SIXTH DIVISION
[CA-G.R. CV No. 52892. January 5, 2001.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Rep. by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MONATAO KALAW, MANIRAM BALAS, ASGAR SANGCOPAN, OMERA SANGCOPAN, BASHER SANGCOPAN, TARHATA SANGCOPAN, PACAMBONG SANGCOPAN and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARAWI CITY, defendants-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
MABUTAS, JR., J p:
Before Us on appeal is the decision (dated September 12, 1995) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 8) in Marawi City in Civil Case No. 100-86 (cancellation of patents and titles).
The dispositive portion of the assailed decision, reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands and against defendants Monatao Kalaw, Maniram Balas, Asgar Sangcopan, Omera Sangcopan, Baser Sangcopan, Tarhata Sangcopan, Pacaambong Sangcopan and the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, as follows:
1. Declaring Free Patents Nos. (XII-6) 004938, (XII-6) 004939, (XII-6) 004937, (XII-6) 004936, (XII-6) 004935, (XII-6) 004934, and (XII-6) 004933 and their corresponding Original Certificates of Titles Nos. P-402, P400, P-403, P-401, P-404, P-398 and P-399 issued to defendants Monatao Kalaw, Maniram Balas, Asgar Sangcopan, Omera Sangcopan, Basher Sangcopan, respectively, as well as derivative titles emanating therefrom if any, as null and void ab initio;
2. Said private defendants are ordered to surrender their respective titles to defendant Register of Deeds of Marawi City, and
3. Defendant Register of Deeds of Marawi City is directed to cancel said free patents and titles of private defendants.
"With costs against the defendants." (pages 334-335 of the Record).
The antecedent facts of this case, as borne by the record, follow:
On November 5, 1986, the plaintiff (appellee herein) through the Office of the Solicitor General filed a complaint against the defendants (appellants herein), wherein it was alleged, among other things, that:
— The private defendants have been issued free patents on March 20, 1979 by the district Land Officer of Marawi City based on the applications filed by the former;
— These free patents have been registered and "pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Act, defendant Register of Deeds of Marawi City issued in the name of said defendants, the corresponding Original Certificates of Title over their respective lots;"
— Subsequently Batara Naga and 10 others filed a protest claiming "that the lots covered by the patents comprise their Lot 289, Q-124 of the Dansalan Cadastre." Thus, "a formal investigation and ocular inspection of the premises were conducted by a representative of the Bureau of Lands wherein it was ascertained that:
"a) The lots covered by the Free Patent issued to the defendants are parts of Lot 289, Q-124 of the Dansalan Cadastre;
"b) Lot No. 289, Q-124 was surveyed and allocated in favor of Casim Kakai Inay Kambing, predecessor-in-interest of the protestants;
"c) That the said parcel of land was adjudicated by the Cadastral Court in favor of Batara Naga et al. in a decision rendered by the Court on October 7, 1939 and as a consequence the corresponding certificate of title was issued on March 27, 1941 and said title was later on reconstituted as Original Certificate of Title No. RO-342 on August 17, 1958 pursuant to Republic Act No. 26;
"d) Protestants have been in lawful possession of the land in question since time immemorial and they have been paying the realty taxes thereon." caAICE
— Clearly, "at the time of the issuance of the foregoing patents, the Bureau of Lands, thru the District Land Officer in Marawi City, had no jurisdiction over the lots in question, the same being private property of Batara Naga, et. al." Ergo, said patents "having been issued without legal basis . . . are null and void ab initio." (pages 1-4 of the Record)
On November 27, 1986, the defendants-appellees filed their answer with affirmative defenses wherein they denied the material allegations made by the plaintiff-appellant. According to them, they are the "true, lawful and exclusive owners and possessors of the land in question;" that, "Lot 289, Q-124 of the Dansalan Cadastre was surveyed in the name of and exclusively allocated to the late Kakasi Ynay Kambing on December 1, 1914, who is the grandmother of the defendants as children of Paca-ambung Sangcopan alias Kambing Sangcopan, who is the son of Kakasi Ynay Kambing and who altogether have been in the actual, public, open, uninterrupted and exclusive ownership and possession of the same land since time immemorial to the exclusion of the protestants;" that "their titles to the same land were issued to them in accordance with pertinent laws, rules, and regulations and such titles have become indefeasible;" and, that "the complaint states no cause of action." (pages 8-9 of the Record).
The issue in this case, according to the trial court, "boils down on (sic) whether or not attendant frauds and irregularities were committed in the issuance of free patents to the defendants by the District Land Officer of Marawi City on March 20, 1979 and the corresponding original certificate of titles over the disputed property." (page 331, id.)
After evaluating the evidence before it, the trial court rendered its decision, thusly:
". . . it was established that Maniram Balas, title holder of OCT No. 400 is the wife of the then Bureau of Lands Region XII Director Alimbusar Limbona. As aptly contended, she had never been in possession of the parcel covered in her title, neither was she among the heirs of the registered owners thereof and that her name was used purposely to insure the procurement of the questioned titles, considering her influence in the Lands District Office in Marawi City being a wife of a Regional Director.
"It was also established that defendant Monatao Kalaw, title holder of OCT No. 402 was then an employee of the Bureau of Lands District Office of Marawi City with the position of Land Inspector and was the one who conducted the inspection of the questioned titles. His reports appears to be highly questionable if not fabricated and baseless to insure the issuance of titles to his co-defendants and to himself. City Prosecutor Elias Yusoph, in his momorandum (sic) dated June 22, 1987 (p. 31 of records) even hinted that it is timely to prosecute Manatao Kalaw and his co-conspirators in the illegal procurement of subject titles.
"Apart from the foregoing observations and findings, this Court cannot just ignore the recommendation of the then Director of Lands (Exh. S) as mentioned and quoted earlier when he recommended that steps be taken in Court for the filing of an action to cancell (sic) the subject certificates of Titles of defendants.
"No less than the Supreme Court has adopted a long-standing policy to respect the conclusion of quasi-judicial agencies, which because of the nature of its functions and its frequent exercise thereof, has develop[ed] expertise in the resolution of pending incidents before it.
"In the instant case, great weight and credence should be accorded to the findings and recommendations of the Director of Land in recommending for the cancellation of subject titles of defendants. He is in a best position to ascertain whether fraud attended the issuance of patents to defendants. He concluded that there was such fraud. There is no showing that the Director of Land committed grave abuse of discretion in his findings and recommendantions (sic) and should therefore be accorded great weight and ought not to be disturbed." (pages 333-334, id.)
Not satisfied with the trial court's decision, the defendants filed a notice of appeal on October 2, 1995 (page 336 of the Record) — and the case found its way to this Court.
In their brief, the defendants-appellants assailed the decision rendered by the trial court allegedly because it failed to consider:
"I. THE VALIDITY OF THE TITLE ISSUED TO THE APPELLANT DESPITE BEING ISSUED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS WHO UNDER THE LAW ARE PRESUMED TO BE REGULARLY PERFORMING THEIR DUTIES IN ISSUING THE TITLE;
"II. THE INDEFEASIBILITY OF THE TITLE ISSUED TO THE APPELLANT AND THUS BINDING AGAINST THE APPELLE[E]/CLAIMANTS." (pages 1-2 of the Appellants' Brief).
In arguing for their first assigned error, the appellants averred that the following documents —
"1. Free Patent survey of Kakasi Inay Kambing over lot 289, Free Patent No. 10259 (Exh. 5);
"2. Tax Declaration No. 627 in the name of Kakasi Inay Kambing over lot 289 dated June 4, 1953 (Exh. 7);
"3. Tax Declaration over the same lot in the name of Kakasi Inay Kambing dated March 29, 1978 (Exh. 8); and
"4. Real Property Tax Receipt No. 4739561 dated March 31, 1978 in the name of Kakasi Inay Kambing (Exh. 9)"
presented by them before the lower court, when taken together "will support the fact that the appellants are the rightful owners of the disputed property." (page 6 of the Appellants' Brief).
Invoking Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the appellant asserted that since "(t)he officers of the land District Office in Marawi City fall within the category of public officers . . . their act in issuing the above documents is deemed regularly performed and therefore the resultant effect has the semblance of validity in fact and in law." (id.)
Anent their second assigned error, appellants had this to say:
". . .. a title was issued to the appel[l]ants which the appellee in the instant case sought to be cancelled. These titles are indefeasible legal confirmation of the conferment of the right over the property in dispute and thus must be respected by anyone." (page 6, id.)
After a careful consideration of the arguments presented by the opposing parties, We find the first and second assigned errors untenable.
As posited by the appellee, the defendants-appellants "cannot capitalize on the argument that they were issued by public officers who are presumed to have regularly performed their duties under the law."
Although under the present rules on evidence, there is a presumption that official duty has been regularly performed (Section 3, Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court), this presumption, it must be stressed, is disputable. In short, it is "satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be overcome by other evidence." (id.) IDSaTE
Verily —
"In the absence of evidence to the contrary, there is a very strong presumption embodied in the maxim, 'omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta' (all things are presumed to have been done regularly), that public officers have properly discharged the duties of their office, and performed faithfully those matters with which they are charged. Stated in another way, the courts will presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that public officers have not culpably neglected or violated their official duties. (I Jones Sec. 139)
"Presumption of this nature is indulged by the law for the following fundamental reasons: first, innocence and not wrongdoing, is to be presumed; second, an official oath will not be violated; and third, a republican form of government cannot survive long unless a limit is placed upon controversies and certain trust and confidence reposed in each governmental department or agent by every other such department or agent at least to the extent of such presumption. (I Jones on Evidence, Sec. 139). Thus, this presumption evidences a rule of convenient public policy universally applied and without which great distress would spring in the affairs of men. (Grass vs. Evans, 244 No. 329, 149 S.W. 828; People vs. de Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, Feb. 9, 1994)
"b. It is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary not only that such public officers perform the duties of their office, but that acts within the sphere of their official duty, and purporting to be exercised in an official capacity and by public authority, were performed regularly and legally in compliance with controlling statutory provisions, and in good faith, and in the exercise of sound judgment. In other words, the law presumes that acts of a public official within the sphere of his official duties are within the scope of his authority and in compliance with controlling statutory provisions. The presumption of regularity and legality of official acts is applicable in criminal as well as civil cases.
"c. The presumption, although one of law, and not of fact, that public officers, in the discharge of their duties, have observed all proper formalities, is rebuttable and that public officers have done their duty is not a substitute for proof of an independent and material fact. . . ." (pages 75-76, Remedial Law Vol. VI, Herrera, '99 ed.)
In fact, in Chan vs. Court of Appeals (298 SCRA 713), it was ruled that "the acts of a government official are presumed to be regular and in the absence of enough evidence to the contrary, the said legal presumption stands. (Tatad v. Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 436, Rule 131, Sec. 3(m). Revised Rules of Evidence)."
The foregoing notwithstanding, We are compelled to agree with the disposition made by the trial court of this case because "(w)hile ordinarily, irregularity will not be presumed, an adverse presumption may arise where the official act in question appears to be irregular on its face. The presumption has no application, . . . where an officer acts under a naked statutory power, with a view of divesting the title of a citizen to property in certain contingencies. . . .." (page 82, id.)
In the case at bench, since the formal investigation and ocular inspection conducted by the representative of the Bureau of Lands revealed: that the disputed lots are actually parts of Lot 289, Q-124 of the Dansalan Cadastre which had been surveyed and allocated in favor of Casim Kakai Inay Kambing (predecessor-in-interest of the protestants) and subsequently adjudicated by the Cadastral Court in favor of Batara Naga et al. in a decision rendered by the Court on October 7, 1939; and that, consequently, the corresponding certificate of title was issued on March 27, 1941 and said title was later on reconstituted as Original Certificate of Title No. RO-342 on August 17, 1958 pursuant to Republic Act No. 26, it follows that at the time the free patents were issued in favor of the defendants-appellants by the District Land Officer in Marawi City, the disputed property was no longer subject to alienation by the government. In fine, at the time the disputed property was awarded (by way of homestead patent) in favor of the appellants by the Director of Lands, the latter no longer had the authority to dispose of the same, since the said property was already owned by the protestants (Batara Naga et al.). Besides, the fact that the protestants have been in lawful possession of the land in question since time immemorial and have been paying the realty taxes thereon, belies the appellants' contention.
The appellants ought to be minded that "(t)he Government is never estopped from questioning the acts of its officials, more so if they are erroneous, let alone irregular. (Republic v. Aquino, 120 SCRA 186; Republic v. Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., 32 SCRA 211; Luciano v. Estrella, 34 SCRA 269)." (Sharp International Marketing vs. Court of Appeals [14th Division], [201 SCRA 299])
Verily, ". . . there is the long familiar rule that 'erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block, subsequent correct application of the statute and that the government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agent' (E. Rodriguez, Inc. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 28 SCRA 1119 [1969]; Tan Guan v. Court of Tax Appeals, 19 SCRA 903 [1967]; Visayan Cebu Terminal Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13 SCRA 357 [1965]; Floro v. Philippine National Bank, 5 SCRA 906 [1962]; The Collector of Internal Revenue v. Ellen Wood McGrath, et al., 111 Phil. 222 [1961]; Gutierrez, et al. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 101 Phil. 713 [1957]; and Atlas Consolidated Mining and Dev. Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 102 SCRA 246 [1981]) which finds application in the case at bar . . .." (People vs. Castañeda, Jr., [165 SCRA 327], Cruz, Jr., vs. Court of Appeals [194 SCRA 145])
Moreover, We find the following ruling in Heirs of Agustin Fiesta and Simeon Juan vs. Court of Appeals (136 SCRA 421), apropos:
"The sole issue presented for determination is whether or not the Director of Lands could validly grant homestead patents in petitioners' favor during the pendency of Cadastral proceedings for lands the nature and character of which had not yet been determined.
"The issue raised has already been resolved in the following related cases: De la Cruz, et al vs. Reaño, et al., G.R. No. L-29792; Francisco Juan, et al vs. Reaño, et al., G.R. No. L-29866 (34 SCRA 585 [1970]); and more recently in De la Cruz, et al. vs. Hon. Pobre Yñigo, et al., G.R. No. L-39899 (126 SCRA 413 [1983]). As a matter of fact, those cases and the present one involve the same cadastral proceeding (Cad. Case No. 67, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 1656 of the Nueva Ecija CFI), and differ only as to claimants and lots involved.
"In G.R. No. L-29792 and G.R. No. L-29866, this Court held:
'The issue arising from the above facts may be briefly stated as follows: HEcIDa
'May a parcel of land already titled for more than ten years in the name of a party by virtue of a Homestead Patent issued by the Government in the ordinary course of administrative proceedings, be registered again in the name of another party as a result of subsequent cadastral proceedings?
'The answer, We believe, must be in the negative.
'In Manalo v. Lukban, et al., Vol. 48, Phil. P. 973, We held that land granted by the Government to a private individual who applied for it as a homestead is considered no longer registerable within the meaning of the Land Registration Act after the issuance of the homestead patent and the original certificate of title issued in accordance therewith.
'In Pamintuan v. San Agustin, et al., 43 Phil. 558, as well as in El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil. p. 17, We likewise held that in a cadastral proceeding the Court has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed and registered in an earlier registration case, and that the second decree entered for the same land is null and void.
'Moreover, considering that the petitioners in both cases before Us and their predecessors had been in possession of the land, first as homesteaders and later as absolute owners, for more than ten years before respondent Reaño filed his application for registration; that, as a result of the proceedings had in connection with their Homestead application, the homestead patents and original certificates of title mentioned heretofore were issued in their name, no further argument is needed to show that said petitioners and their predecessors had acquired title to the land by prescription.'
"In the present case, petitioner JUAN obtained OCT No. P-241 covering Lots Nos. 1877 and 1888 in 1948, or eighteen years before respondent REAÑO filed his Answer in the cadastral case. Similarly, FIESTA obtained OCT No. P-695 for Lots Nos. 1858 and 1890 pursuant to a Homestead Patent granted on April 7, 1951, or fifteen (15) years before REAÑO's Answer had been presented to the Cadastral Court. Significantly, too, before petitioners became registered owners, they were already homesteaders in possession of their respective lots.
"Since the lots in question had been already titled in the names of FIESTA and JUAN for more than ten years before REAÑO intervened in the cadastral case, the Cadastral Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the lands again in favor of another party (Manalo vs. Lukban, 48 Phil. 973; Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, et al., 43 Phil. 558)."
We hasten to add that as early as in the case of Natividad vs. Nadal (2 SCRA 195), the Supreme Court had already made the pronouncement that the homestead patent granted to a person by the government covering a parcel of land already owned by another is null and void.
All told, We cannot help but agree with the appellee's posture that the defendants-appellants —
". . . cannot ignore the fact that the parcels of land which they applied for free patents were already titled in the name of another person long before they filed their applications. Admittedly, the parcels of land covered by the free patents were parts of Lot 289, Q-124 of Dansalan Cadastre which were already adjudicated by the Cadastral Court in favor of Batara Naga, et al. in a decision rendered on October 7, 1939 and, as a consequence thereof, the corresponding certificate of title was issued to the claimants on March 27, 1941. The aforesaid certificate of title was subsequently reconstituted as OCT No. RO-342 on August 17, 1958 pursuant to the provisions of RA No. 26.
"In the light of these undisputed facts concerning the subject properties, it is crystal clear that the lands in question are no longer public lands but private lands at the time of the filing of the applications for free patents so much so that the Director of Lands had no more power and jurisdiction to dispose them in favor of defendants-appellants.
"On the other hand, defendants-appellants cannot invoke the doctrine of indefeasibility of their titles considering that, as discussed above, their respective titles are null and void for want of power and authority of the Director of Lands to award the properties in their favor because they had long ceased to be public lands." (pages 6-7 of the Appellee's Brief)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision (dated September 12, 1995) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 8) in Marawi City in Civil Case No. 100-86 is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Barrios and Cruz, JJ ., concur.