 265 (1978); Abe-abe v. Manta, 90 SCRA 524 (1979); Garces v. Court of Appeals, 162 504 (1988).

12.       Carale v. Abarintos, 269 SCRA 132 (1997).

13.       Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 316 (1988).

14.       Lindo v. Commission on Elections, 194 SCRA 25 (1991).

15.       Esber v. Sto. Tomas, 225 SCRA 664 [1993].