ELEVENTH DIVISION

[CA-G.R. SP No. 57331.  November 29, 2001.]

WELLER JOPSON, petitioner, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, THE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, FABIAN O. MENDEZ, JR. and LEONARDO TOMINIO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

VASQUEZ, JR., J p:

At bar is a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision (Annex "A", p. 16, Rollo) dated January 25, 2000 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in DARAB Case No. 4980.

The facts that matter are as follows:

Spouses Jose H. Mendoza and Laura S. Pascual were former owners of a parcel of agricultural land with an aggregate area of Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Forty-Six (8,946) square meters, more or less, in Concepcion, Pequena, Naga City. Melchor Jopson, and his son, petitioner Weller Jopson, were the tenants of the said parcel.

On January 4, 1962, while petitioner and his father were still cultivating the land, spouses Mendoza and Pascual conveyed the subject parcel by way of "dacion en pago" in favor of respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). On August 19, 1962, DBP was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1149 (Annex "7", p. 182, Rollo). Despite the conveyance, petitioner and his father continued to cultivate the land and shared their harvest with DBP. And when Melchor died on July 15, 1981, petitioner and his immediate household assumed the task of tilling the land and sharing the harvest with DBP.

On September 18, 1990, DBP sold the said parcel through public auction. Respondent Fabian Mendez, was the highest bidder. On December 28, 1990, DBP executed a Deed of Absolute Sale (p. 192, Rollo) in favor of Mendez. And on February 28, 1991, the Registry of Deeds of Naga City issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21190 (Annex "10"; p. 196, Rollo) in the name of respondent Mendez. In the meantime, on December 20, 1990, respondent Leonardo Tominio, acting upon the instructions of Mendez, forcibly evicted petitioner from the subject land.

Petitioner sought the help of the City Agrarian Reform Office. On May 30, 1991, the Legal Division, CARPO, Camarines Sur, to resolve the parties' conflicting claims, recommended the filing of a proper action before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD).

On June 27, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint (Annex "B", p. 29, Rollo) before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, PARAD Office, Camarines Sur, against respondents for Annulment of Sale, Pre-Emption/Redemption, Reinstatement, with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order with Damages.

In the complaint, petitioner alleged that the sale between respondents was invalid inasmuch as Mendez was not qualified to acquire the subject property under the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657. Moreover, the transaction violates Executive Order No. 360, Series of 1989 in relation to Section 1 of Executive Order No. 407, which provides that:

"All government instrumentalities including but not limited to — government owned and controlled corporations or financial institutions such as the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES —, shall immediately execute Deeds of Transfer in favor of the Republic of the Philippines as represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform and surrender to the latter department all landholdings suitable for agriculture including all pertinent ownership documents in their custody, such as the owner's duplicate copy of the certificates of title, tax declarations and other documents necessary to effect the transfer of ownership."(p. 5, Complaint; p. 33, Rollo)

In addition, petitioner claims that he was deprived of his preferential right to buy the tenanted land or redeem the same as provided under Section 11 of Republic Act 3844, as amended. In the prayer, he asks that he be reinstated as the tenant-farmer of the subject land and that his preferential right to buy or redeem the property be recognized, plus payment of damages.

On August 25, 1995, the PARAD rendered a decision (Annex "BB"), the dispositive portion provides:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1.      Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) in favor of co-respondent Fabian Mendez contrary to law and therefore a nullity;

2.      Ordering DBP to execute the necessary Deed of Transfer in favor of the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform and surrender to the latter possession of the subject landholding for coverage under E.O. No. 407;

3.      Ordering DBP to return the purchase price of P1,200,000.00 to co-respondent Fabian Mendez;

4.      Denying the claim for redemption and reinstatement by petitioner;

5.      Ordering the Clerk of the Board, DARAB, Naga City to return to Fabian Mendez the cash bond of P10,000.00;

6.      Dismissing all other claims for lack of merit;

7.      Ordering the Register of Deeds, Naga City to cancel TCT No. 21190.

SO ORDERED." (pp. 88-89, Rollo)

Respondents DBP and Mendez moved for reconsideration alleging that the PARAD erred in finding that the subject land is an agricultural land, which falls under the ambit of Executive Order No. 407. On February 26, 1996, the PARAD issued an order, granting respondents' motions for reconsideration, set aside its previous decision and entered a new one, to wit:

"1)       Denying the petition for redemption and reinstatement;

2)         Declaring the Lot at issue duly classified and zonified as non-agricultural land in accordance with pertinent laws and guidelines;

3)         Declaring the regularity of the sale between herein respondents DBP and Fabian Mendez Jr., and

4)         Ordering the return to said Fabian Mendez, Jr., the cash bond of P10,000.00.

SO ORDERED." (p. 109, Rollo)

Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed the PARAD order before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Diliman, Quezon City.

On January 25, 2000, DARAB, finding that the subject lot is an agricultural land, rendered the assailed decision, to wit:

"WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the assailed Order is hereby REVERSED, and a new one entered:

1.      Declaring petitioner-appellant entitled to reinstatement to the subject landholding; and

2.      Directing Fabian Mendez and all other persons acting in his behalf or under his authority to maintain petitioner-appellant in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject landholding as agricultural lessee thereof.

SO ORDERED." (Annex "1", p. 157, Rollo)

However, notwithstanding petitioner's right to redeem the subject realty was recognized, DARAB held that he had already lost said right for his failure to consign with the Adjudicator an amount to cover the reasonable price of the land or at least present a certification from the Land Bank that it shall pay pursuant to Section 80 of the Code.

Hence, this petition.

According to petitioner:

"ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS, THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD AND THE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDIACATOR (sic) ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S RIGHT OF REDEMPTION." (Petition, p. 8; Rollo, p. 8)

Accordingly, the sole issue then is whether or not respondent DARAB committed reversible error in denying petitioner's right of redemption upon his failure to consign with the Adjudicator an amount to cover the reasonable price of the land or at least present a Certification from the Land Bank that it shall make payment pursuant to Section 80 of the Code.

The petition must fail.

The same issue had been raised and categorically passed upon by the Supreme Court in Belisario vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (165 SCRA 101 [1988]) where it held:

"The general rule in redemption is that in making a repurchase, it is not sufficient that a person offering to redeem makes manifestation of his desire to repurchase; this statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment, which constitutes the legal use or exercise of the right to repurchase (Angao vs. Clavano, 17 Phil. 152). Likewise, in several cases decided by this Court (Fructo vs. Fuentes, 15 Phil. 362; Retes vs. Suelto, 20 Phil. 394; Rosales vs. Reyes, et al., 25 Phil. 495, Canuto vs. Mariano, 37 Phil. 840; Dela Cruz, et al. vs. Resurreccion, et al., 98 Phil. 975) where the right to repurchase was held to have been properly exercised, there was a definite finding of tender of payment having been made by the vendor. The tender of payment must be for the full amount of the repurchase price, otherwise the offer to redeem will be held ineffectual. (Rumbaoa vs. Arzaga, 84 Phil. 812) Bona fide redemption necessarily imports a reasonable and valid tender of the entire repurchase price. There is no cogent reason for requiring the vendee to accept payment by installments from the redemptioner, as it would ultimately result in an indefinite extension of the redemption period (Conejero, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-21812, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 775, 780)"

Moreover, petitioner's contention that he should not be faulted for his failure to consign an amount to cover the reasonable price of the land inasmuch as it was the adjudicator's duty to determine the reasonable amount is equally devoid of merit. The later case of Quiño vs. Court of Appeals (291 SCRA 249 [1998]) which supplied the rationale for the earlier cited doctrine, instructs us:

"It is not difficult to discern why the full amount of the redemption price should be consigned in court. Only by such means can the buyer become certain that the offer to redeem is one made seriously and in good faith. A buyer cannot be expected to entertain an offer of redemption without the attendant evidence that the redemptioner can, and is willing to accomplish the repurchase immediately. A different rule would leave the buyer open to harassment by speculators or crackpots, as well as to unnecessary prolongation of the redemption period, contrary to the policy of law in fixing a definite term to avoid prolonged and anti-economic uncertainty as to the ownership of the thing sold. Consignation of the entire price would remove all controversies as to the redemptioner's ability to pay at the proper time."

Applying the foregoing doctrines in the case at bar, We hold that public respondent DARAB did not commit reversible error in denying petitioner's right to redeem the subject property.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Reyes, Jr. and Tolentino, JJ., concur.