SEVENTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. SP No. 57360. November 5, 2001.]
ROMULO S. JIMENEZ, petitioners, vs. FERMIN ARANIA, HEIRS OF ARSENIO OROSCO, represented by PEDRITO OROSCO, HEIRS OF FLORENCIO BARROGA, represented by ENRIQUE BARROGA HEIRS OF FRANCISCO VILORIA, represented by EXEQUIEL VILORIA, DOMINGO MAGALANG, Represented by ALEJANDRA MAGALONG, HEIRS OF ANTONIO ANDRES, represented by PAULINO ANDRES, HEIRS OF GREGORIO GAHIS, represented by FELIX GAHIS, HEIRS OF FLORENTINO CORPUZ, represented by ERNESTO CORPUZ and GAVINO CORPUZ, and HEIRS OF SIMPLICIO GALAPON, represented by FERNANDO GALAPON, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
REGINO, J p:
Before Us is a petition for review from the Decision, dated December 21, 1998, and the Resolution, dated January 25, 2000, both issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in DARAB Case No. 6576 entitled, "Fermin Arania, the Heirs Of Arsenio Orosco, Represented By Pedrito Orosco, the Heirs Of Florencio Barroga, Represented By Enrique Barroga Heirs Of Francisco Viloria, Represented By Exequiel Viloria, Domingo Magalang, Represented By Alejandra Magalong, Heirs Of Antonio Andres, Represented By Paulino Andres, Heirs Of Gregorio Gahis, Represented By Felix Gahis, Heirs Of Florentino Corpuz, Represented By Ernesto Corpuz And Gavino Corpuz, And Heirs Of Simplicio Galapon, Represented By Fernando Galapon vs. The Heirs of Magdalena Sangalang represented by Romulo S. Jimenez," affirming, in its entirety, the Decision, dated April 1, 1997, of the Provincial Adjudicator, Laureano A. Cacho, and denying the motion for reconsideration thereof, respectively.
The antecedent facts are set forth below.
Respondents filed a petition, dated May 16, 1996, before the PARAD, as the alleged lawful tenant-tillers in the landholdings of Magdalena Sangalang Estate, located at Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, and attached affidavits, the Certification of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) and their respective Certificates of Land Transfer, as evidence in support thereof. They alleged that sometime in 1987, Magdalena Sanggalang and her cohorts, "thru coersion (sic), threats and intimidation," forced them to leave their respective landholdings against their will. When the landowner died sometime in 1993, the land became unproductive while the respondents, who were paying rentals before they were forcibly removed from the property, were left with no regular source of income. They prayed for the restoration to their possession of their respective landholdings. (Rollo, p. 38-9)
In his Answer, dated July 12, 1996, petitioner alleged that the lands being claimed by the respondents were untenanted and has been under his administration and that of his mother's, Magdalena Sangalang, during her lifetime. He disclaimed knowledge of the issuance of the certificates of land transfer and alleged that the certification issued by the BARC was a mere falsification since the said committee was only organized in September 1988 by virtue of Republic Act No. 6657.
In a Decision, dated April 1, 1997, the Provincial Adjudicator Laureano A. Cacho, decreed, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgement is hereby rendered as follows:
"1. Ordering the respondents to vacate and relinquish their possession of the landholdings in question; and
"2. Declaring the petitioners to be the lawful and legitimate farmer-beneficiaries over the landholdings in question." (Rollo, p. 65)
Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion to Quash and/or Set Aside Decision dated April 1, 1997, dated April 30, 1997, on the ground that he was deprived of his right to due process. He admitted receiving the respondents' Supplemental Position Paper, dated February 28, 1997, but claimed that since the PARAD never required the parties to submit position papers, he was deprived of the right to a hearing when the decision that was subsequently rendered actually relied on the respondents' pleadings. The motion was duly opposed by the respondents who alleged that the petitioner was given the opportunity to present evidence when the parties were given twenty-five days within which to submit their affidavits, counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence. (Minutes of Proceedings, dated July 18, 1996, Rollo, p. 79) In his Reply, dated June 30, 1997, petitioner listed the following defects in the assailed decision: first he only received respondents' supplemental position paper, hence, there exists an original position paper which was never furnished to him pursuant to the requirement of Rule 5, Section 4, paragraph (a) of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure and; second, the DARAB took cognizance of the case despite the absence of a certification that the dispute has been submitted to the BARC for mediation or conciliation and no settlement was reached. In an Order, dated August 26, 1997, the Provincial Adjudicator, denied the petitioner's motion.
Hence, the petitioner filed their notice of appeal to the DARAB, dated September 12, 1997 and in their Respondents-Appellants' Memorandum, dated October 17, 1997, raised the following issues:
"1. THAT THE HONORABLE ADJUDICATOR GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DECIDING THE CASE WITHOUT THE RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS BEING HEARD AND WERE DENIED THE PRESENTATION OF THEIR EVIDENCES;
"2. THAT THE HONORABLE ADJUDICATOR DENIED RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS;
"3. THAT THE HONORABLE BOARD FINDINGS OF FACTS WAS BASED ON DOCUMENTS WHICH WERE ACTUALLY PIECES OF PAPER SINCE THE RESPONDENT-APPELLANTS WERE NOT FURNISHED COPIES THEREOF, AND THAT THOSE EVIDENCES WERE FILED BY COUNSEL WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORITY FOR THE RREASON (SIC) THAT THOSE PAPERS WERE FILED AFTER THE DEATH OF THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE, FERMIN ARANIA, THUS, SEVERING THE COUNSEL-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP; AND
"4. THAT THE HONORABLE BOARD HAS NO JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE PRESENT PETITION." (Rollo, p. 98)
In a Decision, dated December 21, 1998, the DARAB found that there was substantial evidence supporting the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator and affirmed it in toto.
Hence, this petition based on the following ground:
"THAT THE HONORABLE BOARD GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CAPRICIOUSLY AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR WITHOUT RESOLVING THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE PETITIONER ON HIS APPEAL AND SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION." (Rollo, p. 16)
The failure of the petitioner to comply with the requisites of procedural due process has been challenged on three grounds, namely, first, the alleged absence of any hearing for the presentation of the evidence of the parties; second, the assailed decision relied on the respondents' position paper which is inadmissible since a copy thereof was never furnished to the petitioner; and, third, the respondents were allowed to submit their position paper despite the absence of any order from the PARAD.
With respect to the necessity of a hearing, it appears from the records that during the hearing conducted on July 18, 1996, the parties agreed to the following course of action as evidenced by their signatures appearing on the Minutes of Proceedings:
"25 days to file all affidavits and counter affidavit or documentary evidences
FOR RESOLUTION" (Rollo, p. 79)
Although it was only his counsel who signed for the petitioner, their relationship binds the petitioner to abide by the terms thereof. The handwritten notation clearly states that in lieu of a hearing the parties agreed to present their documentary evidence within the period prescribed, after which, the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution. This procedure is consistent with the following provisions of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure:
"Section 3. Technical Rules Not Applicable. — The Board and its Regional and Provincial Adjudicators shall not be bound by technical rules or procedure and evidence as prescribed in the Rules of Court, but shall proceed to hear and decide all agrarian cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity. . . . (Rule 1)
and
"Section 1. Nature of Proceedings. —The proceedings before the Board or its Adjudicators shall be non-litigious in nature. Subject to the essential requirements of due process, technicalities of law and procedure and the rules governing the admissibility and sufficiency of evidence obtained in the courts of law shall not apply. The Adjudicator shall employ reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the controversy including a thorough examination or reexamination of witnesses and the conduct of ocular inspection of the premises in question." (Rule VIII) [emphasis supplied]
The submission of affidavits and documentary evidence, to the Court's mind, is a reasonable means of resolving the issue raised in the original action. It has even been judicially recognized that the procedure by which issues are resolved based on position papers, affidavits and other documentary evidence is not violative of the right to due process. (Evelyn Chua-Qua vs. Jacobo C. Clave, 189 SCRA 117, 122 [1990]) Besides, the requirement of a hearing under Section 4, Rule VIII, DARAB Rules, supra, has been duly complied with when the Adjudicator conducted the hearing on July 18, 1996.
The failure of the respondents to furnish the petitioner with a copy of their position paper does not constitute denial of due process. In a number of instances, the Supreme Court has considered the omission as curable by the subsequent opportunity on the part of the aggrieved party to present his defense. Hence, in Maglutac vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 189 SCRA 767, 778 [1990], the failure of the complainant to serve a copy of his Reply-Position Paper was not deemed fatal when it was duly established that the other parties were given reasonable opportunity to present their side. The records in the case at bench indicate that petitioner was apprised of the existence of the respondents' position paper when he received the supplemental position paper on February 28, 1997. From this date until the PARAD rendered its decision on April 1, 1997, he had every opportunity to comment on the position paper or voice his protest but he chose to keep silent. It thus, clearly appears, that the required opportunity to rebut the respondents' evidence was present but not availed of through petitioner's fault.
In another case, the Supreme Court took into consideration the Labor Code provision, Section 221, mandating the use of "every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure" and ruled that the failure to furnish the petitioners therein with a copy of the supplemental position paper with annexes, has been cured when the petitioners were allocated to appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter and later to file a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC. (Vallende vs. NLRC, 245 SCRA 662, 667 [1995] citing General Milling Corporation v. Torres, 196 SCRA 215 [1991]) In the case at bench, the petitioner was not only heard on a motion to quash before the PARAD but likewise on a memorandum of appeal before the DARAB. Under these circumstances and considering that both the DARAB and the NLRC are quasi-judicial agencies that are not bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence, the following ruling of the high court is of pertinent application and is hereby adopted by the Court.
"At all events, a plea of denial of procedural due process, where the defect consists in the failure to furnish an opponent with a copy of a party's position paper, cannot be entertained when he who makes the plea is effectively given the opportunity to be heard in a Memorandum of Appeal. Even if a party has not been heard at the stage of mediation and factfinding, he still can take that opportunity to present his side when the Memorandum of Appeal is given due course, as it has so been given in this instance, by the NLRC. Thus, the fundamental rule of due process that mandated notice and an opportunity to be heard has here been amply met. (Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc. vs. NLRC, 300 SCRA 66, 70-1 [1998])
Petitioner likewise challenged the validity of the trial court's decision, insofar as it relied on the respondents' position paper, a pleading which was allegedly inadmissible since it was filed in the absence of any directive from the PARAD. Upon a close examination of the assailed Decisions of the PARAD and DARAB, respectively dated April 1, 1997 and December 21, 1998, they relied not so much on the arguments in the position paper but on the documentary evidence. Since the BARC certification and the certificates of land transfer were already attached to the petition, dated May 16, 1996, it was only the rental payment receipts (Exhibits "Q" to "Y") which were presumably attached to the respondents' position paper. Considering that the parties agreed to submit their documentary evidence (Minutes of Proceedings, dated July 18, 1996, Rollo, p. 79), without need of furnishing the other party with a copy thereof, then the documentary evidence attached to the alleged position paper constitutes admissible evidence which may be the basis of the PARAD's and subsequently, on appeal, the DARAB's decision.
Petitioner next challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the respondents in the form of certificates of land transfer, for the purpose of proving their claims. Although the certificate does not vest in the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein (Pagtalunan vs. Tamayo, 183 SCRA 252, 259 [1990]), as between the landlord and tenant, the following relationship exists:
"It must be emphasized that once a Certificate of Land Transfer has been issued to a tenant covering the property under the supervision of and in compliance with the implementing rules and regulations of the Department of Agrarian Reform, he is thereby deemed to be the owner of the agricultural land in question. There is no more landlord and tenant relationship and all that remains is for the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the valuation of the land in accordance with existing rules and regulations for purposes of compensation to the landowner." (Quiban vs. Butalid, 189 SCRA 107, 112 [1990])
The aforecited certificates, combined with the certification of the BARC, which enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties (Rule 131, Section 3, subparagraph m, Rules of Court) and the unrebutted affidavits attached to the petition filed before the PARAD, collectively constitute substantial evidence supporting the decision.
Finally, petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB to hear the case since the subject matter thereof is allegedly the recovery of possession of real property under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court, depending on the value of the subject property (Section 19, paragraph 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by Republic Act No. 7691). We do not agree. In determining the jurisdiction of the subject matter of the case, the allegations in the complaint, or in this case, the petition, shall be controlling. (Morta, Sr. vs. Occidental, 308 SCRA 167, 172 [1999]) Respondents based their cause of action on the alleged tenancy arrangement between them and the petitioner's predecessors-in-interest as well as the Certificates of Land Transfer issued in their names. Hence, the existence of the tenancy relationship (Chico vs. Occidental, 308 SCRA 167, 172 [1999]) and the fact that the respondents were seeking to enforce their respective Certificates of Land Transfer, which, in turn, derives validity from Presidential Decree No. 27, the implementation of which is within the jurisdiction of the DARAB (Quiban vs. Butalid, supra and Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB New Rules, supra.), squarely places the case at bench within the jurisdiction of the DARAB and the PARAD.
Wherefore, premises considered, the petition for review is DISMISSED and the assailed Decision, dated December 21, 1998, issued by the DARAB, is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Labitoria and De Guia-Salvador, JJ., concur.