SECOND DIVISION
[CA-G.R. SP No. 50584. February 23, 2001.]
GREGORIO A. SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF ESTEBAN FELICITAS, REPRESENTED BY MARCELINO B. FELICITAS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AGCAOILI, J p:
This is a petition for review to set aside the decision of the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) dated May 13, 1998 and its order dated August 10, 1995, denying reconsideration. The DARAB decision set aside the decision of Provincial Adjudicator Jose V. Reyes dated August 10, 1995 and reinstated the latter's earlier decision dated June 16, 1995 which recognized Elena Felicitas as the farmer-beneficiary of the agricultural land known as Lot 259, Pcs-03001071 (OLT), located in San Miguel, Tarlac, with an area of 2.0197 hectares. For easy reference, the dispositive portion of the adjudicator's decision dated June 16, 1995 reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, decision is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Directing the reinstatement of the herein plaintiffs over the land in question thus, the respondent and all other persons acting in his behalf, is/are directed to vacate the premises in question;
2. Allowing respondent Gregory Sarmiento, Jr. to withdraw the Amount of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINETY ONE AND 08/100 (P35,991.08) he paid with the Land Bank of the Philippines, Paniqui Branch, Paniqui, Tarlac in the name of Elena Felicitas thus, the LBP-Paniqui Branch is hereby ordered and directed to release the said amount to Gregory Sarmiento, Jr., and
3. Dismissing all claims and counterclaims for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED." (Rollo, 44)
The facts are:
On May 5, 1994, Elena Felicitas filed a complaint against Gregorio Sarmiento, petitioner herein, with the Provincial Adjudication Board (PARAD), Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Tarlac, Tarlac. She alleged that she is the widow of the late Esteban Felicitas, a farmer-beneficiary of subject land pursuant to RA No. 3844, as amended; that upon the death of Esteban in 1974, Elena took over the cultivation of the land, assuming the role of father and mother of the family; that because of extreme necessity, she was forced to mortgage a portion of the land to Gregorio with the agreement that the said portion will be returned to her after payment of the loan; that sometime in 1994, she went to see Gregorio to redeem the property but was dumbfounded when she learned that Gregorio was now claiming to be the owner of the entire property by virtue of the alleged waiver and renunciation of rights which she supposedly executed in his favor; that assuming that there was such a waiver, the same is null and void as being contrary to public policy; that she is not only the recognized farmer-beneficiary but is deemed owner of the land pursuant to law; and that as a matter of fact, she had been issued a certificate of land transfer (CLT) over the land which has the same efficacy and value as any title issued under the Torrens system. Elena prayed that Gregorio be directed to vacate the premises and to turn over the peaceful possession and cultivation thereof to her.
In his answer, Gregorio alleged that he became the owner of the land because the same was sold, not merely mortgaged, by Elena to him; that, consequently, Elena has no cause of action against him; and that assuming that Elena has a cause of action, the same has prescribed pursuant to section 38 of RA No. 3844, as amended. Gregorio prayed that the complaint be dismissed and that actual and moral damages be awarded to him.
On June 16, 1995, Provincial Adjudicator Jose V. Reyes rendered a decision in favor of Elena Felicitas, the dispositive portion of which is quoted above. The adjudicator held that Elena had not transferred her rights to the landholding to Gregorio; however, if there was such a transfer, the same is null and void as PD No. 27 allows the transfer of land covered by the law only to the government or by hereditary succession. Contrary to the claim of Gregorio, the surviving spouse, Elena, never abandoned the property — she was only forced to mortgage the same because of poverty and in order to meet her obligations to the family.
Gregorio filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground of "newly discovered evidence" consisting of the supposed Waiver and Renunciation of Rights and Voluntary Surrender (Renunciation) of Rights (Annexes "1" and "2," Motion). On August 10, 1995, the provincial adjudicator issued an order reversing his decision. He ruled that by virtue of the waiver and surrender of rights, Elena has effectively abandoned the landholding in favor of Gregorio who thereby became the legitimate beneficiary thereof. The dispositive portion of the order reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of this forum dated June 16, 1995 is hereby reconsidered and set aside and a new decision is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Dismissing the instant complaint for lack of merit.
2. Declaring respondent Gregory Sarmiento, Jr. as the substitute allocatee over the entire questioned Lot No. 259 under Pcs-03-001071 (OLT) in an area of 2.9641 hectares, more or less, thus, the Department of Agrarian Reform of Tarlac is hereby directed to generate an Emancipation Patent in favor of Gregory Sarmiento, Jr.; and
3. Directing the Register of Deeds of Tarlac to register the Emancipation Patent generated in favor of Gregory Sarmiento, Jr.
SO ORDERED." (Rollo, 56)
Elena thus appealed to the DARAB. On May 13, 1998, the DARAB rendered a decision setting aside the order of the provincial adjudicator dated August 10, 1995 and reinstating his decision dated June 16, 1995 which upheld the right of Elena as farmer-beneficiary over the landholding in question. The DARAB held in effect that the waiver and surrender of rights supposedly executed by Elena in favor of Gregorio is not in the nature of a newly discovered evidence since these documents "conveniently became available" only after the rendition of the decision of June 16, 1995 in favor of Elena.
Gregorio filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the DARAB in its resolution dated January 11, 1999. Hence, the instant petition for review which presents the following issues:
"I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS COULD VALIDLY ACQUIRE THE LAND SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS CASE CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT THEY HAD SOLD AND ABANDONED THE SAME CULPABLY IN GROSS VIOLATION OF THE CARP LAW OR REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657;
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROSCRIPTION ON TRANSFER OF TITLES ON LANDS ACQUIRED UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27 WAS APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE;
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE LAND SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS CASE COULD BE VALIDLY TRANSFERRED IN THE POSSESSION OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT A TORRENS TITLE WAS ALREADY ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE PETITIONER WHICH IS INDEFEASIBLE AND IS STILL SUBSISTING;
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS COULD VALIDLY TAKE POSSESSION OR REACQUIRE THE LAND IN DISPUTE WITHOUT FIRST ATTACKING AND CANCELLING THE TORRENS TITLE OF THE PETITIONER IN A DIRECT JUDICIAL ACTION;
V. WHETHER OR NOT THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE AND THAT PETITIONER SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN THE PEACEFUL CULTIVATION OF THE SUBJECT FARMHOLDING FOR THE SAKE OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY." (Rollo, 6)
Gregorio, as petitioner, argues that for "having culpably sold, disposed of, or abandoned their land," Elena is disqualified as a beneficiary pursuant to section 22, par. 3, of RA No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998, to wit:
"SEC. 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. — The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the following order of priority:
xxx xxx xxx
Beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 who have culpably sold, disposed of, or abandoned their land are disqualified to become beneficiaries under this Program." (Emphasis given)
Consequently, Gregorio concludes, the DARAB's decision reinstating Elena and her co-heirs to the possession and cultivation of the land is patently contrary to law.
The argument does not bear analysis.
In the first place, there is no direct evidence that Elena had "culpably" sold or disposed of the land to Gregorio. What is admitted is that Elena, on account of extreme poverty and urgency, was forced to ask Gregorio for a loan, with a portion of the land given to him as security. It was their understanding that as soon as Elena can redeem the property, possession thereof will be immediately restored to her. It is to be recalled that with the death of her husband, Elena had to play the unusual role of a father and mother to the children and had to find ways and means to support them, even to the painful extent of mortgaging the land in suit. But she never intended to give up the land; after all, her husband, being a legitimate tenant, was already a qualified beneficiary under the law, and she simply succeeded him by operation of law. It is bad enough that as soon as Elena was ready to pay, Gregorio, in evident bad faith and to the consternation of Elena, was now proclaiming himself as the absolute owner of the property. Elena had no alternative but to sue Gregorio before the DAR to recover the land which she believed was truly hers to keep, to cultivate and to build a home for herself and children under our agrarian laws.
But Gregorio persisted in his claim of ownership. With an aura of confidence, he charged Elena with having "abandoned" the landholding by her act of "waiving" and "voluntary surrendering" her rights thereon. Was there abandonment? We do not think there was. The word "abandon," in its ordinary sense, means to forsake entirely; to forsake or renounce utterly. It means giving up absolutely, with intent never again to resume or claim one's rights or interests. In other words, the act of abandonment constitutes actual, absolute and irrevocable desertion of one's right or property. (Teodoro v. Macaraeg, 27 SCRA 7 [1969])
Thus, abandonment may be said to result where there is concurrence of two (2) elements: the first being the intent to abandon a right or claim, and the second being the external act by which that intention is expressed and carried into effect. There must, moreover, be an actual, as distinguished from a merely projected, relinquishment of a claim or right; otherwise, the right or claim is not vacated or waived so as to be susceptible of being appropriated by the next owner. (Medrana v. Office of the President, 188 SCRA 818 [1990])
In this case, Elena cannot be said to have abandoned her right or claim to the property by the simple act of mortgaging it to Gregorio. According to her, it was agreed upon that as soon as she could redeem the property from Gregorio, the same shall be restored to her immediately. Elena indeed wanted to pay her indebtedness only to be bluntly told by Gregorio that the entire property now belonged to him. Elena was clearly a victim of double-dealing. But that did not stop her from pursuing her strong determination to reclaim the land. This is clearly manifested by her filing of a complaint against Gregorio with the DAR for the purpose of recovering the land and eventual issuance to her of the corresponding emancipation patent as farmer-beneficiary. After all her rights as such was already recognized by the government by the issuance to her of the corresponding certificate of land transfer (CLT). Elena's dogged persistence thru overt acts unmistakably negate the idea of abandonment. As observed by the provincial adjudicator in his decision dated June 16, 1995:
". . .. When the surviving spouse (Elena vda. de Felicitas) mortgaged the land in suit to the herein respondent, she had done so because of poverty and the necessity for her to survive and her siblings, and has no intention to abandon the subject landholding as revealed by the intention of the plaintiffs to recover the land from the respondent." (Rollo, 45; emphasis given)
The finding that Elena (and her heirs) did not abandon the land is a question of fact. In agrarian cases, all that is required is mere "substantial evidence." (Bagsican v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226 [1986]; Gagola v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 18 SCRA 992 [1966]) Accordingly, if the findings of fact of the agrarian court or agency are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive and binding on the appellate court. (Malate v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 572 [1993]; Heirs of E.B. Roxas, Inc. v. Tolentino, 167 SCRA 334 [1988]; Manila Mandarin Employees Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, 154 SCRA 368 [1987]) Administrative agencies are in a better position to pass judgment over matters falling under their jurisdiction and their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality. (Garments and Textile Export Board v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 258 [1987])
In any event, we share the view of the DARAB in its decision dated May 13, 1988 that the Waiver and Renunciation of Rights dated June 8, 1982 and Deed of Voluntary Surrender (Renunciation) of Rights dated October 10, 1982 (Rollo, 49-50) may not fall under the category of "newly discovered evidence." To recall, Elena filed her initiatory complaint with the PARAD on May 5, 1993, docketed as DARAB Case No. 584-T'94. (Rollo, 17-23) Significantly, in his answer with counterclaim dated May 20, 1994, never did Gregorio allege or give the slightest intimation that there was such a waiver or voluntary surrender of rights. The main core of his defense then was that there was a sale — not a mortgage, or waiver, or surrender of rights — of the subject landholding to him by Elena, with the reservation that the proper "documents (will) be presented during the hearing of the case." (Rollo, 24) Nothing was even mentioned of any emancipation patent or certificate of title issued to him. It was only after the decision of June 16, 1995, which was favorable to Elena, did Gregorio come up with his benighted theory of sale. Thus, in his motion for reconsideration dated July 12, 1995, he alleged for the first time the existence of the waiver and voluntary surrender of rights (Annexes "1" and "2," Motion) which, he claimed, were "newly discovered evidence."
It is difficult to understand why these documents metamorphosed only in 1995 when these were supposed to have been executed way back in 1982, or some thirteen (13) years before. This should explain the poignant observation of the DARAB in its decision of May 13, 1998 that the documents "conveniently became available" only after the decision (which was adverse to Gregorio) was handed down on June 16, 1995. If the supposed waiver and surrender of rights were already in existence at the time the initiatory complaint was filed in 1994, it taxes credulity why they were not even mentioned in Gregorio's answer to buttress his defense that Elena had no cause of action against him. Significantly, it has not been explained what efforts or degree of diligence Gregorio exercised in looking for and producing these documents which, if he were to be believed, had long been in existence.
To qualify as newly discovered evidence for purposes of a motion for reconsideration or new trial, the offeror must show that the evidence was discovered after trial; that it could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; it must be material and not merely collateral, cumulative or corroborative; and if presented, it would probably alter the result. (Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol II, 1994, ed., 127-128, citing cases) Our review of the record does not indicate the efforts or degree of diligence exercised by Gregorio in locating and thereafter producing the documents referred to before the provincial adjudicator. The importance of the documents to Gregorio's defense cannot be overemphasized. While serious questions as to their legal and binding effect would most likely have been raised (as in fact it has), considering the policy of the law against the transfer of land reform rights, still the supposed waiver or surrender of rights could probably have helped in explaining Gregorio's theory of abandonment or loss of interest on the part of Elena. For their non-production when most required, the so-called newly discovered evidence is nothing but forgotten evidence.
However, assuming that the waiver and surrender of rights adverted to have been regularly executed (Elena insists that what was agreed upon was a mere mortgage), the same are null and void for being clearly violative of PD No. 27 which pertinently provides:
"Title to land acquired pursuant to this Decree or the Land Reform Program of the Government shall not be transferable except by hereditary succession or to the Government in accordance with the provisions of this Decree, the Code of Agrarian Reform and other existing laws and regulations." (Emphasis type given)
Thus, beyond a cloud of doubt, the supposed waiver of rights, or sale for that matter, is null and void. The evident underlying justification of the law is to prevent a circumvention of agrarian reform laws.
PD No. 27 was signed into law in view of the fact that the old concept of land ownership by a few has spawned valid and legitimate grievances that gave rise to violent conflict and social tension. The law mandates that reformation must start with the emancipation of the tiller from the bondage of the soil.
RA No. 3834 (Agrarian Reform Code), RA No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) and PD No. 27 are social legislations to institute land reform in the country, more specifically, to establish owner-cultivatorship with the family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture; to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious industrial restraints and practices; and to make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens. These laws were enacted to uplift their economic status by providing them a modest standard of living sufficient to meet the needs of the farmer's family for food, clothing, shelter, education and other basic necessities. These laws further protect them by conferring upon them security of tenure over the landholdings they are working on.
The fundamental policy of the law is brilliantly etched in the title of PD No. 27 — DECREEING THE EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL, TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND THEY TILL AND PROVIDING THE INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISM THEREFOR. To articulate and strengthen the objective of the law to protect the rights of farmer-beneficiaries to the land they till, PD No. 27 saw the need of prohibiting the transfer of their rights except only by hereditary succession or to the government.
Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
"Art. 6. Rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law."
In People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991), the Supreme Court explained the concept of "waiver" as follows:
"Waiver is defined as 'a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it."
Considering the strict policy of the law against the transfer of rights acquired under our land reform laws, Gregorio cannot use the alleged waiver and surrender of rights to deflect the impact of Elena's recovery action. Being contrary to law and public policy, the alleged waiver or surrender of rights are, and should be, considered null and void and without effect. (Gongon v. Court of Appeals, 32 SCRA 412 [1970])
Grasping at the proverbial last straw, Gregorio would deny the application of the prohibition because, according to him, the law speaks of "title to land" acquired pursuant to agrarian or land reform laws. And since Elena has no title to the land as yet, except only her CLT, then the waiver/surrender of rights in his favor must be given effect. This is a myopic view of the prohibition.
The law is clear and leaves no room for doubt. Upon the promulgation of PD No. 27 on October 21, 1972, the tenant-farmer was already DEEMED OWNER of the land cultivated by him. As explained in Torres v. Ventura, 198 SCRA 96 (1990):
". . .. As of that date, he was declared emancipated from the bondage of the soil, as such, he gave the rights to possess, cultivate, and enjoy the landholding for himself. Those rights over that particular property were granted by the government to him and to no other. To ensure his continued possession and enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, make any valid form of transfer except to the government or by hereditary succession, to his successors." (Emphasis given)
It is unfortunate, however, that despite the express prohibition, many farmer-beneficiaries, like Elena Felicitas, were tempted, or even compelled, to offer their lands as collateral due to extreme necessity. Aware of this predicament visited upon them, the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued Memorandum Circular No. 7, series of 1979, declaring such transactions null and void, thus:
"Despite the above prohibition, however, there are reports that many farmer-beneficiaries of PD 27 have transferred the ownership, rights, and/or possession of their farms/homelots to other persons or have surrendered the same to their former land owners. All these transactions/surrenders are violative of PD 27 and therefore, null and void." (Emphasis given)
Obviously, Gregorio's interpretation of the phrase "title to land" as used in PD No. 27 is that there must be some kind of paper or document like a certificate of title issued under the Torrens system of registration to make the proscription operative. This strained interpretation is unacceptable.
First, PD No. 27 is clear that upon its issuance on October 21, 1972, the tenant-farmer is already deemed owner of the agricultural land cultivated by him. DAR Circular No. 8 dated April 1, 1975, which may be considered a contemporaneous administrative construction of PD No. 27, further provides as follows:
"3. Tenant-farmers are deemed owners of the land they till as of October 31, 1972 subject to the rules and regulations to be hereafter promulgated. . . ." (Emphasis given)
Moreover, EO No. 228 dated July 7, 1987 reiterates in section 1 thereof that "(a)ll qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquire by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27."
". . .. (T)he contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose duty is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisdiction that no authorities need be cited to support it." (Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 504 [1991])
It thus clearly appears that OWNERSHIP of lands under the coverage of operation land transfer (OLT) was automatically transferred to farmer-beneficiaries as of October 21, 1972. One can be the owner of land without having the paper title thereto — that title, referred to as certificate of title, is only evidence of such ownership.
Second, Elena Felicitas is already the holder of a CLT over the land in question — CLT No. 0020397 — and this fact is admitted by Gregorio himself in his petition, although he claims that the same is "not considered a title yet." (Rollo, 3)
In Quiban v. Butalid, 189 SCRA 107 (1990), it was emphasized that once a certificate of land transfer has been issued to a tenant, "he is thereby deemed to be the owner of the agricultural land in question." It results that there is no more landlord and tenant relationship and all that remains is for the DAR to determine the valuation of the land in accordance with existing rules and regulations for purposes of compensation to the landowner.
Third, in Torres v. Ventura, supra, it was held that the rights and interests covered by a certificate of land transfer are beyond the commerce of men. They are not negotiable except when it is used by the beneficiary as a collateral for a loan with the rural bank for agricultural production. This strengthens the conclusion that the possessor of a CLT has solid rights as owner which are protected by the law in that these rights can never be the subject of waiver, sale, conveyance or any other disposition without impinging the policy of the law.
Even more compelling is the following disquisition of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case:
"We do not agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that petitioner's land is not included in the legal prohibition since petitioner has not yet acquired absolute title to the land having failed to comply with all the conditions set forth by the law. With regard to the legal prohibition, We hold that title refers not only to that issued upon compliance by the tenant-farmer of the said conditions but also includes those rights and interests that the tenant-farmer immediately acquired upon the promulgation of the law." (Emphasis given)
In the more recent case of Corpuz v. Gorospe, G.R. No. 135297, June 8, 2000, the Supreme Court reiterated that except by hereditary succession or to the government, the sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights are void, the purpose being to prevent a circumvention of the laws governing land reform.
Fourth, a CLT, as held in Miranda v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 302 (1986), may only be cancelled or nullified "in a case directly attacking its validity but never collaterally." Again, this ruling impresses a CLT with the character of a certificate of title issued under our land registration laws which can only be cancelled through a direct, and not collateral, proceeding.
We note from the petition the allegation of Gregorio that he has already been issued TCT No. 34828 for the land in question pursuant to Emancipation Patent No. 619446. It would appear to us that this certificate of title was not yet in existence at the time the case was filed with the PARAD in 1994, otherwise this fact should have been mentioned in Gregorio's answer to the complaint. The inevitable inference is that the emancipation patent and title could have been issued only during the pendency of this case, clearly under dubious circumstances. The element of bad faith cannot be dissociated from the issuance thereof since, by simple observance of prudence and, it may be added, deference to the outcome of the pending proceedings, the DAR officials concerned should have refrained from acting on the application of Gregorio for the benefits of land reform until the case shall have been decided with finality.
Consistent with our opinion that no land reform rights could have been validly conveyed to Gregorio, the conclusion that the issuance of the aforesaid emancipation patent and title is tainted is simply irresistible. However, the cancellation thereof could not be decreed in this instance since an action to nullify a certificate of title can only be done in a direct, not collateral proceeding, before the proper court. (Sec. 48, PD No. 1529; Trinidad v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 204 SCRA 524 [1991])
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate direct action before the proper court for the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to petitioner Gregorio Sarmiento for the land subject of this case. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Garcia and Asuncion, JJ., concur.